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This thesis concerns the legal regulation of economic affairs,
paying particular regard to the example of anti-trust legislation
as it developed from the last decade of the 19th century into the
first half of the 20th century. As such it involves the examination
of the concept of legal regulation and the associated idea of the
interrelation of 'legal' and 'economic' domains.
It is argued that the issue of monopoly, and the problem of the
'trusts', concerns the growth of the corporate form of ownership.
Accordingly, the way in which law perceives the corporate form of
ownership is a vital constituent of any sort of viable regulation.
Since the perception of the corporate form of ownership is irretrievably
bound up with the concept of private property, and since this concept
is an inadequate expression of corporate relations of ownership, this
fact alone places certain limits upon the reliability of law as a
form of regulation. Finally, the thesis sets out the particular
way in which anti-trust legislation portrays the corporation in terms
of a series of basically human attributes and why this produces
problems for regulation. The thesis is concluded by an examination
of the real political basis of the anti-trust movement.
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People of the same trade seldom
meet together, even for merriment and
diversion, but the conversation ends
in a conspiracy against the public, or
in some contrivance to raise prices.
It is impossible, indeed, to prevent
such meetings, by any law which either
could be executed, or would be consistent
with liberty and justice. But though
the law cannot hinder people of the same
trade from sometimes assembling together,
it ought to do nothing to facilitate
such assemblies, much less to render them
necessary.
Adam Smith, 'The Wealth of Nations'
(1884) London: T. Nelson & Sons, Booklxp
(vi)
INTRODUCTION
There are too many texts on anti-trust legislation. Ever
since Senator Sherman first articulated proposals for controlling
the trusts the topic has attracted a seemingly endless amount of
attention. So why add yet another to the near infinite catalogue
of texts which ostensibly look at anti-trust legislation? The answer
is that this thesis does not add to the cumulative assessment of anti¬
trust legislation. Its objective is quite different. In one sense
it is not even about anti-trust legislation. Rather the purpose in
mind is to unveil the principle of legal regulation together with
the mechanisms which are conventionally used toward that end. Anti¬
trust legislation facilitates this process by providing what is
perhaps a unique display of a specific legislative attempt to control
monopoly. Therefore, anti-trust legislation is of interest only
insofar as it examples the more general issue of the feasibility of
'legal' regulation. But how does this differ from other accounts
of anti-trust legislation?
Anti-trust legislation is normally regarded from two, essentially
conflicting, standpoints. First of all, it is examined as a purely
technical response to the problem of monopoly. Thus, anti-trust
legislation is subjected to a rigorous process of legal scholarship
whereby the origins of certain regulatory concepts are traced to
(1)Common Law antecedents. Also, the precise germination of special
interpretations is located within judicial rulings sanctioned by
historically determinate supreme court ratifications. This exercise,
whilst valid, is basically a technical exercise internal to 'law'.
(1) For an excellent example of this sort of interpretation
see Thorelli, H. (195*0 'The Federal Anti-trust Policy'
London: George, Allan & Unwin.
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To be sure, a number of studies widen their scope to include an
analysis of corporate structure or economic performance but the
(1a)
level of analysis remains purely technical. For example, there is
a current pre-occupation with the so called 'economic' impact of
price regulation on performance, output and so on. But the basic
issue of whether or not law in general, and the specific articles
of anti-trust legislation in particular, can regulate 'monopoly'
is seldom countenanced. Even where the issue is addressed it is
from a perspective which seems to argue for greater legal control
or enforcement in apparent disregard of what will be argued is the
quite limited potential of law in this respect.
On the other hand anti-trust legislation is often regarded in
terms of its fundamental irrelevance to the basic issues of industrial
concentration and corporate ownership. For example, Pearce, Kolko,
Weinstein etc. each advance substantially similar explanations of
(2)anti-trust legislation and its fundamental irrelevance. They
are joined in this by a number of pessimists of a 'liberal' or
'conservative' persuasion who believe that the means for effective
control of monopoly are, necessarily, incompatible with the freedom
they associate with private enterprise. Accordingly, anti-trust
legislation is inherently and necessarily inadequate. For whatever
reason, then, anti-trust legislation is irrelevant to the problem
of monopoly, or worse still, actually enables the process of
concentration (Arnold) or else constitutes an ideological screen or
an imaginary social order (Pearce) behind which concentration
(1a) Although see below p. 201 e_t sea for a discussion of the so
called 'Economic' limits to regulation.
(2) See Pearce, F. (1976) 'Crimes of the Powerful', London:
Pluto Press. Kolko, G. (1967) 'The Triumph of Conservatism',
Chicago Quadrangle, and Weinstein, J. (1968) The Corporate
Ideal in the Liberal State, Boston: Beacon Press. See also
Kolko, G. (1963) 'Railroads & Regulation' (1877 - 1916)
Princeton: Princeton U.P.
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and. centralisation goes on apace.
What these, admittedly diverse, proponents of anti-trust
legislations' weakness fail to consider is the reason for such
evident failure or, where reasons are adduced, they concern the
co-optation of the regulatory machinery by the very monopolies which
are supposedly regulated. In other variations the role of co-opter
is undertaken by the ruling class allies or representatives of big
business. Irrespective of which agency predominates it will be
argued here that such explanations are necessarily inadequate as
forms of social explanation and that they lack the specificity
required for an accurate account of the actual failure of anti-trust
legislation. Anti-trust legislation is unable to affect the process
of monopolisation even in a fantasy of regulatory potency. That is
to say, even if anti-trust legislation is administered impartially
and with critical vigour. It is this factor which requires proper
explanation.
The object of the thesis, then, is the examination of the
possibility of the legal regulation of monopoly in general paying
particular attention to the example of anti-trust legislation in the
United States. Quite clearly, this does not constitute an exercise
in legal and historical scholarship and seekers of such tracts should
look elsewhere. They should find little difficulty in locating the
(/f)
appropriate volumes since there is a super abundance of such texts.
(3) See Arnold, T. (1962) 'The Folklore of Capitalism' New Haven:
Yale U.P. and Pearce, F. (1976) ojd cit.
(^f) For example, see Thorelli, H. (195*0 op cit, also Neale (1966)
'The Anti-trust laws of the U.S.A' Cambridge: U.P.; Miller, J.
(1962) 'Competition, Cartels & Their Regulation' (ed). Amsterdam
and Kronstein, Miller & Schwartz (1958) 'Modern American Anti¬
trust Law', New York: Oceana, etc. See also Bibliography.
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Likewise, the thesis is not intended as a general survey of all
the ways and all the geographical contexts in which law is involved
in economic affairs. It attempts, instead, to address the way in
which the issues of concentration, centralisation and monopoly
signalled a major transformation in the form of ownership, the
ramifications of which were riven deep in American culture. It
thus seeks to deal with the involvement of 'law' in the process of
organisational change or adjustment by locating both the general and
the specific reasons for the impotence of law in this respect.
Compared with the more conventional accounts or dismissals of
anti-trust legislation this thesis starts off from a rather different
perspective. After examining some of the ways in which corporate
behaviour is 'criminalised' the argument commences upon what is,
after all, the essential element of anti-trust legislation namely,
(5)
the very issue of the legal regulation of economic affairs.
The mere existence of anti-trust legislation implies that 'law' and
'economy' are interrelated in a manner which enables the relationship
of 'regulation' to be valid. By way of an analysis of some of the
major proponents of the law/economy relationship it is argued that
the regulatory relation invariably rests upon a definite conception
of the 'legal' and the 'economic' as separate instances of sociality.
Not only is this portrait of social relations basically inadequate
but, more especially, it will be argued that this inadequacy contains
within it the very seeds of the failure of anti-trust legislation.
(5) The concept of 'criminalisation' is relevant because the
Sherman Act is a criminal statute with criminal sanctions
over and above the realm of civil remedy normally associated
with 'regulation'. Chapter One attempts to assess the
various ways in which Criminology has handled 'corporate'
crime etc.
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Accordingly, the principle of legal regulation is criticised on
the basis of its prior assumption of a particular division of social
relations into legal and economic realms and the consequences that
this division heralds for the prospect of a truly viable form of
regulation.
If the idea of a relationship between law and economy is an
inappropriate way in which to view the question of legal and economic
relations then it becomes apparent that an alternative means of
regarding the issue is required. This alternative is formulated on
the basis of a sociological typology of ownership. For this sort
of perspective there is no reason why the 'law' of property must be
viewed as something which 'engages' or is engaged in a separate form
of social action. On the contrary, a general typology of ownership
formulated within the auspices of sociological theory should be
capable of addressing so called 'legal' and 'economic' relations
from a standpoint which does not split sociality into legal and
economic instances or orders.
This may be all well and good as a statement concerning the
proper conduct of sociological enquiry but what has it to do with
Anti-trust legislation? The answer depends upon the realisation
that anti-trust legislation was concerned, at least in its initial
stages, with the development of a type of 'corporate' ownership
which was anathema to the pioneers of American Industry, Agriculture
and Labour. Therefore, monopoly is really all about foreclosing
alternative forms of 'independent' ownership whether explicitly,
as in monopolisation of trade, or covertly, through conspiracy in
restraint of trade. Either way anti-trust legislation appears to be
an attempt to get to grips with a particular type of 'corporate'
ownership insofar as it precludes a substantial measure of other
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forms of ownership. Accordingly, the typology in mind is necessary
for the proper demonstration of the pertinent differences between
'laisser-faire' ownership and 'corporate' ownership. These parameters
are quite basic to any discussion of anti-trust legislation for they
are, in effect, the central contenders.
Of course, monopoly and the corporate form of ownership are far
from being identical. But there is very persuasive evidence that
it was the way in which ownership was transformed from a 'bourgeois'
to a 'corporate' type which was at the back of the issue of
monopolisation and the 'trusts'. It was this aspect which elicited
the wrath of the various real politico-social groupings which
constituted the backbone of the anti-trust movement. In a word
it was the manner in which ownership was held in the form of the
'trust' which enabled the growth of monopoly. Whilst it is quite
conceivable that a system of laisser-faire capitalism could comprise
a number of corporations, (indeed the concept of the 'corporation'
is used as an American synonym for the 'company') the very nature of
corporate relations of ownership is such that they generate
monopolistic forms and practices by precluding large areas of
endeavour from alternative forms of ownership. Thus the very
essence of the trust question, and monopoly in general, is inevitably
bound up with a discussion of the corporate form of ownership.
Moreover, it is perhaps no accident that the form of legislation
is styled as 'anti-trust' legislation for this suggests the very
real measure of opposition which characterised the issue in its
formative stages.
It has been suggested already that the existence of anti-trust
legislation relies upon a particular conception of how law and economy
must interrelate in order for legal regulation to be viable and that
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this conception generates a vital weakness in any such regulatory
device. Taken together with the way in which 'law' conceives of
the corporate form of ownership then this reduces still further the
possibility of effective regulation. For example, it is argued
that within the legal system in question anti-trust legislation
depends upon an implicit conception of ownership which references
the central notion of private property. The fact that the concept
of private property is riven through with an implicit philosophical
Anthropology which ultimately relies upon individual or collective
sub.jects as owners means that the concept of the corporate form of
ownership is inadequately drawn. But this is not to say that the
category of the subject is basic to all law merely that it occupies
a central place in the 'legal' analysis of corporate forms of
ownership. Accordingly, there is no reason why the subject must
be the atom of juridic theory (as in Pashu k anis) since we are
concerned only with the conception of ownership and private property
unfolded within a particular sort of legal system.It will be
argued that the corporate form of ownership depends upon the radical
denial of any form of essential subject, collective subjects or even
aggregates of human attributes. Thus for law to address the
corporation as i_f it can be comprehended via a theory of (human)
subjectivity is to constrict the potential of the regulatory
relationship in a way which renders anti-trust legislation impotent.
The particular centrality of the subject and private property
to the legal system in question is far from a general form which
pervades all law irrespective of the content of any given act. On
the contrary, it is the basic structure and content of anti-trust
(6) Pashu fcanis, E. (1978) 'Law and Marxism', London: Ink Links.
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legislation per se which is responsible for the characterisation
of the corporation in terms of subjective attributes. For example,
the concepts of conspiracy in restraint of trade, monopolisation
and, intent, are quite basic to anti-trust legislation and they each
imply certain attributes of (human) subjectivity. Therefore, the
manner in which anti-trust legislation addresses the corporation, as
well as the fact that regulation is seen as an essentially legal
process, place certain constraints on the viability of anti-trust
legislation. Of course this does not mean that law has no effect
whatsoever or that a system of law which is capable of regulating
'economic' affairs cannot be constructed. Still less does it assume
that law has a necessary, unalterable and inadequate structure. All
that is argued is that this particular system of law, and especially
anti-trust legislation and the law of property, is constrained in a
way which prevents it from re-structuring the relations of 'corporate'
ownership.
The argument ranged against the legal regulation of monopoly is
twofold. In the first place it is argued that the conceptual
structure of law in general, and the articles of anti-trust legislation
in particular, is such that severe constraints are placed upon the
entirely laudable objective of controlling monopoly. Law is ill-
equipped to tackle the complexity of corporate interrelationships.
Secondly, it is suggested that the use of law, irrespective of the
concepts available to it, places further restrictions upon the
possibility of controlling monopoly. In a word, even if_ law were
supplied with concepts which respected the complexity of corporate
interrelationships then the very fact that 'law' is seen as a separate
agency of review would limit the potentiality of legal regulation.
Whereas the former is argued in the strong sense of the word the
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latter is more agnostic concerning the possibility of effective
regulation.
Finally, it will be argued that the 'failure' of anti-trust
legislation, since it is due to quite specific constraints, does not
reduce to the existence of a conspiracy between big business and
government. On the contrary, the anti-monopoly movement was an
authentic political movement subject to definite organisational
contingencies which do not collapse into the overall movement of
history or the class struggle. Accordingly, the anti-monopoly
movement will be analysed according to its radical independence which,
at least for a time, challenged the very basis of the corporate form
of ownership.
At this point it is perhaps as well to issue a number of
disclaimers. First of all, it should be re-iterated that anyone who
expects to find here a detailed examination of anti-trust legislation
in action should look elsewhere. This is relatively easy since there
are any number of texts which attempt exactly that. The intention
behind this thesis is to concentrate more on the way in which the
concepts and the various controversies of anti-trust legislation
depend upon a distinct vision of what the corporation is like. This
vision reproduces the corporation in a fashion which is wholly
inadequate to the further regulation of corporate conduct. And this
goes a long way toward accounting for the relative failure of anti¬
trust legislation irrespective of how and whether such legislation
is enforced or interpreted. Secondly, there will be further
disappointment if the thesis is viewed as an historical study of the
Granger, Populist or Progressive movements. The purpose of the
final chapter is to demonstrate that the anti-monopoly movement cannot
be written off as an irrelevant adjunct to a real conspiracy between
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big business and the state and that the movement had an authentic
organisational structure of its own. In this sense the argument is
no more than a suggestion that there are alternative ways of looking
at the issue. In short the chapter is not concerned to describe
the 'emergence' of anti-trust legislation in any great detail nor
should the thesis be viewed as an historical account of Agrarian
society or the roots of American Individualism. (jEhere are volumes
which claim this as an objective but this is not one of them.
Finally, the demonstration of a typology of ownership is intended
merely to facilitate the description of, and the contrast between,
two definite types of ownership. It is not intended as a general
survey of several modes of production or types of society.
Accordingly, feudal and soviet relations of ownership are included




ORGANISATIONAL CRIME AND CRIMINOLOGY
1
In an attempt to widen the focus of criminology and to render
its concepts more inclusive attention has increasingly centred on
white collar crime, organised crime, crimes of the powerful and,
more recently, criminal organisations, institutions and fractions
of 'Capital'. Whatever the particular focus this tendency would
seem to evince a dominant motif, namely, the assumption that crime
is committed as a direct reflex of corporate forms of organisation,
hierarchically ordered professional structures or, more simply, in
the pursuit of an occupational role. The presence of this generally
reflexive context apparently justifies the classification of crime
as white collar crime, corporate crime, occupational crime or
organised crime rather than as crime per se. In other words, the
thematic unity of the area is secured by the application of a common
epithet, accordingly, the concept of crime is qualified in roughly
the same manner throughout. A very important consequence follows on
from this, that is, the form of organisation is crucial to the
definition and explanation of the existence of this specific type of
criminality which, for the sake of argument, can be termed'organisational
crime'. Thus, in order to define 'organisational crime' it is
necessary to reference some form of organised structure and in order
to explain 'organisational crime' an analysis of the structural
features of organisation is required. For example, even Ross'
concept of the 'criminaloid' implies relations of super/subordination
(1)
and hence some concept of structural organisation. Otherwise
we end up with the rather simple statement that 'powerful' people
or organisations or presidents commit crimes full stop. Crimes
(1) Ross, E. (1907) 'The Criminaloid' in The Atlantic Monthly,
99 PP« ^ - 50.
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of the powerful may be exposed by this procedure but they remain
substantially unanalysed and it is perhaps this defect which tends
to characterise some of the major architects of the field.
The particular strand of Criminology which takes 'organisational
crime' as its object has increasingly referenced and come to rely on
certain concepts - power, state, capital, class and, lately, totality -
as the intellectual crutch with which to sustain what, arguably,
remains a rather shaky endeavour. It is necessary to ask, however,
whether these concepts are entirely adequate, whether they are used
in an appropriate manner and what effect, if any, their incorporation
has on the overall structure of 'criminology' as a discipline. These
issues are both fundamental to the proper location of the corporate
violation of anti-monopoly law within sociological analysis and to
the construction of what Taylor, Walton and Young would describe as
(2)
a fully social theory of crime and law.
The area of criminology conventionally described by an abiding
interest in 'white collar crime' signalled a major contribution by
the exemplary manner in which the concept of 'social structure'
achieved an unequivocal place on the criminological agenda. Thus
Newman makes the following observations: "The most important
theoretical implication of white-collar crime is that it presents a
problem almost exclusively sociological ..
.. To comprehend it adequately a fundamental knowledge of class
structure, values, roles and statutes, and the many other essentially
social process' and concepts, is needed". He goes on to say that
(2) Taylor, I. etal (1973) 'The New Criminology' London: R.K.P.
(3) Newman, D. (1958) 'White Collar Crime: An Overview and Analysis'
in Geis, G. & Meier, R.F. (1977) (eds.) 'White Collar Crime'
New York: Macmillan, p. 60.
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the concept of white collar crime has forced the theoretician
into an analysis of highly complex and very abstract relationships
(Zf)
within our social system" Finally, and perhaps most pertinent of
all, he argues that "whether he likes it or not the criminologist
finds himself involved in an analysis of prestige, power, and
(5)
differential privelege" This call for a wider criminological
horizon echoes quite generally amongst those concerned with
'organisational crime' as a topic. After all, Sutherland was at
great pains to emphasise the general nature of his theory of crime and
law and again the superabundance of 'structural' terms attests quite
convincingly to the general persuasion as to their relevance.
Notwithstanding this clear articulation of relevance there is an
equally transparent failure to measure up to the more stringent
requirements set by the overall tenor of the enterprise. A brief
examination of the sorts of explanation commonly adduced for the
a-criminalisation of organisational crime reveals a whole host of
inherent ambiguities which go a long way toward accounting for the
relative failure of what remains a laudable attempt.
The most common explanation afforded to the relative immunity
of 'white collar' criminals is to be found in the class bias of the
court and the prevailing influence of the 'powerful' in molding the
criminal law according to their own interests. For example, Kolko
asserts that the involvement of big business in the drafting of
'Railroad' legislation was a major factor leading to the attenuation
of law in this respect.Likewise Sutherland argues that:
(k) ibid p. 63.
(5) ibid p. 56.
(6) Kolko, G. (1963) 'Railroads and Regulation' 1877 - 1916,
Princeton: Princeton U.P.
"White collar criminals are relatively immune because of the class
bias of the courts and the power of their class to influence the
(7)
implementation and administration of the law". Such immunity
is both an analogue of respect and prestige but also derives from
the cultural homogeneity of legislators, judges and administrators and
their congruence with businessmen. Conspiracy of this order, albeit
latent, reaches its apo theosis in the assertion that certain
presidential regimes, for example, McKinley, Harding, Hoover and
Coolidge, were'friendly' to business and, therefore, their administrations
correlated with a low incidence of Criminal prosecution of business
activity. As a corollary the climate of 'trust busting' is associated
with an identifiable hostility toward 'big business' on behalf of
particular administrations, the example of T. Roosevelt is often used
/ON
in this respect. One thing these interpretations share is an
equal commitment to the idea that public policy is but an outward
manifestation of the self conscious attitude of a political regime
or a homogenous elite. What is more, self consciously formulated
attitudes are seen as an index of real regulation and successful
criminalisation of corporate activity: an assumption which is
arguable to say the least.
To be sure there are more sensitive and indeed opposite
explanations to be found and Newman is a prime example of an important,
but nevertheless incipient, tendency: "The diffuse nature of the
perpetrator (the corporate body), as well as the diffuse nature of
the victim (the public), does not fit many white collar cases to the
(7) Sutherland, E. (19^0) 'White Collar Criminality' in Geis &
Meier (1977) ££ cit p. 44.
(8) See Hofstadter, R. (1955) 'The Age of Reform' New York: Vintage
p. 238 & p. 246 on the largely undeserved character of this epithet.
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normal criminal format. Then, too, the virtual absence of intent,
of mens rea, on the part of the violators makes criminal sanction
(9)
seem inappropriate". Even here the fact that Newman finds it
necessary to preface such a revealing remark by the more conventional -
"The relatively infrequent use of criminal sanctions is undoubtedly a
reflection of many factors including the high social status of many
violators and the lack of consensus about the criminal nature of their
behaviour" - would seem to suggest a sense of paralysis in the
analysis of 'organisational crime'. A form of paralysis which
structures explanations around a series of highly ambiguous and wholly
inadequate concepts and which has, as its underlying cause, the
entirely inappropriate relationship of sociology to criminology:
Sociology is seen as a resource made available to criminology in the
interstices of explanatory seizure.
Other sorts of explanations may be characterised by the idea that
government was impotent in the face of a business plutocracy which
would simply 'take over' at the slightest hint of government moves
(11)
against its interests, or the somewhat simple assertion that
'corporations are powerful social forces' - as if that explained
(12)
anything at all! Further, the essentially Weberian argument
that formal and complex rational law often favours 'corporate'
(9) Newman D. (1958) ojo cit p.
(10) ibid p. 5^+«
(11) See Sumner, W.G. (1963) 'Democracy and Plutocracy' in
Stow Persons (ed), 'Social Darwinism: Selected Essays'
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 1V5 - 1^9.
(12) Geis, G. & Meier, R. (1977) ojd cit p. 66.
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bureaucracies is given new form in the assumption that specialist
corporate lawyers invariably run rings around government prosecutors
(Braithwaite) and the idea that foreclosing loopholes is self defeating
given the fact that complexity favours corporate organisations
(13)
(Pepinsky). Yet again the idea that the a-criminalisation of
organisational crime is to be found in the location of the relevant
statutes in civil rather than criminal codes (Geis and Meier) is
perhaps slightly disingenuous given the number of activities which
(1
are in principle criminalisable, for example, the Sherman Act provisions.
Furthermore, Tafts argument that the social system compels the business
institution to be exploitative and at times even criminal and Quinney's
assertion that deviant behaviour is a reflection of social structure
appear to say a lot without explaining anything at all, evincing a
conception of social structure which at once explains everything and
nothing: criminal totalities replace identifiably human authors of
(15)
criminal action.
Others have attempted to salvage the essential ambiguity of the
concept of 'white collar crime' rather than explain its causal
antecedents. Of these the most important is undoubtedly Aubert who
argues that the controversial nature of white collar crimes ".. is
exactly what makes them so interesting from a sociological point of
view and what gives us a clue to important norm conflicts, clashing
group interests, and maybe incipient social change. One main benefit
to be derived from the study of white collar crimes springs from the
opportunity which the ambivelence in the citizen, in the businessman
and among lawyers, judges and even criminologists offers as a barometer
(13) See Braithwaite, J. (1979) Transnational corporations and
corruption in 'International Journal of the Sociology of Law 7?'
p. 133) and Pepinsky, H. (1976) 'Grime and Conflict' London:
Martin Robertson.
(1*0 Geis, G. & Meier, R. (1977) o£ cit.
(15) Taft, D. (1956) 'Criminology' New York: Macmillan and Quinney, R.
(1963) 'Occupational Structure and Criminal Behaviour' in Social
Problems 11, pp. 179 - 185.
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of structural conflicts and change potential in the larger social
(16)
system of which they and the white collar crimes are parts".
More recently, Carson has attempted to recover the ambiguity of white
collar crime by arguing that its ambiguity can become institutionalised
in the space between the movement of the 'totality' and the historically
specific organisational forms, for example, the factory which collide
(17
at various points with the seemingly inexorable logic of the totality.
One thing these various attempts seem to imply is that sociological
theory is at its most incisive at the margins of legitimacy and
illegitimacy and that further, the contradictions inherent in the
concept of white collar crime offer a unique insight into social
structure or the workings of the totality. A peculiar form of
sociology indeed where relevance is confined to the margin and
importance reigns supreme only when the mask slips: a kind of
sociology of error or, a sociology limited to the measure of ambiguity
rather than regularity. Furthermore, the way in which the concept
of 'totality' insinuates itself into the explanatory framework is
perhaps one more example of the way in which the repertoires of
criminology, whilst exhausted in the face of complexity, are
replenished through a parasitic relationship to sociology, Marxism
and political economy.
Still others have sought to question the elasticity of the concept
'crime' and, therefore, the very basis of the field of 'organisational
crime'. Thus the classic 'debate' between Sutherland and Tappan
takes place against a backcloth of the essentially positi'vist concern
for the differentiation of criminal and non-criminal action/^''
(16) Aubert, V. (1952) 1 White Collar Crime and Social Structure' in
Geis and Meier (eds) (1977) ££ cit. p. 172 (Additional emphasis).
(17) Carson, W. (1980) 'White Collar Crime and the Institutionalisation
of Ambiguity: The Case of the Early British Factory Acts' in Geis,
G. & Stotland, E. (eds) 'White Collar Crime: Theory & Research'
California: Sage.
(18) See Sutherland, E. (19^5) 'Is "'White Collar Crime" Crime'? in the
American Sociological Review, 10. pp. 132 - 139 and Tappan, P.
(19^7)'Who is the Criminal'? in American Sociological Review 12
pp. 96 - 102.
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They both share a deep seated concern for the criterion of criminality
and hence for the basis for specifying a violation of the criminal law.
Whilst Sutherland argued that white collar crimes are real crimes and
that the prevalent use of administrative agency merely parallels the
bureaucratic response to juvenile delinquency. Tappan argued that
real crime should be restricted to the statutory definition of crime
and the actual processing of criminals through the criminal justice
system. Otherwise, as he puts it, "the rebel may enjoy a veritable
(19)
orgy of delight in damming as criminal most anyone he pleases".
Tappan's position would indeed find limited support amongst those
dissaffected by the characterisation of Standard Oil, or General
motors as criminal organisations and those not convinced by the
efficacy of 'reversing' the arsenal of criminal sanction. For
example, Clark highlights the absurdity involved in such a 'reversal':
"Presidents, congressmen and corporation bosses on long-term prison
sentences for tax frauds, illegal profiteering, and war-mongering,
while petty thieves freely wander the streets attending occasional
and voluntary, therapy classes".Pepinsky makes a similar point
in arguing that the 'debate' between Sutherland and Tappan hinges
upon the definition of relevant social injury rather than the existence
of social injury per se. Therefore, Pepinsky attempts to extend
Sutherland's classification of white collar crime as real crime; a
definition which he argued was gripped by a particular form of socio¬
economic bias and hence partial definition of social injury.
Pepinsky's definition of white collar crime would include the concept
(19) ibid p. 98.
(20) Clark, D. (1978) 'Marxism, Justice, and the Justice Model' in
Contemporary Crises, 2. p. 53-
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of exploitation based on a definition of private property as a
•superior' right. Exploitation is the infringement of a superior
right, these rights are enshrined as property rights which in turn
(21)
provide the basis for a definition of white collar crime. This
approach echoes that of Macpherson who also attempts to extend the
concept of private property to encompass a whole series of 'basic'
(22)
rights the violation of which is a crime. Ultimately, however,
the definition of white collar crime as exploitation is gripped by an
inherent circularity in that exploitation implies the priority of
certain (proprietal) rights over other (proprietal) rights and hence
the problem of relative social injury. If a selection of relevant
social injury is to be avoided then an absolute concept of social
injury and an absolute definition of (proprietal) rights is required.
Apart from the advocates of transcendental and absolute justice such
a concept would not find any particular favour.
These are the 'general' sorts of explanations and issues which
tend to characterise criminological attention to 'organisational
crime'. I would like to concentrate in more detail on a specific
attempt to break with the conventional criminological approach to
this area, one which has as its dominant motif the idea of a Marxist
analysis of organisational crime. It can be argued that in seeking
to extend the frontiers of criminology in this way, through an
articulation of Marxist concepts, the inherent contradictions of the
field, evident in themselves, become all the more sharply revealed.
The criticism is offered not as a negative assertion of the 'irrelevance'
of the field of 'organisational crime' - whether for Marxism,
(21) Pepinsky, H. (1976) op cit.
(22) Macpherson, C. (1975) 'Capitalism and the Changing Concept of
Property' in Kamenka, E. & Neale, R. (eds) 'Feudalism,
Capitalism & Beyond' London: Edward Arnold.
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criminology or sociology - but rather as a prologue to, what is
perceived as a more acceptable programme of research oriented
toward the specific problem of the corporate violation of anti-monopoly
law.
Beyond 'organisational' Crime and Criminology.
The most recent, and arguably the most developed, exponent of
•Organisational Crime' is Frank Pearce who, in Crimes of the Powerful
(23)
and "Crime Corporations and the American Social Order" presents
a fully developed combination of criminology and political economy.
For the most part Pearce is concerned with three major themes.
First of all, that the American economy has not been based on free
enterprise since the late nineteenth century. As such he is presenting
an internal critique of legitimation ideologies based on the persistence
of free enterprise, that is, based on an "imaginary social order".
Secondly, he deals with the "criminality" of big business in the sense
of its direct involvement in "criminal" acts, for example, Standard
Oil in its formative years. Thirdly, he examines the ability of
big business to enact legislation in its favour; to skew enforcement
procedures to its advantage; to refocus anti-trust law from monopoly
practices onto unionization and, finally, to encourage the growth of
racketeering within, or in opposition to, the labour unions. In this
sense his work provides an opportunity to examine both the possibility
and the consequences of the combination of criminology and political
economy.
Two main questions must be borne in mind with regard to such an
enterprise. One, how must criminology be constituted in order that
(23) Pearce, F. (1976) 'Crimes of the Powerful', London: Pluto Press;
Pearce, F. (1973) 'Crime, Corporations and the American Social
Order' in Taylor, I. & Taylor, L., (eds.) Politics and Deviance,
Harmondsworth: Pelican.
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it can address the "powerful" and with what consequences for
criminology in general and two, has Crimes of the Powerful reformulated
criminology so that it can achieve its objective? These two general
questions locate Pearce's work in relation to the "criminology of the
powerful". More specifically Pearce's work will be situated in
relation to two criteria:
1. Its internal consistency or accuracy both theoretically and
empirically, that is, historically.
(24)
2. Its overarching theoretical adequacy or validity.
i
These twin criteria, it will be argued, provide the grounds for a
continuous critique of the Crimes of the Powerful through an
examination of its handling of the specific areas of capital, the
state^history and empirical evidence. They also serve to demonstrate
the exact range of inconsistencies and problems generated by the
conjunction of two areas - political economy and crime. The
critique is extended by the attempt both to offer a concrete
alternative account of anti-trust legislation together with a basis
for the proper conceptualization of crime and law within political
economy.
(24) It is one of the problems of the eclectic nature of Crimes of
the Powerful and indeed of the "criminology of the powerful"
in general, that it admits of various levels of critique.
That such a critique exists on several different levels means
that it is caught between theoretical refutation; factual
inaccuracy; and factual refutation in terms of different or
opposed facts derived from a different theoretical approach
or problematic. The fundamental question of the level of
proof or the degree of adequacy is ambiguously grounded in
neither theory nor data. This is not to deny that the major
critique of the "criminology of the powerful" is theoretical,
nor to represent this critique as an arbitrary juxtaposition
of levels, but to point to the existence of several layers
and to the contradictions and inconsistencies between them.
The task then becomes one of subjecting those various levels,
and the inconsistencies between them, to a theoretical critique -
namely on the basis of the possibility of "combining" disciplines
or "borrowing" concepts as between criminology and political
economy.
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Crimes of the Powerful is committed to an instrumentalist
conception of the state with all the consequences for theoretical
and political practice entailed in that position. It will be argued
that Crimes of the Powerful is internally inconsistent in its
application of this problematic - both in the sense that it embraces
an element of state autonomy and, in relation to the highly selected
realm of empirical material. Moreover,, the two series of problems -
internal inconsistency (both conceptual and empirical) and the
theoretical failings of the instrumentalist/idealist couple itself -
stem directly from the contradictory relationship established between
political economy and criminology.
Throughout Crimes of the Powerful there exists the presence of
"big business", a presence that somehow functions as the ultimate, if
not the proximate, explanation of events. For instance, big business
was in "control" of the major political parties, the federal
legislature, the federal agencies, and so on. Implicit in this is the
idea that the state apparatus was in some way controlled by big
business. In this formulation, Pearce appears to reify the state
as something to be captured, as a powerful instrument to be used by
big business. It follows that the state is quite clearly established
as a "thing" rather than as an "autonomous subject". This commitment
to one side of the couple - state as thing/state as subject - is at
the heart of the problem. Pearce's resolution of it in favour of an
instrumentalist conception of the state cannot even do justice to the
complexity of the "empirical" evidence that he uses, nor is it a
consistent resolution. Further, as Poulantzas demonstrates, it is
the instrumentalist/idealist couple itself, that is, independent of
any commitment to one side or the other, that entails a conception
of the state as an entity possessing its own power. The hegemonic
fraction of capital is then free to either absorb the state's power^
through fusion with it, or be resisted by the state's power
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(25)
involving the independence of, or arbitration by, the state.
That Pearce advocates the fusion thesis is only central to the
question of consistency and application, it is not central to the
question of adequacy. What is central to the determination of
theoretical adequacy is the overall location of Crimes of the Powerful
within the idealist/instrumentalist couple itself, a couple which
generates the conception of the state as guardian of its own power.
Instead, for Poulantzas, "The state does not have its own 'power',
but it forms the contradictory locus of condensation for the balance
of forces that divides even the dominant class itself, and particularly
its hegemonic fraction - monopoly capital.
The thesis of state power is far from settled for political
economy and the fact that Pearce treats it as if it were is of
crucial importance to the conditions under which criminology and
political economy can or cannot be conjoined. Moreover, Crimes
of the Powerful is inconsistent in its formulation of a theoretical
position, inconsistent in the application of that position to a
series of data, and is unaware of the problems generated by the
formulation of the position in that way. These systematic silences
and anomalies, it is argued, betray the contradictory relationship
between political economy and criminology.
(25) For Poulantzas it is the "complex contradictory unity in
dominance" of the several dominant fractions that explains
".. how the concept of hegemony can be applied to one class
or fraction within the 'power' bloc. This hegemonic class
or fraction is in fact the dominant element of the contradictory
unity of politically 'dominant' classes or fractions, forming
part of the 'power' bloc". (N. Poulantzas (1973) p- 237)
Whilst having no explicit concept or theory of the "power
bloc", and hence no conception of the hegemonic class or
fraction, it is quite clear that the position occupied by
hegemonic class or fraction in relation to the state would,
for Pearce, be occupied by "big business" See Poulantzas, N.
(1973)• Political Power and Social Classes, London:
New Left Books.
(26) Poulantzas, N. (1975)- Classes in Contemporary Capitalism,
London: N.L.B., p. 158 - 159.
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Attendant on the failure to adequately derive a concept of the
state is the lack of any explicit division within capital itself.
Capital is simply left as an unfractured whole and its conditions of
existence conceived as a unity. For, Crimes of the Powerful there is
only big business; the rest is reduced to nothing. As will be seen,
there is, in Crimes of the Powerful an implicit demonstration of the
empirical consequences of different fractions of capital, of a clash
of political interests relating to diverse conditions of existence.
Nevertheless, these remain outside the theoretical display since they
are not part of Pearce's central concern namely - the demonstration
of the total dominance of big business. There is a contradiction
between the concept of capital used and the range of empirical
evidence which implies a rather different concept of capital.
Accordingly, the theoretical analysis is at variance with the
empirical display, that is, two series of inconsistencies intersect.
Alongside the problem of the state and the unitary concept of
capital is the ahistorical approach of Crimes of the Powerful.
There is little attempt made to confront the differential relationship
between the conditions of existence of various capital fractions and
the forms in which they are secured through time, that is the
differential "mobilization" of state and federal levels in relation
to the historical displacement of the conditions of existence of
non-monopoly capital by those of monopoly capital. This particular
silence leads Pearce to adopt an ahistorical subsumption of all
interests to big business at all periods under consideration thereby
ignoring the dynamic development of the monopoly capital form.
Furthermore, as Pearce is committed to an instrumentalist view of the
state and its relationship with big business this presupposes a prior
separation of the two. This separation, whilst necessary for Pearce,
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is nowhere demonstrated in the analysis. The omission is two tiered
for there is also no indication of any prior instrumental relationship
between the state and, for example, entrepreneurial capital; big
business is simply projected backwards in time as if it had always
controlled the state. Therefore, the analysis of the historical
derivation of the state is inadequate and inconsistent in relation
to the theoretical concept of state power.
The range and treatment of sources by Crimes of the Powerful
suggests two things: One, the inadequacy of the concept of merger
and two, that the empirical evidence is at variance with the argument.
For instance, when he states that mergers were largely completed by
the beginning of the twentieth century Pearce ignores two factors:
1. The "empirical" fact that there were three merger booms;
1898 - 1902; 1925 - 1929; 1955 - 1969, corresponding
to three definite moments within the formation of monopoly
capital. Namely: a) The phase of relative transition
from relations of production characterized predominantly
by non-monopoly capital to relations of production
characterized by the pre-eminence of monopoly capital;
b) The phase of consolidation of the conditions of
existence of monopoly capital; c) The phase
representing the partial re-integration of economic
ownership and possession signalling a new conjuncture
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of increased political conflict. In short mergers
were not "completed" by the beginning of the twentieth
century and, more importantly, mergers occurred after
they had supposedly finished. Mergers which had a very
precise theoretical significance, that is, they were far
from small scale and negligible as Pearce seems to suggest.
2. The crucial distinction between economic ownership - the ability
to assign the means of production and to allocate resources and
profits to this or that use - and economic possession - the
direction and relative control of a certain Labour process -
is lost to Pearce. In effect the distinction indicates that
possession is not a necessary pre-condition for control, for
example subcontracting, oligopoly, minority shareholder control
and price leadership all represent effective forms of economic
control of the market. So that to argue the completion of
mergers is to say very little. Not only is this very dissociation
(27) Beman, L. (1973) "What We Learned from the Great Merger Frenzy", For'
tune April 1973 P« 70 - 150. The three merger booms may be described
as follows:
(i) The first merger movement was, conventionally, caused by
the business failures of the 1890s together with the
proliferation of railways, telegraph and telephone leading
to the establishment of the first truly national markets.
The dominant types of monopoly organization were trusts,
mergers and combinations which in many industries embraced
all existing capacity, that is more than 90%. Pearce is
quite correct in stating that the basic corporations were
established prior to merger mania.
(ii) The second movement was governed largely by the parallel
responses of separate organizations. The 1929 peak
extended the domain of big business to new industries and
created numerous vertically integrated enterprises, that
is the consolidation of monopoly capital. The conventional
cause was the shift to autos and trucks with the consequent
enlargement of markets and the destruction of local
monopolies.
(iii) The third movement was more of an extended trend starting
in the 1950s and peaking in 1968. The process produced
the giant conglomerate form signalling in part the re-integrati
of economic ownership and possession with the co-incident
elevation of the problem of the multi-national companies to
the political agenda. Of course effective control still
ovtpiHpil hevnnH nnsspsHi nn.
of economic ownership from economic possession a consequence
of the relative transition from competitive to monopoly
capitalism, that is, it denotes a particular phase of monopoly
capitals formation, but it also means that the process of
concentration and centralization of capital are effected under
( 23 )
forms that are often hidden by legal ownership. To place
such store by the concept of merger in the light of the above
considerations is to reveal a theoretical deficiency associated
with a poorly specified empirical content - in that "mergers"
were not completed anyway. Where he does raise the problem
of other means of control he does so in terms of the subordination
of all else to big business. The process fulfills a different
function within Pearce's theoretical framework since it serves
to establish the absolute domination of big business rather than
its conditions of existence and mode of operation in the market.
Although monopoly capital did, in effect, "control" large
sections of industrial production and distribution though
merger and economic possession there were still significant
sectors that were not "controlled" by monopoly capital.
Anti-Trust Legislation
So far the problems which the state, capital, history and
empirical material raise for a criminology of the powerful have been
discussed separately. It is now necessary to consider to what
extent they intersect in relation to anti-trust legislation.
In the process one can trace the existence of continuities with
other revisionists, continuities that are not accidental but rather
(28) The centralization of capital is defined by growth through
merger and combination whilst the concentration of capital is
defined by the growth of separate companies.
reveal the same fundamental problem - namely the conflation of
cause and effect.
In any analysis of anti-trust legislation it is necessary to
draw a distinction between the anti-trust movement and the effectiveness
of anti-trust enterprise. Pearce concentrates on the function and
effect of anti-trust legislation and thereby ignores or reduces the
anti-trust movement. Two statements serve as an occasion for
analysis: 1) that "The attitude of the large corporations to the
anti-trust laws developed from hostility in the late nineteenth
century to an active involvement in their administration by 191^"^^
and 2) that "The corporations became aware of their precarious
position in relation to the federal government and at the same time
were recognizing their vulnerability to prosecution by socialist
state legislatures" and consequently they agitated for a "transfer
of these powers to the federal level where they would be able to
effectively control the implementation of Federal regulation of
(31)
their activity". Several points of interest arise "internally"
from these statements.
First of all, the large corporations "hostility" to anti-trust
legislation implies a certain degree of effectiveness in such
legislation, an element of "threat" to the corporations. There
existed, therefore, a period in time when anti-trust legislation or
enterprise was not enacted by, nor under the control of, big business
(29) Pearce, F. (1976), op cit. , p. 85.
(30) ibid, p. 88.
(31) ibid, p. 86.
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and, as a result, was in a position to challenge its conditions of
existence. Anti-trust legislation and, more especially the anti¬
trust movement cannot,therefore, be reduced to its control by big
business since its prior independence is at least implied if not
argued by Pearce. Yet Pearce explicitly argues the opposite namely,
anti-trust is reducible to its functionality for big business.
Secondly, vulnerability to prosecution by state legislatures
indicates the existence of significant interests opposed to the
mergers and, in addition, suggests that since enforcement of anti¬
trust legislation could be controlled more effectively at federal
than at state level, the federal/state split is an index of the
division within the "power" bloc and an admission of the effectivity
of political conflict.
Thirdly, the overall emphasis which Pearce places on the
appropriation or control of anti-trust by big business explains
away any possibility of anti-trust legislation being the product of
political class struggle. The importance of class struggle is
simply ignored in favour of the overwhelming, all pervasive
dominance of big business. Origins are collapsed into ends.
From these critical comments and elements of inconsistency
alone it is possible to construct the existence, at the political
level, of an "anti-monopoly alliance" comprising socialist, populist
and entrepreneurial fractions that formed the anti-trust movement.
As Hofstadter notes "often a common hostility to big business was
the one link that bound together a variety of interest groups that
(32)
diverged on other issues". This political alliance, once
established, could be said to function, at least for a time, in
(32) Hofstadter, E. (1953). The Age of Reform, N.Y.: Random.
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opposition to the conditions of existence of monopoly capital, an
opposition that was located in many significant respects in the
(33)
federal/state split.
There are several points at which Pearce's formulation implies
or allows alternative interpretations. Alternatives which derive
as much from internal theoretical inconsistencies as from the
particular choice of evidence. For example, in opposition to the
earlier "fusion" thesis - regarding the relationship of the state to
big business - Pearce erects the conception of the "states" short
term autonomy vis-a-vis a section of the ruling class in the
interests of the whole ruling class. As was demonstrated at the
outset this is merely a change in terms since the couple which allows
the state to be conceived in terms of having its own power is retained,
that is, it is common to both the fusion and arbitration variants.
"Big business" was, therefore, simply "restrained" in order that the
system of hegemony vis-a-vis the dominated classes was not challenged.
But by whom or by which class or combination of classes or fractions
and indeed by what process? Pearce cannot answer this because his
conception does not contain any extended analysis of the power bloc
he has in mind.
There are, then five components to Pearce's analysis of
anti-trust:
(33) For instance, the laissez-faire policy of federal government,
that is its non-intervention, aided - or at least did not prove
an obstacle to - monopoly capital, especially where interstate
monopolies were concerned. This, coupled with the more
interventionist stance of local state policy towards monopoly
capital's conditions of existence - albeit an ineffective
intervention since state boundaries did not constitute an
obstacle to monopoly capital in its corporation form - firmly
establishes the basis for a division along federal state lines.
Although Pearce makes nothing of this, preferring instead to
rely on the domination of the federal government by big business
as the explanation of any division.
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1. Mergers were effectively complete and, therefore, anti-trust
was ineffective.
2. Mergers made a dramatic impact and there was a consequent need
to assuage radical socialist and populist demands - demands that
are not theorized at the political level but are merely referenced
by Pearce.
3. The appropriation, co-optation or emasculation of anti-trust
legislation by big business.
4. Mergers involved only one section, presumably big business, of
the ruling class and the whole ruling class made its presence
felt in opposition to big business in the general interest of
long term survival.
5. The active involvement of big business in the advocacy of anti¬
trust legislation with the result that anti-trust becomes a
front behind which the market is ordered and structured in the
interests of big business.
These five components are positions made explicit at various
points in Crimes of the Powerful. They represent the more or less
ad hoc importation of an eclectic series of explanations or accounts
(34)
borrowed in the main from revisionist history. In themselves
these accounts are not necessarily contradictory and thus Pearce is
able to maintain their mutual articulation without too much trouble.
(34) By "revisionist history" I refer, in the main to the work of:
Kolko, G. (1967). The Triumph of Conservatism, Chicago:
Quadrangle; Wiebe, R. (1967). The Search for Order, New
York; Weinstein, J. (1968). The Corporate Ideal in the
Liberal State, Boston: Beacon Press; Appleman Williams, W.
(1961). Contours of American History, New York: World
Publishing; Hofstadter, R. (1955)? °£ cit. There are,
of course, significant differences between these various
authors although these remain internal variations within
what is here described as "revisionist history".
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What is important is that these various components, taken together
with the positions which are either implicit or logically entailed
in Pearce's work, reveal the fundamental absence of any critical
comment on the concepts and theoretical systems introduced willy
nilly into the area. The absence of a theoreticalframework derived
in the first place from political economy introduces the range of
inconsistencies and contradictions that cloud a "criminology of the
powerful". That such inconsistencies are registered at an overtly
concrete level is evidenced by the apparent need to buttress Crimes
of the Powerful with an eclectic reading of Revisionist history.
The inadequacy of the concepts results in a retreat into history
which, far from producing a solution, simply re-inforces the
inconsistencies already there.
The historical sources for Crimes of the Powerful are supplied
by revisionism in general and the work of Kolko in particular.
Accordingly anti-trust legislation is seen as part of a conscious
strategy advocated by big business and engineered by a powerful
elite with a view to the rational stabilization of an increasingly
competitive market. As a result big business controlled itself
through the agency of a unified elite rather than being controlled
by anti-trust enterprise. This formulation offers a voluntaristic,
conspiratorial conception of big business in terms of a series of
interlocking elites with the result that a reified political strategy
on one side is arbitrarily "coupled" with an abstract economic "need"
or "necessity" on the other. Furthermore, the perception of an
"increasingly competitive market", which supposedly contains within
itself the "need" to be rationally organized, is based upon a series
of misconceptions; of the conditions of existence of monopoly capital
of its "eventual" compatibility with "elements" of competition and;
of the increasing "anarchy" of monopoly capital production (Lenin).
Thus we now arrive at the more general theoretical implication
of Crimes of the Powerful in that anti-trust legislation is now seen
as a product of the whole ruling class in the interest of the long
term survival of the capitalist system as a whole. This position
assumes an internal discipline within the power bloc itself together
with the historical subservience of big business to the general
capitalist interest. It is characteristic of this position that
it can take one of two general forms involving either the relative
autonomy of state power in relation to its function of organizing
factor of, or for, the "ruling class" or, the pre-given internal
consensus of the ruling class and its simple translation into state
power through fusion with it. As a result anti-trust can be viewed
as an anticipation of harsher measures, as a reaction to the reform
movement or, finally, as the self-organizing principle of the
capitalist system.
It is inherent in the method of Crimes of the Powerful that
the inconsistencies generated within the concept of "state power";
that is, the failure to produce a consistent resolution of the
concept in terms of either instrumentalism, idealism or even relative
autonomy; leads Pearce to attempt to bury those inconsistencies in
the apparent anarchy of empirical history. The decision to engage
revisionist history in the form of Kolko leads inexorably to the
demonstration of the relative autonomy of the capitalist class as a
whole vis-a-vis big business in particular. This relative autonomy
occurs within and on the basis of the more general fusion of the
capitalist class and state power. This formulation is upheld
notwithstanding the persistent reduction of state power to big
business alone. Vihilst being consistent in the adherence to "state
power" as a concept the internal variations within that concept
develop severe contradictions which are only compounded by the
2b
retreat into historical empiricism.
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The preceding analysis has shown that Crimes of the Powerful
is incapable of handling the concepts of big business, power and
the state. That Pearce is aware of the problems is clear:
Thus the ultimate implication of this mode of analysis
is the dissolution of criminology as a separate
(35)
discipline.
Thus in analysing 'crimes of corporations' we are
ultimately led to ask fundamental questions about
the nature of America and the worlds 'free enterprise
system'.
That neither the conditions nor the consequences of the dissolution
of criminology are specified and that Crimes of the Powerful fails
to ask fundamental questions of the "free enterprise system", let
alone provide a framework for an answer, is perhaps a function of
the relative incompatibility of criminology and political economy.
Moreover, by implying the end of criminology the question of the
proper formulation of the "powerful" is redundant, whilst the
conditions under which crime and law can become central to Marxism
are assumed to be covered by an eclectic combination of concepts.
Crimes of the Powerful is, therefore, left in a theoretical vacuum
since it belongs neither to criminology nor to political economy.
Once the question is posed in these terms, as a relation between
criminology and Marxism, then the solution is quite clear.
(35) Pearce, F. (1976) op cit. p. 80.
(36) ibid, p. 105.
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If a "criminology of the powerful" were at all adequate to its
object then quite simply it would cease to be "criminology".
The problems of Crimes of the Powerful are conceptual and
logical. They can, in the end, be reduced to two, one the
imperfect and ad hoc translation of political economy's concepts
into criminology and two, the failure to address the contest
within political economy concerning the nature of the state,
capital and the interrelation, or even separate existence of the
political and economic levels. This last carries the assumption
that such debates either do not exist or can effectively be ignored
for the purposes of a "Marxist" criminology. The position argued
here is that not only can those debates not be ignored but further
such ignorance obscures the conditions under which crime and law
can become central to political economy - namely by theorizing
law and crime in terms of their centrality or otherwise to the
reproduction of the conditions of existence of determinate
relations of production.
It will be readily apparent that the purpose of this 'introductory'
chapter is to reject those forms of analysis which deploy the concept
of 'power' or the 'powerful' as an ultimate source of coherence
between otherwise disparate phenomena, or else which view the
(37)
concept as a supplementary explanation of residual anomalies.
More especially the concept of 'power' is often conceived in
behavioural terms as the hydraulic fluid responsible for the
transmission of the desires of 'business' to the organs of state
reception and response. 'Power', therefore, attains an almost
(37) See Cain, M. (1979) 'Trends in the Sociology of Police
Work' in International Journal of the Sociology of Law. 7« j
for a criticism of this approach.
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mystical or transcendental form at once ubiquitous and invisible
and hence perhaps uniquely suited to a discipline which is apparently
unable to theorise its object correctly. Power becomes a quality
which you either have or have not, an enabling facility which,
necessarily, implies a series of instrumentalities to which it may
be applied, for example, law, state, police etc. Over and against
this, I have argued that law and state cannot be conceived of as
'instrumentalities' and that, used in this way, the concept of
power is both unnecessary and ultimately meaningless. Accordingly,
an analysis of organisational crime can proceed through a discussion
of social relations, forms of organisation and so forth, without
reference to the transcendental ramifications of the concept 'power'
and the consequent heralding of asymetrical power relations as an
explanation of, for example, 'ambiguity'.
'Power' implies an agency, its source normally being supplied
by various forms of state, which either gives form to inchoate
'power' or which constitutes the nub of that power, constructing
the powerful through the existence of a privileged relationship
with state: the 'powerful' are those who have access to state
'power'. The state, therefore, is an important lynchpin which can
condense competing claims, focus class conflict by presenting itself
as the object of struggle, or else articulate the various instances
("^8 ^
of the 'totality' according to some ultimate determinative principle.
In conceiving of the state in these specific, albeit discrete, ways
it is implicitly assumed that the state acts toward the general
orchestration of society, as a means for imposing, constructing, or
(38) See, for example, Cutler et al (1977 & 1978) 'Marx's
Capital and Capitalism Today' I & II, London: R.K.P.
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representing uniformity. The very concept of state as it applies
to discrete operations necessarily implies a form of unity, even if
it be a contradictory unity, otherwise the concept of state apparatus
would have no meaning whatsoever. Thus social relations are assumed
to be stamped throughout according to some determinative principle,
some definitive condensation of class struggle or interests, or some
material reflex of an ideal state. I will argue against this notion
of uniformity; that, for example, law and state, necessarily,
represent the 'interests' of 'capital' or the 'powerful' and that
relatively autonomous components of social structure ultimately
cohere with such interests or conditions. Against the notion that
the fabric of society is woven around a principal design, whether
the pattern is loosely sketched or rigidly marked.
After paying due respect to the particular, it is often assumed
that the ultimate explanation of a phenomenon is to be found in the
eventual convergence of social relations around a principle of
'capital' reproduction, the realisation of an ideal force, the
definitive resolution of competing interests, or the 'totality'.
In this respect the area of organisational crime is no exception,
abounding as it is with 'absent' causes. The argument is really
very simple; by itself the concept of state explains nothing and
can add nothing. For radical criminology to act as if the simple
introduction of the 'state' as an additional weapon in the
criminological armoury immediately rectifies the failings of more
traditional white collar criminology is the measure of its overwhelming
failure to address organisational crime in any but a token manner.
The state is defined by Nicos Poulantzas as follows,
"The state ... forms the contradictory locus of condensation for the
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balance of forces that divides even the dominant class itself".^9)
Notwithstanding the commitment to a 'structuralist' architecture
and given the problems involved in rendering a theory of political
action within an essentially Althusserian concept of the 'totality',
there is a sense in which Poulantzas is perhaps hinting at a more
radical concept of state. a conception which dissolves the
state as an entity and as the realisation of an ideal force, so
much is quite clear in his work, but, further, one which attempts
to roll back the state to a point where it becomes nothing other than
a site for the intersection of political (class) forces. Quite
simply the state does not 'exist': it is merely a 'bourgeois'
distraction which encourages social Democratic politics. This also
provides a clue to the sustained dialogue between Poulantzas and
Miliband and, in particular, the issue of whether the 'family' is
(41)
part and parcel of a state apparatus. It can be argued that
the 'proper' focus is on forms of organisation, social relations,
and what Paul Hirst would describe as political practices and
(if2 )
criteria of decision making. Far from halting analysis by
describing an operation under the auspices of a state apparatus and
(39) Poulantzas, N. (1975) ££ cit. p. 158/9.
(40) The concept of 'totality' will be described in more detail
in Chapter two.
(^1) See Poulantzas, N. (1976) 'The Capitalist State'. New
Left Review, 95 j Miliband, R. (1973) 'Poulantzas & the
Capitalist State' NLR 82; and also Poulantzas, N. (1969)
NLR. 58, & Miliband, R. (1970), NLR 59-
(^2) Hirst, P. (1979) 'On Law & Ideology', London:
Macmillan.
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thereby implying a source of ultimate conformity, the state, this
procedure has the merit of analysing concrete forms of political
process rather than suspending analytical endeavor by the invocation,
or even incantation, of state.
Again, the utilisation of the concept of 'power' often implies
that it is the source of a fundamental cleavage between the power¬
ful - and the impotent. As such this implicit concept of class
assumes that the 'powerful' are an elite unified by their conscious
reflection that they are powerful and united in defense of that power
and, consequently, in defense of the structure which sustains them in
power. In the absence of an overt conspiracy the mere possession
of 'power' is apparently sufficient to generate a congruence of
interests and their subsequent transmission to organs of state.
Power, therefore, structures the scenario, possibly under the
direction of an absent 'economic' actor, through the mediation of
powerful actors who, either implicitly or explicitly, support these
underlying structures of 'power' and implement their requirements.
Conscious conspiracy or structural congruence tend to exhaust the
repertoires of 'power' available to criminology in its quest for an
analysis of organisational crime and it is precisely this exhaustion
which is characteristic of its relative failure.
Finally, the absent economic actor 'who' stalks the wings in
anticipation is assumed to be a uniform, regular character, able in
one way or another, to achieve the realisation of 'his' requirements.
It will be quite clear that to talk in terms of a unified font of
all 'power' - Capitalism, monopoly capital, big business, an ideal
spiritual force, or an international Jewish conspiracy - is to
devalue the very real struggles and conflicts which shape 'law' and
state. Workers against the monolith becomes a slogan which effectively
cripples all political action and all forms of concrete analysis.
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I have argued that each of these concepts - state, power,
capital, class and totality - is gripped by inherent contradictions
which raise severe problems for sociological analysis. That
criminology tends to 1 use' these concepts at random, especially
since they are at best only equivocal conceptual explanations, is
the primary obstacle to a proper analysis of 'organisational crime'.
More specifically I have argued that the problems with 'crimes of the
powerful' are instances of the inherent limitation of a criminological
approach to 'organisational crime' and thus are not specific to a
particular text, but refer centrally to a particular enterprise.
These problems denote the limits to a Marxist Criminology and in
particular the problems attendant upon a conjunction of criminology
and Marxism. As an alternative I would venture to suggest that
the problems of the legal regulation of corporations are more complex
in that they cannot be reduced to the capitulation of law enforcement
agencies and the genuflection of state in the face of almightycorporate
'power'. One thing 'white collar' criminology does not seem to
consider in any great detail is the possibility that corporate activity
cannot be regulated by classifying it as real crime and utilising the
machinery of law, that criminalisation may not be a viable means of
(3)
controlling corporate crime. It is this possibility which the
thesis seeks to take up and explore.
(43) It is quite true that Cressey hints at such an outcome
arguing that the criminal law cannot effectively be used
to attack organisations although his solution - the
creation of an offence of 'organised crime' and his
explanation; that corruption causes organised crime -
tend to thwart any radical potential and belie the
original promise. See Cressey, D. (1972) 'Criminal
Organisation', New York: Heinemann, p. 82.
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CHAPTER II
LAW, ECONOMY AND SOCIOLOGY.
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The idea that law and economy exhibit a general
interrelationship is perhaps a commonplace. Whether it is the
relatively simple assertion that company law provides the framework
for capital organisation or the somewhat stronger claim that legal
relations reflect economic reality, the idea that law and economy
are related in some way remains paramount. Consequently, the only
task would seem to be to establish specific points of convergence.
Indeed this is the standard brief of much 'socio-legal research.
Against this, however, it is arguable that the very idea of a
relationship between law and economy entails a particular conception
of the nature of the 'legal* and the 'economic' as separate orders.
This sort of conception is both inadequate, as far as it goes, and,
moreover, heralds a portrait of the social formation which is at
best unacceptable and at worst plagued with contradictions. I
would question, therefore, both the manner in which the issue of the
law/economy relation is traditionally posed together with the very
idea of a relation between separate instances of the social formation
To this end the present chapter is concerned to outline the
terms in which the law/economy relation is conventionally established
to demonstrate the concepts generated in pursuit of a law/economy
relationship and to argue the particular consequences of these
respective positions. The critical thrust of these remarks is
sustained in turn by a demonstration of the pertinent features of
what is, arguably, a more appropriate analysis of 'legal' and
'economic' relations. This alternative formulation emerges more
clearly in the context of an examination of corporate relations of
production, private property and forms of ownership undertaken in
subsequent chapters. The demonstration of this alternative,
however, is essential for the proper conceptualisation of the
historical relevance and effectivity of anti-trust legislation
together with the proper assessment of the more contemporary
influence of 'legal' controls on corporate forms of business
activity. For example, it will be argued that the very separation
of 'law' from 'economy', achieved via the constitutional doctrine
of the separation of powers, is directly responsible for the
limited impact of anti-trust legislation.
What then is wrong with the conventional portrait of the law/
economy relationship? The problem is easily stated. In order to
describe a relationship between the structure of legal relations,
on the one hand, and the relations or forces of production, on the
other, it is necessary to effect what Cutler _et al would call a
prior distribution of social space into 'economic' and 'legal'
(1)
realms. It is arguable that not only is this distinction
untenable in itself but also that it generates a series of quite
specific problems which will be set out in due course. In apparent
disregard of these twin problems the particular distribution of
social space in mind constitutes the under-acknowledged starting point
for the perspectives described below. More importantly perhaps,
this division of social space appears to operate as a 'given'
beyond analysis which is unavailable for examination by the positions
which, nevertheless, claim it. Therefore, the prior distribution of
social space into distinct 'legal' and 'economic' instances, first
of all, is not normally justified by the perspectives which rely
upon it and, secondly, constitutes an obstacle to the proper
assessment of legal/social relations. Accordingly, the refusal to
either remove or justify the prior separation of legal and economic
(1) Cutler, A. _et al; (1977) 'Marx's capital and capitalism Today'
London: R.K.P. p. 135.
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instances means that the conditions of the relation, together with
the status of that which is related, cannot be adequately assessed.
In general the analysis of the relation between law and economy
takes one of two forms. Either, law is seen as absolutely autonomous
of economic affairs with the result that law is viewed solely as a
logico-deductive system which is both consistent and self sufficient,
evolving on the basis of the self realisation of an eternal, legal,
essence. For example, legal positivism and logical normativism
achieve just such a cleavage between law and economy. Or else law
is reduced to the economy in one of two ways. First of all, in terms
of law's functionality or co-optability for the 'economic substratum'
which leaves law as a positive, although empty, framework, which is
then subject to various purposes or uses through time. For example,
it will be argued that the work of Karl Renner evinces this general
tendency as do certain of the propositions within the work of Max
(2)
Weber. This particular perspective displays a basic
instrumentalism with regard to the external relationship established
between law and economy. In effect the 'law' is there to be used
at will by successive economic substrata irrespective of the relations
constitutive of each. Secondly, on the basis of the parallel
development of juridic and economic thought, Pashukanis argues that
juridic categories are reflections of objective social relationships
and that the 'form' of law is basically the 'form' of commodity
(3)
exchange. For Pashukanis, the form of law thus expresses the
(2) See Renner, K. (19^-9) • 'The Institutions of Private Law and
their Social Functions'. London: R.K.P. and Weber, M. (1968)
Economy & Society, New York: Bedminster.
(3) Pashukanis, E. (1978). 'Law and Marxism'. London: Ink Links.
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form of commodity exchange or production by virtue of an essential
parallelism between the analysis of law and the analysis of value.
The reduction of law to economy is accomplished in both cases; for
Renner, through a form of instrumentalism and, for Pashu Kanis,
through a sophisticated, albeit ultimately more compelling, variety
of Economism.
A rather different, although linked , procedure can be seen
(4)
in the work of Althusser, Balibar and Poulantzas. This is not
meant to suggest that all three can be reduced to a common or
essential problematic, indeed there are quite substantial differences
between them, but merely to point out some of the similarities in
their respective treatment of the law/economy relation. Althusser,
and to a certain extent Poulantzas, do not directly analyse the
relationship between law and economy but instead, along with Balibar,
assign each their respective locations within the 'totality'. The
conditions of the combination or, more generally, the relation which
holds between law and economy, therefore, is reduced to an effect of
the specific combination of the invariant elements of production.
In the last instance this sort of position can, with some justification,
be described as a more elaborate version of 'economism'. For
example, this perspective quite clearly depends upon a definite
conception of the 'totality' as an expressive force which underlies
and ensures the ultimate coherence of relatively autonomous (regional)
instances.
The distribution of social space into an economic and a distinctly
legal realm, so vehemently affirmed in the positivist insistence on
(A-) See Althusser, L. and Balibar, E. (1970). 'Reading Capital'
London: N.L.B. and Poulantzas, N. (1973) ££. cit.
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abstracting the logical structure of legal systems as a separate
object of analysis, is shared also by 1economistic' and
'instrumentalist' positions on law and economy. Therefore, the
prior separation of 'law' and 'non-law' and law from economy are
effectively parallel positions. This follows for the simple
reason that the two cannot be distinguished by this criterion
alone. This particular distribution of social space is found
again in the work of Cutler _et al who also manage to achieve a
somewhat similar separation between, in this case, the relations of
production and the provision of their (legal) conditions of
•
4. (5)existence.
These then are the general parameters of the law/economy
relation. It is necessary, however, to provide a more detailed
description of each perspective. Whilst paying due regard to the
specific problems encountered by each respective position the
critique will be sustained by the argument that these specific
problems are but instances of a more basic fault. This fault,
it v/ill be argued, is the prior separation of law and economy as
distinct orders of sociality.
The choice of specific advocates of the law/economy relation
is evidently selective in as much as there is a pre-ponderance
of avowedly Marxist accounts. Whilst this may be viewed in terms
of overepresentation it can be justified on the grounds that, by and
large, it has been 'marxist* accounts which have addressed the issue
with more sustained attention than any other. Where the influence
of Marx is not readily discernable it stems, nevertheless, from an
(5) Cutler, A. et al (1977) ££ cit.
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implicit dialogue or from confronting the issue of the economic
and the non-economic (Parsons) or the relation of law and
capitalism (Weber).With certain reservations these rather
different perspectives effectively re-inforce the argument set out
below.
Pashukanis:
For Pashukanis 'the primary basis of lav/ is rooted in commodity
relations' both in that the form of law and the form of value share
a common conceptual structure and in the sense that law is necessary
for commodity production that is, it is seen as a condition of
existence of exchange. As C.J. Arthur notes, "For production to
be carried on as production of commodities, suitable ways of conceiving
social relations and the relations of men to their products have to
(7)
be found and are found in the form of law". The suitability of
law for this particular function lies in the supposed centrality of
the concept of equivalence in law. That is to say the ideal that
all men exist as private and abstract social beings endowed with the
capacity to have and acquire equal rights and equal obligations is
fundamental to the law. As Pashukanis notes "every sort of juridic
relationship is a relationship between subjects. A subject is the
atom of juridic theory: the simplest element, incapable of being
/g)
resolved further". In short, in order for commodities to exchange
(6) See Parsons, T. & Smelse/r, N. (1956), 'Economy and Society',
London: R.K.P. and Weber, M. (1968) a£ cit.
(7) Arthur, C. 'Towards a Materialist Theory of Law', Critique 7
(1976/77) p. 35-
(8) Pashukanis, E. (1951)« 'General Theory of Law and Marxism'
in Babb, H.W. and J.N. Hazard (ed.) (1968) Soviety Legal Philosophy,
Harvard: Johnson Reprint Corp. p. 160.
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it is necessary that agents 'don the mask of owners' and enter into
relation with other 'owners' and other commodities.
The conceptual parallel between the derivation of value in
Marx's Capital and the derivation of the form of law (the category
of the 'subject of rights' is an abstraction from acts of exchange
in the market) is supplemented by the 'necessity' of law as a condition
of existence of commodity production in general and as a condition of
existence of capitalist relations of production in particular. It is
not clear, then, whether law stands in a relation of expression to
relations of production, in which case formal juridical relations of
property are considered as economic relations. For example,
Pashu Kanis asks the question "where shall we search for the unique
(9)
social relationship whose inevitable reflection is the form of law?"
and states that the required relationship is that of the possessors
of commodities. Although elsewhere he remarks that, a juridic
relationship between subjects is merely the other side of the
relationship between the products of labour which have become goods
(commodities)^''^ Furthermore, Pashu Kanis makes the point that
property relationships, " .. are the very same relationships of
(11)
production expressed xn juridic language". The essential
economism entailed in seeing property relationships as relations of
production has been noted by Poulantzas when he points out that,
"... this renders the cardinal distinction between real appropriation
(9) ibid p. 138.
(10) ibid p. 1^0.
(11) ibid p. 1^5j (emphasis added).
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(that is, economic property) and formal juridical property .....
(12)
theoretically impossible".
The inability to draw this distinction between economic and
juridic ownership results in very real difficulties when Pashu Kanis
attempts to theorise the corporate enterprise in terms of a 'lapse'
of private property and the partial suppression of commodity exchange
between formerly separate units of the corporate enterprise.
Moreover, if law is a condition of existence of relations of production
then such a radical separation subverts the essential 'equivalence'
between commodity and legal relations established above. To be sure
Pashu Kanis is ambiguous on this point, at one stage he consistently
denies that law can function as a condition of existence of relations
of production. For example, he states that law can assure or
guarantee relations of production or exchange but it cannot generate
such relations and that in the absence of relations of commodity
production the corresponding juridic relationship is inconceivable.
At another point Pashu Kanis argues that the existence of man as a
subject of rights is a condition of exchange according to the law of
value and consequently views law as a condition of existence of
relations of exchange.
The dual determination of law, once by its function and once
by its reflexive expression of commodity relations, perhaps points
up another more basic weakness within the work of Pashu Kanis.
That is to say the two components of Pashu Kanis' analysis of law,
the form of law as the form of commodity production and law as a
condition of existence of commodity production, are contradictory,
(12) Poulantzas, N. (1973), p. 72n. 20. See also P.Q. Hirst (1979)
op cit for a more recent reiteration of this sort of criticism.
ko
and, as a result of their combination, inherently unstable. If
law does reduce to commodity production, through the nominal
equivalence of their respective forms, then commodity production
establishes its own conditions of existence through the dominance of
its 'form'. As a consequence law cannot at the same time be a
condition of existence of commodity production since the form of
commodity production is a condition of existence of (bourgeois) law.
If the concept of conditions of existence is rejected then the
(13)
economism of the residue is evident. Otherwise Pashukanxs
must posit an immutable essence underlying the variability of all
phenomena; a position which underlines the incipient idealism of
Pashukanis' work. Finally, for legal relations to be seen as
economic relations, and for property relations to be seen as relations
of production expressed in juridic language, there must be a prior
specification or assumption of two separate instances - law and
economy. This must follow if one instance can be expressed in the
language of the other and if one can be seen as the other. A prior
separation exists both ways. Moreover, for Pashukanis, to cite
the equivalence of method as between the derivation of value and the
derivation of law is to imply that political economy, for example, is
applied to distinct domains and, therefore, to distinct instances,
Lav; and Economy. If, on the other hand, law is seen as a condition
of existence then the separation between law and economy is evident
yet again^as are the consequences attendant upon that separation.
(13) For example P.Q. Hirst makes the point that "Possessive right,
the essence of the legal form, is a derivative of commodity
relations between economic subjects. One reductionism, of law
to class oppression, is rejected in the interests of another,
of legal form to commodity form".
Hirst P. (1979)? 'On Law and Ideology' London: Macmillan p. 110.
Poulantzas:
For Poulantzas, "The relation, between legal contract and
exchange is a relation of structures" and the limits of intervention
of one regional structure on the other are ultimately set by the
conditions under which the direct producer is separated from the
(1 if )
means of production. The relation, then, is not based on any
measure of 'equivalence' between contract and exchange, nor is legal
contract an 'expression', or a condition of existence, of an 'economic'
relation. Instead the separation of the direct producer from the
means of production has two series of effects:-
(1) at the economic level this separation results in the concentration
of capital and the socialisation of the labour process;
(2) at the juridico-political level this separation, "sets up agents
of production ... as political and juridical 'individuals-subjects',
(15)
deprived of their economic determination".
The relation between the economic and the juridico-political level
is not an expressive relationship, but depends instead upon the
specific combination of invariant elements of production in a
determinate mode of production, and upon the particular social
formation under consideration. The juridico-political level comprises
two distinct realities and two relatively autonomous levels - the
juridical structures (law) and the political structures (the state).
(l^f) Poulantzas, N. (1973) 'Political Power & Social Classes.
London: N.L.B. p. 89.
(15) ibid p. 128.
(16) ibid p. kZ n.8
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This subdivision of the juridico-political level does not alter the
relationship of effectivity between the relations of production and
law, although it does pose a relative dislocation between law and
state, each conceived as separate, though related, instances of the
social formation.
Although the juridical structure is determined, in the last
instance, by the structure of the labour process the juridical
structure has reciprocal effects on the (economic) class struggle.
This primary effect of the juridical structure consists precisely
in concealing the fact that the relations between agents of production
are specifically class relations. As Poulantzas notes, "This means
that agents of production actually appear as 'individuals' only in
those superstructural relations which are juridical relations. It is
on these juridical relations, and not on relations of production in
the strict sense, that the labour contract and the formal ownership
(17)
of the means of production depend". The implications of this
are clear; individuals are not constituted as subjects for the
relations of (commodity) production nor is the 'individual-subject'
the unique expression of the form of (commodity) production.
Poulantzas is quite clear on this; agents of production only exist
as 'individuals-subjects' in the field of juridical relations at the
level of juridical structure, agents of production do not exist as
individuals-subjects in the production process. This 'isolation'
of individuals-subjects has an effect on socio-economic relations;
namely, it results in the .."ideological conception of the capitalist
relations of production which conceives them as commercial encounters
(17) Poulantzas, N. (1973) ££ cit, p. 128 emphasis added.
^3
between individuals/agents of production on the market". Xn
a word it results in the (ideological) concept of (free) competition.
The effect of the juridical structure is restricted to the field of
socio-economic relations and therefore, it does not alter the structure
of the capitalist relations of production. In the 'juridic sense',
private property belongs to the level of juridical relations; it s
effect is that of an ideological concept which has no substantive
basis in the relations of production but is designed to conceal these
by representing them to agents of production as relations between
individuals-subjects. The ultimate convergence of law and economy
is not secured by any simple correspondence or expression but is
orchestrated by the requirements of the totality. Poulantzas, thus
separates the juridic and economic levels and any relation between
the two is consequently external, being secured by the mode of
production in question. Determination in the last instance by the
character of the labour process ensures the 'unity', albeit a
contradictory one, of the economic and juridic instances conceived as
levels within a totality ultimately 'structured' by the relation
between the direct producer and the means of production which is
ultimately dependent on the mode of possession of, or separation
from, the means of production. Poulantzas, therefore, avoids
rampant 'economism' and 'instrumentalism' although only at the expense
of embracing a formal structural-functional architecture raised on the
basis of structural causation and the implicit notion of an expressive
totality. Thus, law instead of 'reflecting' economic reality or
being a 'condition' of economic production is but an instance of the
'totality'. Furthermore, the fact that the totality of the social
(18) ibid p. 130.
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formation is ultimately structured according to a single determinative
principle namely, the character of the labour process, means that
'legal' relations, necessarilly, 'cohere' with 'economic* relations.
The correspondence is an effect of the structure; it emanates from
(19)
the totality. Therefore, legal relations are assigned a
particular function which, in the case of Poulantzas, reduces to the
portrayal of an imaginary social order where commercial encounters
are meetings between individual human subjects. Two very important
consequences follow from this. First of all, law and economy are
assigned distinct places within the social structure. Secondly, each
is an effect of the structure (structural causation). The picture
is complicated, further, by the ultimate determination of the whole
by the economic. To be sure, this is no simple economism, but it
does have the effect of drawing a purely arbitrary distinction between
law and economy.
In his last book, State, Power, Socialism, Poulantzas attempts
to jettison some of the more unacceptable implications of his earlier
work. This reformulation starts by attempting to take seriously the
profound interconnection of state and social relations. Or in other
words, .. "the necessity of relating the state institutional structure
to the capitalist relations of production and social division of labour"^'
Thus the state is both rooted in the field of social relations and at
the same time has a vital role in their constitution and reproduction.
This is not the entire story, however, for the state also exhibits a
(19) For an elaboration of this argument see Cutler e_t al (1977)
especially Chapter 8 and 9«
(20) Poulantzas, N. (1978). State, Power, Socialism,
London, N.L.B. p. 123«
'peculiar material framework' irreducible to the structure of social
relations but nonetheless co-extensive with them. The state,
therefore, is poised rather precariously on the edge of the field of
social relations of which the state is both member and alien, part and
non-part. The picture is further compounded when the' original
definition of the state as the mere 'locus' for the condensation of
a balance of forces is re-affirmed. All this is maintained within
a general adherence to an implicit conception of the 'totality' and
a vision of ideology as the cement of the social formation.
No doubt there are a number of telling ambiguities in what
(21)
Stuart Hall, in his postcript to Poulantzas, calls an 'unfinished'
and 'unsettled' work. Nevertheless, there are certain observations
on the nature of law which are richly suggestive. For example,
Poulantzas demonstrates the inherence of law in the social order ..
"Law is always present from the beginning in the social order: it
does not arrive post festum to put order into a pre-existing state
of nature. For as the codification of both prohibitions and positive
injunctions law is a constitutive element of the politico-social
"(22)
field. Likewise the fact that .."the capitalist separation
of state and economy was never anything other than the specifically
(2
capitalist form of the state's presence in the relations of production"
appears to allow for a rather different conception of the interconnectedne
of state, and economy and, by implication, law. This allowance is
(21) Hall, S. (1980) 'The Legacy of Nicos Poulantzas'
New Left Review, 119-
(22) Poulantzas, N. (1978) ojd cit p. 83.
(23) ibid p. 167.
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indeed taken up in what Poulantzas terms, the very delimitation
(24)
of the respective spaces of the state and the economy".
Furthermore, Poulantzas argues quite explicitly that the roots of
the specific features of 'capitalist' law... "have to be sought in
(25)
the social division of labour and the relations of production"
which evidences a clear break with those who base the .."specificity
of the capitalist juridical system in the sphere of circulation of
/ p r \
capital and commodity-exchange". Finally, Poulantzas does
indeed go some way toward specifying exactly how law is rooted in
the relations of production: "The axiomatic system of capitalist
law constitutes the framework wherein agents who are totally dispossessed
of their means of production are given formal cohesion ... The
formal and abstract character of law is inextricably bound up with the
real fracturing of the social body in the social division of labour -
that is to say, with the individualisation of agents that takes place
(27)
m the capitalist labour process". Therefore, over and against
those who, like Pashukanis, seek to derive state and law from
commodity-exchange and relations of circulation, Poulantzas tries
instead to find law and state from within the relations of production.
That this position is plagued with internal difficulties stems in the
main from the retention of the concept of a 'totality' and the
positioning of the state as the central organising instance which is
at once historically determinate as well as representing nothing other
than the essential moment of class struggle.
(24) ibid p. 166.
(25) ibid p. 86.
(26) ibid p. 86.
(27) ibid p. 86.
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Balibar:
Balibar is interesting for two main reasons. First of all,
he manifests the more general components of a more or less orthodox
Althusserian position. Secondly, for the reason that within the
general framework he presents a specific attempt to deal with law
and in particular 'possession' based upon an interpretation of
Marx which, if not altogether novel, is at least intriguing.
The starting point for Balibar and for that matter Althusser
and Poulantzas, is the definition of a mode of production as a
system of forms representing one state of the variation of a set of
invariant elements. These elements are:-
(1) The Labourer (Labour power).
(2) The means of production (object of labour and means of labour).
(3) The agent of appropriation of surplus labour.
These three elements are subject to two relations or connexions
between them. The relations, or connexions, refer to the articulation
of the three elements and not to the elements themselves.
The two relations or connexions are:-
(a) The relation of real appropriation; 'the real material
appropriation of the means of production by the producer in
the labour process'; the appropriation of nature by man.
For example, in the individual appropriation of natural
objects the labourer controls himself. This relation, then,
is the connexion between the direct producer and the appropriate
means of immediate production, between labour power and the
relevant means of production. Balibar says of this relation
"Nowhere does the Capitalist intervene as owner; only the
k8
(2.8)
labourer, means of labour and the object of labour".
^_
(Althusser diverges slightly sine he characterises this
relation of real appropriation as the productive forces
understood as relations rather than as things or 'technological
imperatives1. Accordingly, despite the 'Stalinist' overtones
Althussers position should not be confused with the idea that
the dislocation between the forces and relations of production
constitutes the 'motor' of history. Such a conception is
generally induced by arguing the irrepressible expansionism
of the forces of production which thus burst assunder the
corresponding relations of production thereby calling for and
( 29)
in effect generating new relations of production).
(b) The relation of (Economic) property. This connexion .."describes
one of the presuppositions of capitalist production: Capital
is the owner of all the means of production and of labour,
and therefore it is the owner of the entire product".
In a word the mode of appropriation of surplus labour and the
form of its (social) distribution. (Again Althusser
characterises this property relation as the 'relations of productioi
(28) Althusser, L. & Balibar, E. (1970) 'Reading Capital'
London: N.L.B. p. 213*
(29) Lor a forcefull criticism of this conception of 'production'
and 'social' relations see Hindess, B. and Hirst, P. (1975)
'Pre-Capitalist Modes of Production', London: R.K.P and
'Mode of Production and Social Formation' London: Macmillan
(1977)* Also for a defence of Balibar's contribution in
particular see Cohen, G. (1979) 'Karl Marx's Theory of History:
A Defence', Oxford: O.U.P., which argues for the necessary
separation of forces and relations of production.
(30) Balibar, E. (1970) 0£ cit p. 213.
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For Balibar, this property relation is itself specified
according to several complex forms, notably the duality of
'possession' (use, enjoyment) and 'property' (property strictly
(31)
speaking)". Accordingly, the juridic concept of property
does not enter at all as a connexion between the invariant elements
but is instead specified by the juridic instance, the ultimate
foundation of which is located within the specific manner in which
these two connexions 'combine' the elements of production. Strictly
speaking then, juridic property belongs to, or rather is a level
within, the superstructure. Its role appears to be the 'ideological'
interpretation, specification or expression of the 'property relation'
and, therefore, it does not intervene either directly between the
elements or as a relation of those elements to each other. Therefore,
the division between Economic and Juridic structures is effected as
a division between material reality (Economic) and ideology (law).
It is the homology or non-homology of the two relations - real
appropriation and the property relation - which determines the
essential meaning of the phrase - determination of a mode of
production by the economic in the last instance. In the last
instance the combination of forces and relations of production, or
the relation between the two connexions, ultimately determines each
level, including the juridic, within a mode of production.
This, broadly speaking and with certain minor modifications is
the position shared by Balibar, Althusser and Poulantzas. Balibar,
however, has developed the relation between law and economy considerably
further than the other two. Whilst he never escapes the problems of
an ultimate economism and the prior separation of law and economy
(31) ibid p. 213-
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as instances he does at least offer a framework which enables a
proper theorisation of the divorce between ownership and control.
Although in the end it can be argued that the tensions introduced by
two or more competing conceptions of the law/economy relation are
inescapable and ultimately degenerate into serious contradictions.
Nevertheless, it is important to examine Balibar's work mainlyfor
the way in which he poses the problem and/or the issues raised as a
result of posing the problem in that particular way.
The starting point for an analysis of the relationship between
the labour process and the legal structure, for Balibar, is the
prior "... question of distinguishing sharply between the connexion
(32)
that we have called 'property' and the law of property". In
other words 'property' logically preceeds the law of property and
therefore, cannot be dependent on the law of property for its
existence. On this basis law cannot be a condition of existence of
the property relation and consequently cannot function as a condition
of existence of relations of production. It is necessary for
Balibar to draw this distinction, between property and the law of
property, in order for him to theorise the relationship between the
economic and juridic instances as the articulation of regional structures
each with their own relative autonomy. This follows because it is
the relation between the property connexion and the relation of real
appropriation which defines the determinism of the 'economic' in the
last instance. Property, therefore, is a determinant of juridic
property. Balibar is quite insistent that the concept of
'articulation' used here precludes the simple duplication of one
regional structure by another. Thus the relation between law and
(32) Balibar, E. (1970) 0£ cit.
/-tX b]
51 A
economy is not one of duplication but of the articulation of two
heterogeneous instances. For example, Balibar makes the point
that the "... very concept of expression is difficult .... once it
no longer means duplication but rather the articulation of two
heterogeneous instances".Moreover, "... since contradictions
are induced within the law itself by its non-<correspondence with
the relations of production, law must be distinct and second in
(34)
order of analysis to the relations of production". Several
points are clearly established in this and in following passages.
They are as follows:- First of all, Law is part of, or belongs, to
the superstructure,-not in the crude sense of being a mirror image
or duplicate of the economic base - but as a regional instance replete
with its own relative autonomy. It has often been argued that
relative autonomy is an inadequate concept with which to grasp the
law/economy relation and that the concept of relative autonomy
contains an inherent reductionism in that it slides inexorably into
economism. For example, Hindess & Hirst, argue that in the absence
of any attempt to specify the conditions and the mechanisms of
(35)relative autonomy this conclusion is unavoidable. Further,
relative autonomy requires a guiding instance which is capable of
ensuring that autonomous levels are only relatively autonomous. That
is to say, something is required which will produce some sort of
overall coherence. Secondly, Law is secondary to relations of
(33) Balibar, E. (1970) ojd cit. p. 229.
(3^) Balibar, E. (1970) ojo cit. p. 228.
(35) See in particular Hindess, B. (1978) 'Classes and Politics in
Marxist Theory' in 'Power and the State' (ed). Littlejohn, G.
et al, London: Groom Helm. (pp. 72 - 98) and Hirst, P. (1977)
'Economic Classes and Politics' in 'Class & Class Structure'
(ed). Hunt, A. London, L.9-.W. (pp. 125 - 155).
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production and, therefore, can be theorised on the basis of its
non-correspondence with the relations of production. There are
obvious conceptual parallels between the Stalinist and technicist
conceptions of the economic foces in terms of their correspondence
or non-correspondence with relations of production. For this
'technicist' position Law is effectively exhausted by the question
of its correspondence or non-correspondence with the 'economic'.
No other relation is conceivable between these two (separate)
levels - either law is an adequate expression or duplicate of the
economy or it is not. If law does not correspond then it is because
the economy has transformed itself and will eventually manage to
secure a new correspondence in law.
Thirdly, it is quite clear that neither law's functionality nor
its analytic subservience to relations of production can guarantee the
generation of law. For example, Balibar argues that, "What we can
see from the reproduction of economic relations is the necessary function
of the law with respect to the system of economic relations itself,
and the structural conditions to which it is therefore subordinate;
but not the generation of the instance of the law itself in the social
formation". Thus Balibar does not assume that because law may
be functional for production relations that this, necessarily, explains
its genesis. Balibar's precise meaning is demonstrated by the fact
that he reserves, or restricts, the functionality of law to the
re-production of economic relations thereby excluding law from holding
(37)
as a prior condition of those relations as such.
(36) Balibar, E. (1970) ££ cit. p. 229. As we shall see there are
certain parallels to be drawn between this particular point and
the work of Cutler et al (1977) who argue a substantially similar
position.
(37) See, for.example, Hadden, T. (1977)) Company Law & Capitalism'
London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. He argues that a cie facto form
of Joint Stock Enterprise existed prior to the relevant 'enabling'
codes of Company Law. Thus the legal form of the Joint Stock
Enterprise was only of use in the reproduction of 'corporate' Capita
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Nevertheless, this does not prevent Balibar from arguing at the
same time that "... the whole of the economic structure of the
capitalist mode of production from the immediate process of production
to circulation and the distribution of the social product, presupposes
the existence of a legal system; the basic elements of which are the
("^8
law of property and the law of contract". The legal system
apparently functions as a condition of existence of the capitalist
mode of production. It is difficult to envisage, however, quite how
the formulation of the mode of production as a coherent totality
structured in the last resort by the combination of the property
connexion and the relation of real appropriation can avoid becoming
any more than tautological with regard to the reproduction of the
relations of production.
Quite simply Law, as a level within the mode of production, is
by definition a pre-condition of reproduction. Insofar as law is
construed as a condition of existence of relations of production
and consequently of the mode of production then law is external to
the mode of production as well as being a level within the mode of
production. Moreover, law is effectively a condition of itself -
self determined and self secure. There is of course a solution to
this evident contradiction but it is a solution which is entirely
circular namely the capitalist mode of production contains an economic
and a legal structure each level, as members of the same mode of
production, presupposes the other. Therefore, the concept of a
'totality', again ensures the coincidence and ultimate coherence of
the dual determinants of law.
(38) Balibar, E. (1970) ££ cit. p. 230.
5^
Fourthly, Balibar points out that the peculiarity of the
(capitalist) legal system "... is its abstract universalistic
*
character: by which .... this syfem simply distributes the concrete
beings which can support its functions into two categories within
each of which there is no pertinent distinction from the legal
point of view: the category of human persons and the category of
things. The property relation is established exclusively between
human persons and things (or between what are reputed to be persons
and what are reputed to be things); the contract relation is
(39)established exclusively between persons". Furthermore, Balibar
goes on to argue that .. "this universality of the legal system
reflects, in the strict sense, another universality which is part
of the economic structure: the universality of commodity exchange".^ ^
Accordingly, the necessary presence of universal categories (for
example 'commodity') ensures the correspondence of law and economy.
There are evident similarities between this sort of perspective and
that of Pashukanis. But Balibar himself voices doubts over the very
concept of expression. For example, he argues that the Hegelian
concept of Civil society "... includes both the economic system of
the division of labour and exchange, and the sphere of private law.
There is, therefore, an immediate identity of appropriation in the
'economic' sense and legal property, and, in consequence, if the
second can be designated as an 'expression' of the first, it is a
(41 )
necessarily adequate expression or duplication". As we have
seen already for Balibar these two aspects are sharply distinct which
would seem to rule out any concept of duplication or correspondence.
(39) Balibar, E. (1970) o£ cit. p. 230.
(40) ibid p. 230.
(^1) Balibar, E. (1970) ojc cit. p. 227.
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Finally, "whereas the 'lav; of property' is characterised as
universalistic, introducing no differences between the things
possessed and their uses, the only property which is significant
from the point of view of the structure of the production process
(42)
is the ownership of the means of production". A dislocation
obtains between the law of property and economic ownership or the
distribution of the means of production. The law of property can
then be seen as a generalised extension of the ownership of the
means of production. Similarly, the labour contract is an extension
of wage labour, an extension of a social relation of production.
Contract and property are two separate forms in law but they define
a single connexion within the economic structure ... "the ownership
of the means of production and productive wage labour define a
(43)
single connexion, a single relation of production". A similar
conclusion is reached by Renner who argues that one economic process
corresponds to a whole group of legal categories - although the
substitution of 'process' for 'relations' and 'categories' for 'forms'
betrays a far greater distance between the two than is first assumed.
The important point is that both view law as a separate level - either
as a collection of forms effectively exhausted by two fundamental
categories (Balibar) or as a collection of categories. Where they
differ is that Balibar sees in these forms the generalised extension
(42) Balibar, E. (1970) ojo cit. p. 231.
(43) ibid p. 232. See also Kinsey, R. 'Despotism and Legality'
in 'Capitalism and the Rule of Law' (ed). Fine, B. et al
(1979) London: Hutchinson. Kinsey appears to argue,
amongst other things, that the organisation and control
of production reaches its highest expression in the despotism
of legality.
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of a relation of production, an ideological specification or
derivation, whereas Renner sees legal categories in their functional
subservience to one economic process. Whilst the elements - economic
and juridic instances - are substantially similar the relation between
them, together with the specific determinants of each - legal logic
or labour process are substantially dissimilar. Nevertheless,
the concept of law as a generalised extension of relations of production
cannot adequately grasp the law/economy connection. At most the
concept simply resonates the general economic determinism of the last
instance. It most assuredly does not develop any new relation between
the legal and economic instances although it does supply a variation
in the imagery.
Taken as a whole there is a distinct difference in Balibar's
work between the analysis of the legal system, or the legal structure,
as a 'functional' level within the capitalist mode of production and
the concrete analysis of the relationship between property and the
law of property. As a functional level law is structured by the
mode of production which is in turn determined by the labour process;
a kind of remote or mediated economism. Quite clearly, this position
is rendered ambiguous if serious attention is paid to the additional
specification of law as a condition of existence of relations of
production. The central importance of law as a level within the
mode of production provides the main thrust in Balibar's work on the
general location of lav/ with respect to economy. Insofar as he
makes the relation between the labour process and the law of property
the focus of his work, however, then the connexion between law and
economy is far more complex since the relation is founded internally
within the relations of production. This connexion does seem to
replicate the economist overtones of Pashukanis but, at the same
time, it generates a whole series of internal dislocations between
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possession, on the one side, and the law of property, on the other.
As a result a tension is induced between law as an ideological or
functional level within the mode of production and the foundation
of law in the relations of production that is, law is considered only
in relation to its position within the social relations of production.
In this sense juridical property is but one moment in the possession
of /separation from the means of production - it is not a separate
level merely a distinct kind of relation of possession of /separation
from the means of production.
In his later work on the dictatorship of the proletariat
Balibar poses the problem of law and economy in somewhat sharper
(44)terms. Balibar suggests that a consistent anti-instrumentalism
requires that lav/ cannot be the basis of the dictatorship of the
bourgeoisie. Law cannot be its own source nor can it be locked in
mutual relation, and hence circularity, with democracy - democracy
guarantees law which in turn guarantees democracy. In short, law
must either reduce to class power, or the mode of production, or else
it ends up confirming the bourgeois fiction that law is the law
namely, law is its own source subject to no conditions of existence.
In this he seems to forget the more sensitive outline of the relation
between property and the law of property developed in his earlier work
and remembers the dominant conception of law as an instance of the
mode of production. The consequences of a full blown extension of
what remains only a suggestion in Balibar's work will be examined
later. Suffice it to say that in this suggestion one finds both the
differences between Balibar and the earlier work of Poulantzas and a
more productive aspect of the law/economy relation.
(kk) Balibar, E. (1976)'On the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'
London: NLB.
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To summarise, Balibar argues that law primarily belongs to
the superstructure. Therefore, he is at one with Poulantzas and
Althusser since they each state that law and economy are two
separate instances ultimately structured in their relative autonomy
by the nature of the labour process specific to a determinate mode
of production. This general thrust can be neither denied nor
ignored. Although contained within this general thrust, or perhaps
in spite of it, there are a number of more complex sensitive, and
contradictory indications on law and economy. But in the last
resort, these indications vanish in the wake of the reassertion of the
dominant position on law as an instance of a determinate mode of
production. Balibar's subsequent work confirms the hegemonic thrust
of such a position.
Renner:
Karl Renner is concerned primarily with the impact of economic
forces and social changes on the functions of the legal institutions
(Zfq)
of private law. A prior separation, therefore, obtains between
the economic and social realms on one side and legal institutions on
the other. Any relation is theorised in functional terms on the
basis of a functional correspondence or non-correspondence between the
economic substratum and the legal system. The fundamental problem
is posed in terms of the adaptation of relatively immutable legal
frameworks to successive (economic) relations of production -
pre-capitalist, capitalist and post capitalist or corporatist
relations of production. The central theme is that law as such is
static and only its functions change. Renner embraces both
(^5) Renner, K. (19^9) 'The Institutions of Private Law & their
Social Functions', London: R.K.P.
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instrumentalism and (legal) positivism and he does so on the
fundamental premise that law, as law, is quite separate and self
contained, it provides its own conditions of existence. Law is
its own source. To be sure Renner does attempt to introduce a
dialectic between function and law although this attempt is evidently
contradictory given the starting point and the instrumentalist and
positivist problematic in which he is situated.
Renner's main concern is with the functional development of
private property as the legal framework of capitalist relations of
production. Since law is indifferent to its function and since
lav/ is effectively its own source, Renner does not so much produce
a sociology of law as an analysis of the social functions of law.
Law, as the law, is sufficient unto itself and, therefore, does not
constitute an object of sociology. As a positive system law is
given and only its functionality constitutes a legitimate object
of analysis v/ith the result that the determinants, or the conditions
of existence, of law are outside the scope of Renner's analysis.
The cornerstone of Renner's work is his analysis of property.
This analysis hinges upon two further concepts; juridic individualism
and economic function. Whereas juridic individualism characterises
the law of property economic function refers to the power of command
over large aggregates of labour power v/hich defines its social
utility. In a word, Renner distinguishes between the social or
collective function of law and its individualistic form.
Notwithstanding the general separation of legal and economic orders,
Renner appears to assume that the law of property and property are
co-extensive. This apparent failure to register the internal
dislocation within property, between its so called 'juridic' and
'economic' aspects, stems from Renner's insistance that 'property'
is unified by its legal essence on one side and that its functions
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are reified on the other. Property and the law of property are
seen as identical and in their identity they are counterposed to
its social utility. Accordingly, Renner is unable to see the
relative 'dissolution' of the 'property' form as directly bound up
with the predominance of the corporate organisation of relations
of production. Instead, on one side, he sees the corporate economy
and, on the other, private individualistic law. It follows from
this actual co-existence that a functional relation holds
between the two. Renner is thereby restricted to analysing the
conditions of that functional relation seeing the development of
legal institutions as the locus of that functionality. For Renner,
the development of the complementary 'institutions' of contract,
loan and lease ensures that the relation between the law of property,
which is static, and the relations of production, which are variable,
is in fact functional. The re-activation or re-ordering of legal
institutions in accordance with specifically 'capitalist' property
relations constitues the mechanism whereby the untransformed norm
is functionally transformed. The conditions of this re-ordering
are not theorised by Renner and can only be explained through a
relation of functional necessity. Since he concerns himself with
positive law only to the extent that it 'generates' institutions
which are open to 'scientific' observation and analysis then Renner
can, with justification, be located within the confines of another
positivism, that is positivism as understood in sociology. This
sort of analysis has the somewhat dubious merit of appearing to
genuflect before the altar of legal absolutism at the same time as
it denotes a residue of concrete institutions amenable to empirical
analysis.
Essentially, Renner, overemphasises the importance of juridic
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property for economic property with the result that he concludes that
in the end only individuals can work, command and possess things.
This represents the direct extension of juridic categories to economic
relations with the result that relations of production are seen
exclusively as relations between persons and things. Consequently any
analysis of the relations of corporate organisation in their own right
is denied to Renner. As Balibar notes, from the standpoint of
production it is the ownership or distribution of the means of
production which is important, not the juridic form of private
individualistic property relations. For Balibar the juridic form
provides the ideological 'wrapper' £f relations of production but not
their conditions of existence. The fact that 'possession' and
'economic ownership' of the means of production can be lodged at
respective levels of the corporate structure, thereby registering the
separation of the components of private property from each other,
indicates that the 'form' of individualistic property in the juridic
sense, is irrelevant from the standpoint of production. Furthermore,
Gurvitch makes the point that Renner fails to take notice of the
existence of deeper levels of law which vary in 'direct and immediate
functional relation with the totality of social life' and that the
transformation of the structures of jural institutions can occur
independently and in opposition to abstract propositions of lav/.
Such criticism is to some extent misplaced since this is perhaps
Renner's point. Whilst it remains true that Renner draws the
distinction between law and function externally and that Gurvitch
sees the distinction as an internal expression of frameworks, systems
and kinds of lav/ each corresponding to, and being formed by,
respectively - collective groups, inclusive societies, and forms of
sociality - at bottom they are almost saying the same thing only using
competing concepts and different lines of demarcation between law
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and non-law that is based on diverse levels of abstraction or
generalisation. <W>
Renner, therefore, effects a prior separation between law and
economy, sees law in an instrumentalist sense as something to be
used by the economic relations of production, and views the conditions
of that utility as framed by the necessary functionality of law for
production. All this takes place within a positivist insistence on
the role of institutions and a positivist insistence on the origin
and the self sufficiency of Law as a system. In concrete terms he
is unable to distinguish between 'property' and the law of property
and his analysis of the corporation is inadequate by virtue of the
failure to view the corporation as a distinct organisational form.
This last point derives from the over extension of the legal categories
- person and thing - to relations of production. Thus legal
categories remain intact and the relations of production are distended
in order to enter a functional correspondence between law and economy.
This particular portrait of law is extremely important when it comes
to assessing the form and impact of anti-trust legislation since it
imputes a basic capability to law. It will be argued that any such
capacity is fundamentally mistaken.
Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain:
An underlying continuity with Renner can be traced in the work of
Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussain. Law, for Renner, does not cause
economic development although it may nonetheless be a condition of it.
For example, law makes the transformation of property into capital
possible but it is not itself the agency of transformation. The
cause is external to law. Likewise law confers the power to act
(46) Gurvitch, G. (1947)'The Sociology of Law'. London: K.K.P.
upon the owner but it doesn't determine his action. Cutler et al
appear to argue a somewhat similar position by stating that law is
a condition of existence of determinate relations of production.
For them and for Renner the law/economy relation is not posed as the
determination of one by the other, that is to say, as a unilateral
determination of law by the economy or vice versa. On the contrary
political process is the key to the law/economy relation. For Renner,
it takes the form of a functional or institutional mediation or
connexion between law and economy and for Cutler et al it takes the
form of conditions of existence and the political and social practices
which meet those conditions. In the last resort Cutler et al also
have no choice but to rely upon some sort of functional explanation of
the relationship between law and economy.
In the context of their radical separation of law and economy
the notion of conditions of existence does not, of itself, entail
a break with other theories of law and economy. To use Kuhn's
modest phrase, Pashukanis 'anticipated' Cutler et al in his use,
albeit an ambiguous use, of the notion of law as a condition of
existence of relations of production. This specific continuity
with certain aspects of the work of Pashukanis and Renner is matched
by their collective adherence to a general separation of law and
economy as distinct realms.
Cutler et al on law and economy can best be summarised by the
following statement of their position .... "Capitalist forms of
possession are ... dependent on definite legal and political conditions
(if7)
of existence". This statement contains two important implications
(^7) Cutler et al. (1977) 'Marx's Capital & Capitalism Today',
London. R.K.P. Vol. I, p. 2^6.
(1) In that 'capitalist forms of possession' refers to the specific
form of social possession entailed in capitalist relations of
production. Some "... definite social form of possession of the
means and conditions of production" is necessary for production to
take place at all.^^ Possession, in some form or another is a
precondition of all production, it is a universal requirement of
production. I_f production then 'possession' must have already
been secured is the form of their argument.
(2) Forms of possession are firmly separated from their legal
conditions of existence. Production and law are two distinct realms
and 'possession' is divided according to its juridic and economic
(49)
aspects. 'Forms of possession' refers to the mode of exclusive
possession of the means of production and the ability to set production
in motion. The legal conditions of an exclusive possession are many
and varied. No one legal form 'corresponds' to a particular mode
of exclusive possession, no one legal system is entrenched in and
secured by a particular mode of production. There is no reason why
law cannot be equally functional for diverse relations of production.
For example, the individualistic form of juridic property can function
equally well as a condition of entrepreneurial relations of production
and as a condition of corporate relations of production - providing
that the corporation is viewed as an economic agent in its own right.
Law despite its position as a condition of determinate relations of
production and despite the apparent specificity of law vis-a-vis
determinate relations of production appears to reduce to an empty
instrumentality, a form with no content. The functional circle would
seem to be closed.
(48) Cutler, et al (1977) oja cit. p. 220.
(49) ibid p. 244.
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Cutler et al end up embracing a functional explanation of the
relation between law and economy by virtue of the manner of their
rejection of determination in the last instance by the 'economic' -
whether the economic is conceived as forces or relations of production.
They argue as follows "To say that capitalist relations of production
presuppose a legal system with definite forms of property and contract
is merely to specify some abstract and general conditions which a
legal system must meet if it is to be compatible with capitalist
production. But the concept of determinate relations of production
does not tell us in what precise form those effects will be secured
nor does it tell us the precise character of the relations which
secure them". The effects pre-supposed in specifying determinate
relations of production are defined as the conditions of existence of
those relations. Since capitalist relations of production require
that means of production and labour power take the commodity form
a legal system is required in order to define and sanction property
in the form of commodities and to specify and guarantee contracts of
(51)
sale and purchase. The nub of their argument is that if there
are capitalist relations of production then a legal system of a
specific character must 'emerge' to service or facilitate them.
The general concrete relation between law and economy is quite
definitely absent and it is absent on the sole condition that the
connexion can only be specified either as an abstract functionality or
as empirically diverse. Any other connexion reduces to the economy
effectively specifying and securing its own conditions of existence,
(50) Cutler et al (197?) Vol. I, p. 208 ££ cit.
(51) ibid p. 208.
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its own specific legal forms. This argument follows whether the
mechanism which relates law and economy is the correspondence or
non-correspondence of forces or relations of production leading to
the necessary establishment or re-establishment of an equilibrium or,
whether the economy delimits the 'form', or the structural features,
of law and indicates only a residual role for the exercise of relative
autonomy. Even though both conceptions presuppose the distribution
of social space between legal and economic realms the economic and
legal can have no separate existence in either conception. Cutler
et al argue that they can have no separate existence since forces or
relations of production presage or predetermine the corresponding
legal forms or contents and thus create their own conditions of
existence and, therefore, themselves. Both variations collapse
because of their internal contradictions. Although far from providing
a way out of this impasse the concept of relative autonomy would only
compound the problems it supposedly solves - not least among them
being that autonomy, in being qualified, is emasculated.
Strictly speaking, for Cutler et al, there is a further distinction
between "... conditions of existence and the social relation and
(52)
practices which provide them". Whereas conditions of existence
can be 'inferred' from the concept of determinate relations of
production the means and the form in which these conditions are
provided cannot. On one side there are relations of production
which specify their conditions of existence in purely abstract 'quasi-
functional' terms and, on the other, there are the means of rendering
those abstract functional conditions a specific form. In
'precapitalist modes of production' Hindess and Hirst were able to
(52) Cutler et al (1977) Vol. I, p. 219- ££ cit.
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argue that the economic is determinant "... in the sense that the
conditions of existence of the dominant relations of production
assign to each of the (structural) levels a certain form of effectivity
(53)
and mode of intervention with respect to the other levels".
This position is now explicitly rejected. In the earlier work the
task of providing conditions of existence was assigned to structural
levels within the mode of production. These conditions were secured
by rational extension from the concept of the mode of production or
relations of production whilst a measure of regional autonomy was
retained with respect to the empirical means by which those conditions
were eventually secured, and with regard to their final 'form'.
The difference between a relation whereby the conditions of
existence are secured through being assigned to specific levels within
a structured totality and no relation at all, in a word, the difference
between Hindess & Hirst's previous position and Cutler et al's current
position, is at first sight considerable. Aside from rejecting the
concept of mode of production as a structured totality determined by
the economic in the last instance Cutler et al only remove the idea
g-erseral send nece-ss&ry
that law and economy are in any^relation at all from their present
position. In the abstract sense there is a 'quasi-functional'
relation between law and economy which derives from the logical
necessity of law for economy. They argue that if determinate
relations of production obtain, therefore, so must a law of contract
and a law of property. In a word this is a logical analysis couched
in functional terms and demonstrated entirely within 'discourse'.
At the same time, however, the legal institutions of property and
contract in their empirical diversity fulfill those abstract
functions - not by any necessity, rational projection or extension
(53) Hindess & Hirst, P. (1975) ££ cit. p. 13.
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but by a process subject to specific conjunctural determinants.
The analysis ends there, some attempt at introducing political
process, pragmatic considerations or emergent studies in legal
development may be made but the end result is the same. Cutler
et al have produced the most radical form of the separation between
the specific 'empirical' form of legal institutions and the logical-
functional complex of relations of production and their conditions
of existence. The attempted rejection of all epistemology, and
hence all modes of representation or correlation between discourse
and reality, has, paradoxically, ended up reproducing discourse on
one side - relations of production and the conditions of existence
which can be inferred from them - and, on the other, the 'empirical'
diversity in which the law of contract/property is realised in specific
conjunctures. Therefore, Cutler _et al appear to produce what amounts
to the same combination of rationalist and empiricist conceptions for
(54)
which they berate classical Marxism.
Law & Society.
The analysis of law and economy does not only surface specifically
in those works which take the idea of a relation between law and
economy seriously. The relation is often subsumed under more general
considerations which take the law/society nexus as their point of
departure. A common theme persists in these positions: a theme
which is reflected particularly in the work of Alice Tay. The
theme in question stresses the intactness of the concept of juridic
property whilst noting the proliferation of different types of
(54) Cutler e_t al (1977) ojd cit. Vol. I, p. 220. Although it
should be added that they refuse to recognise the conventional
distinction between discourse and reality on the grounds that
it invariably privileges one form of epistemological relation
over another, they argue that any such privilege can only be
accorded by fiat. Therefore, the distinction between knowledge
and being is artificial.
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property. This proliferation does not affect the abstract concept
of private property but merely induces specific regulations for, or
against, distinct types of property (Tay) or; the development and
extension of various satellite institutions in order to square jural
and economic reality (Berle & Means) or more consequentially, the
mutual transformation of deeper legal realities and social relations
(55)
in the context of abstract juridic stasis (Gurvitch). In almost
all these formulations law appears as an abstract positive residue
whilst its institutions, functions, manifest variations or its
relation with forms of sociality are granted at least a measure of
1 autonomy'.
From the standpoint of an examination of the relation between
Lav/ and economy these approaches mark a considerable distance from the
work of Pashukanis and Balibar. Whereas Pashukanis sees that the
essence of law is inextricably bound up with its form, a form which in
relations of commodity production is stamped throughout with notions
of equivalence derived precisely from those same relations, the above
theorists, with the possible exception of Gurvitch, each seem to
insulate the realm of law from its concrete social functions.
There is also a considerable difference between Balibar's position
on law as an instance of the social formation ultimately determined
by the relations of possession of and separation from the means of
production and a position which holds that law is distinct with regard
to its juridic and its functional/institutional aspects. The
particular problems involved in the former in no way provide grounds
(55) See Tay, A. 'Law, the Citizen & the State' in Kamenka, E. et al
(eds.) (1978), 'Law and Society', London: Edward Arnold;
Berle, A. & Means, G. (1967), 'The Modern Corporation and
Private Property' New York: Harcourt Brace and Gurvitch, G.
(19^7) ££ cit.
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for the acceptance of the latter. Pashukanis' economism is
matched by the basic instrumentalism with respect to law of, for
instance, Renner, Tay and to a much lesser extent, Gurvitch, but it
is not transcended by it.
It has been argued that the inadequate specification of law/
economy stems directly from the failure to pose the initial problem
in the proper manner. For example, the concept of a relation between
law and economy is inadequate to the relations under consideration
namely, the ownership of /separation from the means of reproduction
of material existence. If this argument is sustained then the twin
problems of Economism and Instrumentalism are each the result of
conceiving the 'economic' and the 'legal' as separate realms so that
the one can then be reduced to the other - as in economism - or used
by the other - as in Instrumentalism. Alternatively, i_f the two
instances are not assumed to be distinct concepts ultimately referring
to different ontological objects and i_f the relations of ownership
of/ separation from the means of re-production of material existence
are sharply focused then it is possible to avoid both economism and
instrumentalism and, it is argued, the pitfalls of positivism and
functionalism.
To develop this further, there is a profound difference between
the reduction of a legal instance, qua instance, to the economic
instance and the radical dissolution of instances - economic and
juridic - as such. Consequently, all that is left in this formulation,
is the mode of possession of, and separation from the means of productior
In other words the social relations of reproduction of material
existence in their entire complexity. This would seem to avoid the
reliance on structural determination, or co-ordination, of instances
of the mode of production and the ultimate drift into economism; it
avoids the economism of, for example, Pashukanis; and it avoids the
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positivism and instrumentalism of, for example, Renner. It also
avoids the functional hybrid proposed by Cutler et al. But does it
reduce the specificity involved in the analysis of law/economy with
the result that the concepts involved are inadequate to law and
economy? Or, on the other hand, does this formulation drift into
a more profound economism reminiscent of certain aspects of Pashukanis?
The answer depends in part on the realisation that in order to posit
the 'juridic' aspect of relations of production it is not necessary
to invoke an abstract connexion between a juridic instance,
superstructure, or form and an economic process. The position
advanced here only indicates the developed concept of relations of
production, i.e., the regulation of possession. The object addressed
by Sociology is the social relations of reproduction. It is not the
case that there are two separate forms of discourse that is to say a
political economy £f economic processes and a juris prudential analysis
V-/
of Law.^^ Nor is sociology applied in positivist fashion to a
pre-existent jural reality. Whether or not this procedure induces
a lack of specificity and whether any loss in specificity is crucial,
remains to be seen in the context of the analysis of 'property'
outlined below. As for the second question it is difficult to
envisage how this position can be construed as economism because in
the absence of separate instances the concept of reduction, so
crucial to economism, is also absent.
(56) Of course it is quite evident that such a jurisprudence
and a form of political economy do 'exist'. The point,
however, is that as far as the relationship between law
and economy is concerned the communion of separate forms
of academic discipline must, inevitably, produce purely
arbitrary versions of the relationship.
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Law & Sociology
To deny the necessity of baptizing instances of sociality as
•legal' and 'economic' orders is no mere idiosyncracy for.in certain
respects this sort of solution has a very real sociological pedigree.
For example, from within sociology the most interesting proponents
of an alternative solution are, respectively, Parsons and Weber.
Whilst not directly concerned with 'law', the remarks of Parsons
on the 'economy' are especially pertinent. As Savage says of
Parsons: "Parsonian theory has elaborated what is undoubtedly the
most rigorous and systematic analysis of the economic/non-economic
(57)
relation that has been produced from within sociology".
Accordingly, Parsons is interesting at this juncture mainly for the
way in which he approached the essential problem of the relationship
of economic to non-economic phenomena. Without dwelling too much
upon whether or not he was successful in this venture (and on balance
there are serious problems with his work) it is sufficient to note
here that Parsons quite clearly rejected the reduction of non-economic
factors to economic phenomena. Instead he posed the universality
of a theory of human action as the basis for any integration of
sociology and economics. Thus economic theory is but a special
case of the general theory of the social system and the so called
'economic' sphere but a sub-system of the general social system.
The economic and the non-economic are conceived in terms of their
specific forms of organisation centred around different functional
items differentiated by the division of labour along functional
lines. Thus the economic is both autonomous and functionally
(57) Savage, S. (1977) 'Taloott Parsons & the Structural-Functionalist
Theory of the Economy' in Hindess, B. (ed). (1977) 'Sociological
Theories of the Economy', p. 1, London:
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interdependent, manifesting both the properties of a sub-system and
/rO\
those attached to it as a component of the larger social system.
Whilst Parsons clearly poses the problem in a radically different
way - and given that the origins and the content of the arguments are
quite different - the formal similarity of Economy and Society with
the Althusserian notion of the totality and the structural articulation
of relatively autonomous instances or levels should not be ignored.
Likewise the notion of conditions of existence is not altogether
different from that of functional pre-requisites.
Parsons, therefore, attempts to produce a genuinely social
analysis of law and economy. There are no prior grounds within
Parsonian discourse for distinguishing between the two except insofar
as they are but two special cases of the larger social system.
Accordingly, the relation between Economics and Sociology and thus
between economics and law should be regarded as a relation integral
to sociology rather than as one forged between separate disciplines.
/ \
This much is quite clear in Economy and Society. It is in this
sense, and perhaps in this sense alone, that Parsons work illuminates
the issue of the law/economy relation.
Weber on the other hand poses an elusive, even coy, relationship
between law and economy. For Weber, the relation of law to economy
is to be found in principle in the normative orientation of persons
(59)
engaged in social action. Thus the relation of 'law' and 'economy'
resides in the recognition of legal norms by persons engaged in
'economic' action together with their particular orientation toward
those legal norms. Accordingly, the ideal of legal order and the
(58) See Parsons, T. and Smelser, N. (1956) 'Economy and Society',
London: R.K.P.
(59) Weber, M. (1968) 'Economy & Society' Vols. I & II, New York:
Bedminster.
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actuality of economic conduct is spanned by the is/ought distinction.
Thus 'law' and 'economy' are related through the role of law as an
actual determinant of human (economic) action. The role of law is
here quite clearly counterposed to its more abstract location as an
ideal juristic system. What is important for the law/economy
♦
relationship is the orientation of persons engaged in (economic)
action toward legal norms, whether that orientation is obedient or
defiant and so on. Therefore, the relationship is contingent upon
the subjectively held motives for compliance or deviance and the
law/economy relation is but a special example of social action in
general. This is indeed the important point for it emerges that
there is no reason why the relationship should be abstracted from
its social context, no reason why law and economy should be regarded
as separate orders which are externally related. Instead, the
relation is seen as a basic constituent of social action. Of
course the role of law is here separated from the juristic structure
of law and to that extent is reminiscent of Renner's work. Likewise
the theory of social action is subject to quite specific criticisms.
But we are primarily interested in the way in which the problem is
posed rather than in the particular solution.
More specifically, law is not represented in any simple way
as a condition of existence of exchange or the production of commodities.
Instead, economic activity can, in principle and in practice, proceed
without reference to any external instance which guarantees contracts
or proprietal rights. Rather economic activity can proceed in
relation to its own consensus, egoistic interests or expediential
rationality. Weber gives the example of the stock exchange and
certain 'cartel' agreements. For these law may prescribe a certain
durability for existing economic relations and indicate a certainty
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that promises will be kept but it is not a necessary prerequisite.
Although Weber also argues that law can elicit certain types of
economic relations and that the development of a complex economic
system is unthinkable without 'law'. But in this sense the
development of law is heralded as a special case of the development
of bureaucratic rationality.
Property.
So far the discussion has centred upon the general interrelation
of economic and legal relations. There is, however, a pertinent
relationship between 'property' and the 'law' of property. This
relation involves the issue of how the 'corporate' form of ownership
'emerges' within the legal framework of private property. This
relation is of direct concern to the very possibility of the legal
regulation of monopoly since the form of ownership and the structure
of law are quite basic to anti-trust legislation. What then do we
mean by private property?
"Private property, by its very nature, secures the owner special
rights over and against all non-owners. It is essentially a negative
notion, an assertion, backed by the full co-ercive force of society,
that one man may exclude others from using or benefiting from whatever
it is he owns if he so desires. It assumes the possibility - no, the
inevitability - of a clash between what he wants to do with his
objects and what others want to do with them".^^
(60) Tom Hadden makes a similar point regarding the de facto
existence of joint stock enterprises before the corresponding
legal form allowed such undertakings. See Hadden, T. (1977)
op cit.
(61) Oilman, B. (1977) 'Marx's Vision of Communism'. Critique 8 p. 26.
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Private property, then, is a relation of exclusion of all
others, a relation which excludes on the condition that it guarantees
absolute power of disposal over the object of property, absolute
freedom to use and consume that object as one likes. The juridic
form of property may vary, for example from a relation of exclusion
(this is essentially true/continental Law) to the empirically
specifiable restraints on others from interfering in one's property
(English or Common Law). Nevertheless, property as a relation is
the essential element of private property as is the absolute power
over the means of its disposal. To be sure such absolute power may
be qualified through a series of specific injunctions but it still
operates as a basic premise of private property.
The way in which the concept of ownership and in particular that
of private property is able to encompass a changed set of socio¬
economic relations is of central concern to the very issue of legal
regulation of corporate affairs and more especially monopoly. For
the most part the question is normally asked in two different ways.
How does the concept of juridic property alter to accommodate a change
in economic structure or else how does it manage to stay the same and
still adequately express sanction or structure the changed economic
relations? The prior question of whether it is appropriate to view
legal and economic relations in such a way that one is in advance of
the other, which is thereby rendered obsolete, or whether it is
proper to regard law as capable of keeping up with economic changes
is normally absent from any discussion. Thus the evident 'dissolution'
of property into relations of possession, title and control characteristi
of the 'corporate economy' somehow expresses a set of relations of
production entirely distinct from those relations characteristic of
entrepreneurial capitalism. Such a change in 'factual' property
engenders a corresponding shift or trend in juridic relations of property
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For example, Winkler appears to see the possibility of the corporate
economy, or rather 'corporatism', as the harbinger of a distinct
(62)
corporate law. Pashukanis sets out the elements of a corporate
form of law which is in tune with a changed set of relations of
production, the partial suppression of commodity exchange at the level
of production (between components of the corporate empire) has profound
effects on the form of law based on the importance of commodity exchange.
This follows since a separation between enterprises is necessary for
exchange to proceed in commodity terms. Insofar as this separation
is limited - through the growth of conglomerate forms of enterprise -
then so too must the notion of equivalence in law be subject to
substantial modification, if not actual redundancy. On the other
hand Cutler et al seem to argue that there is no contradiction between
the private property form and relations of corporate production
providing that the corporation is seen as the agent of possession,
providing that is that it absorbs all the functions of property through
*
the exclusive possession of the means of production. Likewise Renner
views it as a change in function, and Tay as an alteration of type.
Two tasks immediately present themselves - First of all, it is
necessary to adequately theorise the relation of ownership of
/separation from the means of production in the context of the
separation of the components of property into title, possession and
control. And, secondly, what are the effects, or the conditions,
of such a separation on the structure of juridic property? In short,
what is the relation or identity between law and economy? This relation
should properly be founded internally on the basis of the relation
of ownership of /separation from the means of production rather than
externally as the abstract interaction of two autonomous instances.
(62) Winkler, J. (1976) 'Corporatism', European Journal of Sociology
17/1.
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Accordingly, the fundamental issue for a sociological analysis of
'property', to borrow terms from Cutler et al, is the distribution
and organisation of the means of production. It is the social
relations of production, the separation from /possession of the means
of production, which must be grasped in their specificity if an analysis
is to be at all adequate to its object, the analysis of ownership.
As has been noted already this approach does not admit of pre-existing
levels - economic and legal - which can then be brought into relation,
one with the other. Instead 'property' is best conceived in its
distinct and varying aspects, through its own 'historical' time and
by reference to the components which it brings into relation or
separation.
The starting point then is the double separation of workers from
the means of production and of enterprises from each other. The mode
of articulation of the different components of these separations is
crucial to any analysis of the concepts of 'possession', 'control'
and 'title'. These concepts are in turn essential for the adequate
specification of corporate relations of production, on the one hand,
and the various limits inscribed on the effectivity, object, and
purpose of anti-trust legislation, on the other. Furthermore, each
separation from the means of production implies a corresponding
'detention' o_f the means of production or, the general relation
'ownership of /separation from'. As a constituent of ownership
possession is lodged in the day to day relation of management whilst
two further separations secure the isolation of workers and shareholders
from the enterprise. Insofar as 'private property' can only be defined
as a specific mode of organisation of the components - possession,
title and control - based on clearly defined powers of disposal secured
through the relation of exclusion then it is unnecessary to comprehend
the relation of the law of property and property as a relation between
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law and economy. Further, within the corporate form these components
are subject to a re-ordering based, not on private property but on
another mode of articulation or organisation of these elements one
to another. This change defines the essential difference between
what is known as entrepreneurial capital and monopoly capital.
Accordingly the social relations of production and ownership are
transformed with the result that the concept of legal lag or legal
functionality is perhaps inappropriate.
To some extent then the juridic concept 'property' is devoid of
meaning outside its definition as a relation of exclusion - as a
relation of possession of /separation from the means of production -
and as the absolute power over the property object in question -
relation of control and, in part, title. Thus 'private property'
constitutes a particular co-incidence of these elements of ownership
or the location of possession, control, and title in one (individual)
bearer, 'entrepreneurial capital'. Several consequences follow
from this analysis.
(1) The distinctly legal character of property relations derives
solely from the co-incidence of the elements - possession, title,
control - in one agent. This, no more, defines the specifically
juridic character, and the ideological appeal, of the property relation.
It does not represent the intervention of a distinct juridic level,
merely the direct (organisational) presence of legal 'relations' in
the actual organisation of production. Thus the necessary presence
of so called legal relations should not be viewed as a one to one
correspondence of 'property' and the law of property nor as the
dependence of economic relations on legal conditions but rather as
an integral appearance. V/hereas there may be some sort of distinction
between production relations and legal relations there is no reason
why this distinction should take the form of ready made instances.
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Furthermore, from the point of view of the interrelationship of law
and economy, legal and economic relations cannot be crystallised out
as separate instances since they form a complex unity. In a word
the consistent interrelationship of law and economy implies the
possibility, even the necessity, that their status as instances is
immediately dissolved.
(2) Since private property is defined as a particular mode of
arrangement of the elements of the relation 'possession of /separation
from' the means of production then juridic property can have no
separate existence apart from those relations - either as part of a
superstructural level or as a separate 'form'. This is not to say
that private property, as a relation, reduces to the elements of
control, possession and title that is, to the 'economic' relation of
possession of /separation from the means of production. It refers
only to the fact that private property, as a relation of articulation,
cannot be specified apart from the elements which it brings into
relation. Private property cannot be specified independently of
these elements nor does it reduce to them. Thus private property
is a form of organisation based upon the centrality of the human
(entrepreneurial) subject. Accordingly, the legal doctrine that
private property is indifferent to its function whilst quite correct
as far as it goes is both irrelevant and even a little misleading
from the perspective of the interrelation of 'legal' and 'economic'
relations within a general concept of 'ownership'.
(3) The comparative dissolution of private property into its separate
components is best represented as the establishment of a new mode of
articulation between these components based on their separation rather
than on their unity. The juridic aspect of the relations of production,
private property defined as a mode of articulation of the elements
possession, control, and title does not give way to a distinctly
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corporate system of law or juridic relations - as, for example,
Winkler maintains - but instead the elements which private property
relates are brought into a different relation, a relation of separation.
There is no system of corporate lav; which can, for example, be plugged
in to the monopoly capital mode of production. As far as the relations
of production are concerned all that is important is that possession,
title, and control are brought into a new relation with each other.
These elements together with the mode of their articulation, can both
be derived from a sociological analysis of 'ownership' and therein
lies the importance of the analysis developed in this section.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has suggested that there is no reason why law
and economy should be regarded as separate orders of sociality. It
has been argued, morever, that this portrait of society entails problems
which are inherently intractable. For example, issues of legal or
economic priority, reductionism, idealism and essentialism, to name
but a few, each depend upon the prior separation of law and economy.
Although the problem is by no means purely academic involving analytic
issues alone, it will become apparent, in subsequent chapters, that
the prior separation of law and economy prepares the way for the very
idea that the legal regulation of_ economic affairs is a valid exercise.
Hence the issue is of direct concern to any analysis of anti-trust
legislation, and is far from being just an abstract or semantic issue.
Over and against the prior separation of law and economy it has
been argued that private property does not exist first of all in a
legal sense and only then,that is, subsequently,does it entail social
and economic effects according to the particular manifestation of the
private property 'form'. This sort of perspective, just as much as
positions which reduce law to an epiphenomenon of the economy, depends
upon a prior allocation of social space into distinct legal and economic
orders. As we have seen this particular division heralds a number of
problems. Although it is not so much that economism, idealism and
functionalism and so on are wrong as that they represent the inevitable
alternatives once the problem is posed in a particular way. On the
contrary then it is the prior allocation of social space into legal
and economic realms which constitutes the nub of the issue. Until the
problem of the relation of law and economy is posed in a radically new
way, not as a relation between separate items of sociality but rather
as a complex fundament of ownership, then the issue is doomed to the
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mere re-iteration of contradictory and essentially circular
'solutions' or alternatives.
It is argued here that a sociological analysis of ownership meets
certain of these requirements. For example, a sociological analysis
is pertinent for at least three reasons:
(i) The conception of ownership as the mutual articulation of the
social relations of control, possession and title means that the
relation of private property is regarded as internal to the organisation
of production. Accordingly, private property is not regarded as a
legal concept which has economic effects but as a basic constituent of
social relations.
(ii) A sociological analysis of ownership in its widest sense entails
a scope which is denied law or economics. Hence, the somewhat arbitrary
combination of a Marxist theory of law and a Marxist theory o^f
production is avoided as are the pitfalls involved in a sociology of
law.
(iii) Finally, a general typology of ownership accords with the
classical relevance of 'law' for sociological consideration. This
particular relevance is all too easily shunted off into a sub-discipline
namely, the sociology of Law. It is arguable that Marx, Weber,
Durkheim, Gurvitch and even Parsons each addressed 'law' as a
fundamental article of their sociological endeavour rather than as
a discrete side line of (empirical) research.
For all these reasons then, a sociological analysis of ownership
provides a proper foundation for a realistic assessment of the issue
of legal regulation in general and the nature of anti-trust legislation




AND THE CONCEPT OF PRIVATE PROPERTY.
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We have seen in Chapter two how the very possibility of anti¬
trust legislation depends upon the idea of the legal regulation of
economic affairs and thus upon a particular conception of legal and
economic relations as separate domains. It can be argued, however,
that the way in which law and, more especially, anti-trust legislation
perceive the reality of economic relations is also a vital constituent
of any sort of 'legal' regulation of monopoly. Therefore, not only
does anti-trust legislation appear to depend upon the idea of legal
regulation but it also references a particular view of corporate
reality. Accordingly, it will be argued that the corporate form of
ownership and the twin concepts of private property and economic
liberty are quite basic to the whole notion of anti-trust legislation.
However, having made that declaration, how are we to understand the
development of the corporate form of ownership in relation to the
seemingly enduring concept of private property?
Private property, like monopoly, is a form of exclusive
ownership but, this similarity apart, they evince radically different
types of ownership. In order to demonstrate this it is necessary
to put forward a typology which respects the basic differences between
each type of ownership but which, nevertheless, allows some sort of
comparison. Instead of arguing that private property is an entirely
abstract concept which is hopelessly overwhelmed by the reality of
the modern corporation or, conversely, which is fundamentally
transformed by 19th and 20th Century developments leading to the
giant conglomerate form of business, it is necessary to understand
the basic meaning of 'ownership'. Drawing on the argument put
forward in the previous Chapter, it is suggested that ownership
requires a rather different examination, one which does not create
an artificial distinction between legal concepts and economic functions,
or between 'legal' and 'economic' ownership. On the contrary, it is
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argued that the proper procedure is by means of a demonstration of
a sociological typology of ownership which addresses'ownership' as a
fundamental aspect of social structure rather than as an epiphenomenon
of 'real' control. Such a typology would have the added advantage
of creating the possibility for the realisation of the basic elements
of anti-trust legislation in a form commensurate with the basic
parameters of the anti-monopoly movement namely, in terms of the
crucial 'contest' between entrepreneurial and corporate forms of
social organisation.
The typology itself will be outlined in Chapter four. As a
prologue to its demonstration it is necessary, however, to pose what
appears to be a very basic question; namely, what is meant by the
concept of ownership? This Chapter will endeavour to address this
question with a view to establishing why it is that the 'legal'
view of ownership is dominated by the concept of private property
and thus is skewed toward one particular type of ownership.
Furthermore, it will be suggested that this one dimensional view
of ownership contributes substantially to the basic misunderstanding
of corporate relations and that this in turn hampers the effective
regulation of monopoly. This involves demonstrating a number of
things. First of all, the conditions under which what we shall
call 'Philosophical Anthropology' is inscribed within the very
structure of private property. Secondly, how the legal view of
ownership is influenced by the concept of private property. And,
finally, why this generates problems for the legal regulation of
monopoly? It will be argued that the hegemonic influence of
Philosophical Anthropology on the concept of private property and of
the idea of private property on ownership leave 'law' relatively
powerless in the face of forms of ownership which cannot be expressed
via the language of private entrepreneurial property. Accordingly,
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•corporate' forms of ownership are outwith the remit specified by
forms of regulation derived from the legal concept of private
property. Of course, there have been a number of specific
legislative attempts to remedy the defects generated by the 'legal'
portrait of corporate relations and these will be examined in Chapter
five. In the final analysis, however, it will be argued that these
attempts not only do not remedy these defects but in some cases
exacerbate them. Accordingly, it is the very structure of 'legal'
regulation and the concepts available to it which account for the
relative failure of anti-trust legislation rather than, for example,
the bad faith of legislators or the political dominance of big
business.
Philosophical Anthropology:
What then is meant by Philosophical Anthropology? It refers
to the reduction of the social world to the activities of an original
producer, man. For example, this tendency is realised in the
earlier work of Karl Marx by the argument that in the process of
production man creates an object in which are fixed his essential
attributes. Man is separated from whatever it is which is essential
in him through its externaiisation in what then becomes an alien
object. As Ranciere indicates, the general structure of the argument
(1 )
concerns the general form of Subject— Predicate — Object. In
effect the essential attributes of the human subject namely, the
predicate, become fixed in the object which he creates. Since the
object now contains the essence of the subject, this object becomes
(1) Ranciere, J. (1971) 'The Concept of "Critique" and the "Critique"
of Politcal Economy' in Theoretical Practice, 1.
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the real subject. Thus, whereas man starts off by being a subject
the process of production ensures that his very subjectivity is
embodied in the object which he creates. Accordingly, subject and
object swop places, man becomes a mere object and his product takes
up the mantle of subjectivity. The objective world is but an
expression of the essence of man. Therefore, Philosophical
Anthropology can be defined as the overlapping of an analysis of
the relations of production, ownership and so on, by the 'anthropologica
structure of Subject— Predicate — Object.
The analysis of ownership within the perspective of Philosophical
Anthropology is but one example of the more general separation of
man from his essence. It follows that the reduction of various
forms of ownership to the limiting case of private property is the
means whereby the general separation of subject and essence is
manifested as a specific separation. In a word, it is because of
man's relation of himself as a subject to his own product as an
external object that things can be owned, products alienated and
commodities exchanged. In this way, the theory of ownership is
overlapped by the anthropological structure of Subject — Predicate
— Object. This overlap results in the derivation of the private
property relation from the primary alienation of man's productive
capabilities; the separation of man from his product through
exchange results in its re-possession by some other (human) subject.
Otherwise the private property relation would have neither utility
nor meaning. The concept of legal rights implies this prior
separation of a (human) subject and his essence since the idea of
a right in any particular object requires the notion of a privileged
connection between subject and object. Thus the private property
relation is derived by analogy with the logic of Subject — Predicate
— Object. Furthermore, as we shall see the relation between
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subject and object becomes a relation between subjects and the
existence of a legal 'right' connotes the essence of proprietorial
subjectivity. Legal 'rights' are, therefore, the guardian of
both the real and the human subject with the result that private
property is at least on an equal, if not superior, footing with
man.
What are the specific examples of Philosophical Anthropology's
incidence on a theory of ownership? The primary influence of
Philosophical Anthropology on ownership is engagingly simple: just
as it can be argued that, for Adam Smith, a Philosophical Anthropology
of the subject, man, and the factory stand instead of an economic
'system', so too, does a Philosophical Anthropology of the subject,
(2)
man, stand instead of a general typology of ownership. This
'masquerade' entails the reduction of all forms of ownership to the
essential (human) subject together with a form of essentialism which
holds that the essence of man both permeates and is the measure of
all material reality. It is important to realise the full
implications of this essentialism, for in order to successfully
achieve the reduction of all social life to the projects of human
subjects, it is necessary to establish the requisite connection
between social relations, social life and the material world, on
the one hand, and the essential human subject, on the other.
Reductionism presupposes the efficient translation of concepts
specified at one level into concepts specified at another, usually
'lower', level of 'existence'. Thus the main assumption of
Philosophical Anthropology is that all social life can be explained
with reference to the primacy of the essential (human) subject.
(2) See Tribe, K. (1978) 'Land, Labour and Economic Discourse'
London: RKP. p. 2.
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Therefore, the human subject is seen as a constitutive essence.
The two are co-extensive; just as social life is nothing but the
manifestation of the human essence so too does social life reduce
to the various attributes of the abstract human subject. Accordingly,
the subject is an 'ideal' essence precisely because it can be separated
from its original location, man, and transposed into a theory of
property 'rights'. Or, to put this slightly differently, the world
of social relations only becomes intelligible in terms of the
centrality of the subject, man, by arguing an 'equivalence' between
man the producer and the objects which he produces. This equivalence
is provided by the concept of an essence which expresses the attributes
of the subject, man, but which at the same time can be alienated in
the object that he produces. Thus the position of the human essence
in the anthropological scheme provides a mechanism for the reduction
of all forms of ownership to the primary relation of the subject and
the object of ownership, to the essence of man as producer. The
idea of an original relation of ownership is directly sustained by
the Philosophical Anthropology implicit in the structure of Subject
— Predicate — Object. Thus, the very fact that the structure of
Philosophical Anthropology namely, the Subject— Predicate— Object
sequence, provides a mechanism for the translation of a human into
a transcendental subject means that there is a unique relation between
the (objective) social world and the individual (human) subject.
(3) For example, Althusser argues that "If the essence of man is
to be a universal attribute, it is essential that concrete subjects
exist as absolute givens; this implies an empiricism of the
subject. If these empirical individuals are to be men, it is
essential that each carries in himself the whole human essence,
if not in fact, at least in principle; this implies an idealism
of the essence. So empiricism of the subject implies an idealism
of the essence and vice versa". Althusser, L. (1969) 'For Marx'
London: Harmondsworth, p. 228.
91
The unique relation is constituted by means of the essential
attributes of the human subject being taken up and transposed into
an external, dominant, subject. Similarly, private property starts
off by representing a relationship between a human subject and an
object but very quickly we find that private property is defined as
a relation between subjects, actual and potential proprietors.
Accordingly, the classic derivation of private property rights starts
off from the assumption that man, as possessor of himself, is,
therefore, possessor of his attributes. For example, his labour
power and the products of his labour belong to him. This conception
forms the basis of the legal concept of ownership and provides the
(4)
key to all forms of ownership specified within law. The matter
does not rest there, however, for although this original or unique
relationship of man to his product may provide a blueprint for other
forms of ownership it cannot generate those forms without recourse
to the logic of Philosophical Anthropology. Therefore, this unique
connection is transposed into a more elaborate theory of legal rights.
Since the relation between subject and object depends upon the fact
that the object contains the essence of subjectivity (the attributes
of the original subject) then the proprietal relationship can be
defined as a relation of subjectivity. If this original relation
is to be a prototype then there must be other relations of subjectivity
which do not depend upon the fact of creation as a guarantee of
ownership but rather recognise the existence of other subjects who
may own the object in question. Furthermore, if this original
justification of ownership as the possession of ones attributes is
(4) For example, Bentham, Locke, Mill and T.H. Green each subscribed
to the 'labour justification of Property'. See Macpherson, C.B.
(ed.) (1978) 'Property', Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
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to have any meaning then any form of ownership by someone other than
the original producer must have the same status. Thus, all relations
of subjectivity must be identical and private property be defined as
a relationship between formally equal subjects. Furthermore, they
each entertain a relationship with an object which contains the
resultant of human subjectivity. Therefore, private property is
defined as a tripartite relation between subjects with regard to a
third real or corporeal product of (human) subjectivity. From there
on any relation of private property must have an equal status with
any other. Moreover, private property can then be defined as the
existence of a relation of subjectivity which depends upon the
effective exclusion of all other relations of subjectivity. These
relations of subjectivity only express a package of human attributes
and need not reference actual human subjects but can include non-
human forms. Although it must be remembered that such apparent
versatility depends upon these respective actors being viewed as
essential subjects.
Finally, there is no reason why the subject in question must be
a prior-proprietal subject or an epistemological-ontological point,
(5)
that is 'given' to legal discourse. The whole edifice of legal
ownership described above can just as easily be constructed wholly
within legal theory as be^supplied by the prior existence of 'economic'
subjects. There is no necessary reason why the subject of private
property must reduce to a pre-given economic subject since we are
talking, primarily, of the legal view and justification of private
property rights. It is argued, therefore, that this is the way in
which law conceives of ownership and not that ownership takes this
(5) See, for example, Hirst, P. (1979) cf£ cit. Appendix 1.
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form because of the prior existence of economic subjects and their
role in exchange. Indeed, we shall see below how the logic of
Philosophical Anthropology is both incomplete in itself and inadequate
to a proper analysis of ownership.
The basic requirements of a Philosophical Anthropology of the
subject, man, lead on, quite naturally, to the various manifestations
of its influence - namely the distortion induced by the structures of
Subject - Predicate - Object. Of particular concern here is the
manner in which Philosophical Anthropology impinges on the concept
of ownership and the consequences that follow for a general theory of
ownership that rests on an implicit Philosophical Anthropology.
It should be clear by now that the object of criticism and the
obstacle to any general theory of ownership concerns the philosophical
analysis of the position of man in relation to the social or material
world; a position that reduces the existence of social relations to
the expressive or purposive activity of an essential man; a humanist
ontology which firmly locates man as the axis and the source of all
social relations. Whilst it may be true, in a generic or original
sense, that man, in tandem with nature, produces material reality as
we know it, two reservations may be made concerning this particular
point. First of all, the argument that man, in producing objects,
is externalising his essential attributes is based on a false analogy
with the production of God by man. Ranciere demonstrates the way in
which the young Marx achieves this slide. He argues, that in the
production of God by man, there is an actual equivalence between man
and his product, man objectifies the predicates which make up his
essence, God only equals mans predicates, nothing more. Therefore,
God is a transparent object in which man can, first of all, see himself
and, secondly, re-appropriate that which he alienated, his essential
attributes in other words. The absurdity is revealed when it is
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considered that the worker and his product are supposed to be
equivalent, that the product is supposed to represent nothing but
maris essential attributes, his essence, and that the worker's product
is supposed to be something in which the worker should recognise
himself. The manifestation of generic life is equated with the
means of maintaining individual existence or "... the productive
activity is identified with the generic activity (the activity of
man insofar as he affirms his own essence) and the object produced is
(£>)
identified with the objectification of the generic being of man".
In brief, whereas the attributes of man and God are essentially the
same the attributes of the worker and the product are essentially
different. To achieve a successful reduction of social relations
to the human subject it is necessary to buttress the entire project
with an undue and misplaced reliance on an idealistic conception of
the relation of man to his product, a reliance which we have seen is
based on an essentially false analogy adopted by, amongst others,
the young Marx. Secondly, even if an original position is granted
to man in the scheme of social 'evolution' it does not follow that
one can continue to reduce all material and social life to the
activities of an original purposive subject. The principal objection
to Philosophical Anthropology concerns precisely this objective since
it is through the persistence of the hegemonic role of the Philosophical
Anthropology of the subject, man, that the specificity of the social
relations of production and, in particular, forms of ownership is
denied. The continual influence of Philosophical Anthropology, and
not its original truth or generic import, prevents the proper
theorisation of social relations of production and it is to this
(6) Eanciere, J. (1971). 'The Concept of "Critique" and the
Critique of Political Economy' in Theoretical Practice
Vol. I. p. b2.
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aspect of philosophical Anthropology that the present critique is
addressed.
It has been suggested that the concept of private property is
characterised by a more or less implicit Philosophical Anthropology
and that the generality of a theory of ownership, dependent upon such
a concept, is unnecessarily limited and even a little distorted.
But how is the concept of private property imbued with Philosophical
Anthropology and why does this induce a necessary inadequacy?
As we have seen, Philosophical Anthropology inheres in the
concept of private property by virtue of the existence of a subject
and object of property and the definition of private property as the
relation between the two of them. This relation is based ultimately
on the re-ification of the essential attributes of the subject. Thus
the structure of subject - predicate - object ensures the inherence
of Philosophical Anthropology in the concept of private property.
This can be demonstrated quite easily since positivist and common
law codes each re-inforce the definition of private property as a
relation between a person and a thing. The relation is sustained
whether private property is defined in terms of a persons absolute
power of disposal over a thing; a persons power of exclusion of
others from, or a denial of their access to, a thing or, finally, as
\
the empirical specification of unwarranted encroachments on a persons
relation to a thing. Even when the relation between a person and a
thing is not directly evident, as for instance in the last two, (which
are often defined as relations between persons) the relation between
subject and object is still implied and directly sustained in all
three definitions of private property. The central terms of the
definition of private property person, thing and relation are thereby
established. But what is it that enables the distribution of material
reality to be effected in this particular way, as between persons
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and things? The answer provides us with the first of two particular
dependencies of private property with respect to Philosophical
Anthropology.
First of all, the definition of private property as a relation
between a person and a thing can only be made on the grounds that
(7)
persons and things are in fact separate. Private property,
therefore, presupposes the prior separation of persons and things, a
separation which is supplied by, or achieved within, Philosophical
Anthropology. Thus, the general separation of the subject from
his essence and its relocation in an alien object, directly sustains
the definition of private property as a relation between a person
and a thing. Furthermore, the actual incidence of a legal intervention
which in this case takes the form of the private property relation,
is a necessary consequence of the separation of material reality into
persons and things, subjects and objects. On this basis alone there
exists a profound continuity between Philosophical Anthropology and
the concept of private property. Although if this were all that
connected the two then Philosophical Anthropology would be no more
than an abstract condition of defining private property in a particular
way and the connection between them would be purely formal - the one
acting as the premise of the other. However, private property relies
on Philosophical Anthropology in a more fundamental and immediate
sense.
The second concrete dependence of the concept of 'private property'
on Philosophical Anthropology concerns the way in which the actual
definition of private property, together with its continued exposition
(7) See, for example, Hirst, P. (1979) ££ cit. on the way in which
this conception of property rights implies the existence of a
prior-proprietal subject.
within law, implicitly references the subject - predicate
object structure. This means that the structure of subject
predicate - object is used to establish the ensuing relation
between a person and a thing as the all important aspect of private
property, as its most developed and articulate form. This is achieved
in the following manner: Two basic alternatives are presented to a
concept of private property defined as the relation between a person
and a thing. It can be argued, first of all, that the relation of
persons and things establishes man's domination of the material world.
Since the material world is only an extension of his subjective will,
man is an absolute constitutive subject. The crucial point being
that this dominance is achieved precisely because of man's privileged
relation to the material world, he is related to it through the private
property relation. Alternatively, the opposite position can be put
forward namely that the external world of objects indexes or
interpolates human beings as its agents. In this case the private
property relation constitutes the essence of subjectivity and man
is its (passive) object. For reasons that will become apparent both
of these alternatives are not without problems. Very briefly, whilst
the first collapses on the basis that it is hopelessly idealistic the
second invests private property with a will of its own with the result
that private property is at once the subject and the guarantor of
individual rights.
Contingent upon these specific inadequacies law may attempt an
escape route via the notion of the 'relation' as the fundamental
/ON
concept with which to grasp private property. Believing this
(8) For example, it is often re-iterated that private property is
an exclusive individual right in or to some thing and thus
represents a privileged relation of the subject to a particular
object or else a relation of exclusion of other, would be,
proprietors.
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to be a solution law merely compounds the influence of Philosophical
Anthropology and, therefore, of the real locus of the inadequacy
of private property, by re-ifying the attributes of man in the
abstract specification of the relation of private property - the
notion of property rights. At a stroke law fulfills the logic of
the structure - subject - predicate - object - and thereby
re-inforces, rather than escapes, the problems induced by an implicit
Philosophical Anthropology.
We have seen how the theory of ownership unfolds according to
the ever present reference point of private property and private
property is specified on the basis of Philosophical Anthropology.
The circle is complete; just as Philosophical Anthropology is
inherent in the notion of private property so too is private property
inherent in the theory of ownership outlined within law. It is
argued here, however, that without the concept of discontinuity and
the distinct forms of ownership that are demarcated it is impossible
to grasp either the basis of the anti-monopoly movement - rooted as
it was in a particular concept of (private) ownership - or the
object of anti-monopoly hostility namely, the corporate form of
structured, though fragmented, ownership. The intimate relation
between the form of ownership and the analysis of anti-monopoly
law cannot be theorised, specified and even spoken of within a
problematic bounded by Philosophical Anthropology. This means
that the construction of a general typology of ownership is logically
prior to the very possibility of analysing anti-monopoly Law. In a
word one can only proceed to an adequate analysis of anti-monopoly
Law by reference to the way in which the various elements of
ownership are articulated, one with another.
Perhaps the starting point for a more detailed analysis of the
influence of Philosophical Anthropology on the theory of ownership
99
is to be found in Marx's critique of the Hegelian inversion of the
subject and object of private property. Here, as Lucio Colletti
notes, "Property ought to be a manifestation, an attribute of man,
but becomes the subject; man ought to be the real subject, but
(9)
becomes the property of private property". Without dwelling
upon whether Marx's extraction of the rational kernel (essence) of
Hegel's thought can amount to an inversion of the same it is sufficient
to note the unchanging position of the human subject with respect to
the property right. In other words the 'inversion' neither destroys
the primacy of the relation between the (human) subject and the
property object nor does it, in actual terms, amount to a thorough
going inversion. Since the (human) subject and the property object
take on aspects of each other, the property object is invested with
a will whilst the human subject takes on the character of an object.
In the first case, the definition of property by reference to a
subject and object and the postulation of ownership as an exclusive
relation between the two is the hallmark of what has been termed the
Anthropological concept of ownership. In the second case, whilst
the content of subject and object are reversed - the human subject
is an attribute of private property - the formal position of subject
and object remain intact. The subject - predicate - object
structure survives in that the specific components, supports or
agents are merely reversed. Both cases meet the criteria laid
down for the identification of the influence of Philosophical
Anthropology and, therefore, must be rejected as inadequate to a
general theory of ownership.
(9) Colletti, L. (1975) Introduction to Marx. 'Early Writings',
London, NLB Pelican, p. 37*
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Developing this further, much in the way that Marx does in the
Critique of Hegel's Doctrine of the State and Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts, the issue becomes much clearer. For example, in
criticising the position and rationality which Hegel accords
prim ogeniture Marx states that "Landed property thus anthropomorphises
itself in the various generations. One might say that the estate
always inherits the first born of the family as an attribute bound
to itself., and that this ... implies that the hereditary landowner
is a serf attached to the estate and that the serfs subject to him
are no more than the practical consequences of the theoretical
relationship binding him to the estate". At least two
consequences follow on directly from this:-
1. The anthropomorphic nature of private landed property established
here is the corollary not only of the subject/object inversion but
also of the very idea of a unique property relation between a subject
and an object - however that relation is conceived, and
2. The relegation of the landowner to a mere serf renders the
cardinal distinctions between the various forms of separation from,
and ownership of, the means of production impossible. Such a
conception is, consequently, inadequate to an accurate specification
of the relations of feudal production.
The primary question then is not whether the estate inherits
the first born or vice versa, it is not the inversion of subject and
object which is at stake, but the whole anthropological structure of
subject - predicate - object which precludes the analysis of
forms of ownership that do not reduce to subjects and confirms the
drift into the anthropological problematic characteristic of the early
(10) Marx, K. (1975)- Early Writings, ojd cit. p. 175»
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work of Marx. This can be demonstrated since Marx, despite
•correcting' the Hegelian 'inversion' falls into precisely the
same trap: "The serf is an appurtenance of the land. Similarly
the heir through priminogeniture, the first born son, belongs to the
land. It inherits him But in the system of feudal landownership
the lord at least appears to be king of the land. In the same way,
there is still the appearance of a relationship between owner and
land which is based on something more intimate than mere material
wealth. The land is individualised with its lord, it acquires his
status, it is baronial or ducal with him, has his privileges, his
jurisdiction, his political position, etc. It_ appears as the
(11)
inorganic body of its lord". Either way the idea of a relation
between (landed) private property and its (human) agent is seen as
an expression of 'will' - the estates will projected anthropomorphically
onto the subject or the will of the possessing individual invading the
object so possessed - and the result, therefore, is the same namely,
a relation between subject and object conceived on the basis of an
abstract will. Furthermore, to the extent that the subject
predicate - object structure is retained then clearly ownership can
only be seen as a particular manifestation of the general separation
of man from his essence, as a specific incidence of the general form
of abstraction/alienation.
There are, then, two distinct ways of looking at ownership
within the problematic of Philosophical Anthropology, two ways which,
as we have seen, already imply a third in the form of their attempted
resolution. Either the human subject is tied to tangible objects
even whilst dominating them, the landowner is tied to the land through
(11) Marx, K. (1975) op cit. p. 318, additional emphasis.
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the projection of his will onto it, or, the human subject is tied
to the object even whilst being its subject the landowner is the
willful expression of the essence of priminogeniture and the owner
of private property is the mere reflex of commodity relations or
trade in private property. In the last sense the real subject
can, without too much trouble, be described as the commodity
structure itself with the exceedingly important consequence that
since the real subject is now contained within commodity relations
(equivalence or, exchange according to the value form) then this
subjective essence can be put forward to account for the ultimate
coherence of law and the state within the economy. The subjective
essence then becomes the real stalking horse of conformity, this
unseen hand thus ensures that law and the state assume the 'form*
of equivalence. Law and state, therefore, become but manifestations
of the general separation of the subject from his essence, they are
simply indices and, as such, it is not surprising that they assume
the common form of equivalence. It will readily be seen that such
a position has important implications for the co-incidence of the
influence of Philosophical Anthropology and the specification of
the relation of law and economy. These implications will be
discussed in the appropriate context although it should be noted
in passing that the adherence to a particular version of Philosophical
Anthropology carries quite specific consequences for the reason that
the influence of Philosophical Anthropology is far from uniform.
However, it is quite true that both of the alternatives outlined
above do retain the general relation between subject and object.
Where they differ is that whilst the second position idealises
private property as an essence which can then be brought into relation
with itself in its manifest or phenomenal form - the human subject -
the first position is simply inadequate since it cannot cope with the
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complexities of ownership but only with an idealised conception of
bourgeois or entrepreneurial property as the reflex of independent
subjective wills.
Against the influence of Philosophical Anthropology it is possible
to argue two things: First of all, private property can quite easily
be described as a complex internally articulated structure of the
elements of ownership, in terms of a general outline of a theory of
ownership. Secondly, Philosophical Anthropology prevents the
formulation of forms of ownership which bear 110 relation to human or
any other subjects, corporate and ecclesiastical 'ownership'. An
example of how Philosophical Anthropology functions as an obstacle
can be seen in the way that the concept of private property is simply
extended or expanded to take in the corporation as what amounts to
a legal person. Hayek correctly notes this tendency: "As in the
law of property the rules developed for ordinary mobile property
were extended uncritically and without appropriate modifications to
all sorts of new rights; thus the recognition of corporations as
fictitious or legal persons has had the effect that all the rights
(12)
of a natural person were automatically extended to corporations".
Having noted the tendency Hayek of course fails to observe that the
transfer of individual rights to the corporation is simply the
logical result of regarding ownership from the perspective of
Philosophical Anthropology. Within a theory of ownership bounded
by the concept of private property it is quite natural for the object
(the corporation) to assume the essential attributes of the human
subject, to become that human subject by acting as the real subject.
(12) Hayek, F. (19^9) 'Individualism and Economic Order'
London: E.K.P. p. 116.
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Needless to say it is Hayek's idealism coupled with his
tendency to re-ify the concept of private property to a level
of pristine purity never fully realised in any determinate relations
of production which prevents him from recognising that monopoly is
inherent in any free enterprise based on the sanctity of private
property. As such Hayek can say nothing of the corporate form
of business organisation save that it be excluded from the primarily
individual rights of private property. Only two options are
available for Hayek on the question of the corporation; either it
is ignored, or, it is somehow forced to respect the restricted
logic of private property 'proper'. The trouble with this last
position is that in respecting one logic of private property is
contravened another, perhaps more fundamental, form of that logic,
the logic that affirms the result of free competition and private
property as the existence of the monopoly form and corporate
ownership. In other words the trouble with competitions is that
somebody wins them.
Summary.
The definition of private property as a relation between a
person and a thing depends upon an idealistic anthropology of the
human subject as the only creator (producer) of objects, objects
which can then be alienated, exchanged and legally owned. This
initial dependency follows because Philosophical Anthropology
provides an already separated subject and object, a prior distributi
of material reality into persons and things, and a separation which
allows law to account for their subsequent interrelation. Moreover
the unique relation of the subject, man, to the products he creates
105
in his own image, creates the conditions for both the invasion of
the material world by the human subject and the equation of the
subjects real essence with the object that he nevertheless creates
(produces). In the first case the object collapses in on the
subject, since the product is but the extrapolation of the will of
the human subject, whilst in the second the object (product) becomes
the real subject since it is the re-incarnation of the human essence.
The tension between these alternative conceptions is only resolved
at the expense of the re-ification of the private property relation
itself, an over insistence on the sanctity of private property
rights as the guarantor of human liberty, and the equation of rights
in private property with the human essence. In this last formulation
private property rights are nothing other than the essential predicates
of the human subject. At once the inescapable fusion of Philosophical
Anthropology and private property forged on the basis of the structure
of Subject - Predicate - Object stands revealed in its fullest
exposure.
The Corporation & Private Property.
So much for the definition of the conditions under which
Philosophical Anthropology inheres in the concept of private
property. What, however, are the limiting and distorting effects
induced in a theory of ownership by the inherence of Philosophical
Anthropology in private property? The objections to the Philosophical
Anthropology of the subject, man, are simple. Any theory of
ownership informed by an implicit or explicit Philosophical
Anthropology must inevitably be subject to at leasttwo substantive
criticisms:- First of all, it is inadequate in the face of
ownership which is not reducible to an essential subject of a given
property right or object. For example, Cutler _et al make the point
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that religious and corporate enterprises cannot be grasped as
(13)
subjects in any precise sense. In this it is the problematic
of the subject which prevents the proper theorisation of corporate
forms of ownership and which, therefore, constitutes an obstacle
to a truly general ownership. The corporation is thus not a
subject. But, in equating man's essence with the products he
creates, exchanges and which consequently become owned' (because of
the essential relation of subjectivity), Philosophical Anthropology
casts the relations of ownership characteristic of the corporation
in the role of gatekeepers of man's essential attributes. These
relations become but different manifestations of the predicates of
an essential man and the corporation itself assumes the mantle of
the benign subject. Big business comes alive. Therefore, the
corporation can only be viewed as a subject on the basis of an
implicit Philosophical Anthropology, the corporation is regarded
as an aggregate of subjective attributes. Not only is the theory
of ownership, implied by the concept of private property, inadequate
to specific sorts of social arrangements but it can only approach
anything like an adequate portrayal of such relations by expressly
including them as subjects. The only option available to law is
thereby unacceptable.
To pose the corporation as a (human) subject is really nothing
other than the logical extension of the inherence of Philosophical
Anthropology in the concept of private property and the recognition
of the central position occupied by private property within a theory
of ownership unfolded under the tutelage of legal discourse. But
what does it mean to specify the corporation as a subject and what
(13) Cutler et al (1977) ojo cit.
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implications follow on from such a specification? It need hardly
be stated that any attempt to grasp the corporation within the
concept of private property, through the specification of the
corporation as an equivalent subject or indeed as a constellation
of human attributes isolated and fixed by the concept of divisible
rights in private property, is bound to be inadequate. The attempt
is futile because it is impossible to describe 'possession', 'control'
and 'title' by reference to a corporate subject or, for that matter,
in terms of a series of human attributes parceled up within the
notion of divisible rights. Furthermore, if this position is held
consistently then the corporate subject ends up, in one way or
another, as the modern equivalent of the entrepreneurial capitalist.
In this formulation the corporation is endowed with a whole series
of human attributes and motivations which enable it to be present,
in person, on the political stage. Quite simply and unashamedly
the corporation is equated with the human essence either a£> the
human essence itself or as the summation of the separate attributes
of the human essences. Paradoxically, this position is adopted
by, amongst others, Cutler _et al - who would appear to see no problem
in accommodating the corporation within law providing it is seen as
a legal subject - and by Frank Pearce - who sees the corporation as
the purveyor of human emotions and political sensibilities, big
(1 if.)
business wanted this, achieved that and resisted the other.
To be sure, Cutler e_t al, quite clearly argue that agents should
not be seen in terms of possessing universal attributes. For
example, they argue that there is no reason why agents need be
(1^) See Cutler _et al (1977/78) ££ cit. and Pearce, F. (1976)
op cit.
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subjects. But if legal recognition is a condition of existence of
capitalist economic agents and given that this legal recognition
entails the existence of subjects then the agent re-appears in the
guise of a subject. There is no other option. For example, they
claim that "The category of agents capable of operating as a
capitalist is a function of the legal system of the social formation
(15)
in question". Accordingly, the category of 'capitalist agent'
is inevitably clothed with the mantle of subjectivity. However,
whilst the subject i_s a basic feature of law this does not mean
that it is the guiding principle of law, nor perhaps, is it even
a necessary feature of any law. Rather, the subject is inherent
in this particular type of law. Likewise, whether or not the
subject is constituted within the legal system in question or
whether it depends upon a pre-constituted subject of commodity
exchange, whilst important, is irrelevant to the presence of the
subject within law and its supposed recursive effect upon the
category of agents capable of being a capitalist. Of course, it
has been argued here that the concept of private property and its
corollary, the category of an essentialist subject, are constructed
within law by means of a process which fulfills the logic of
Philosophical Anthropology. But this does not alter the fact
that the concept of private property does rely upon the category
of the subject and that this has a significant effect upon the way
in which 'capitalist agents' are perceived within law namely, in
terms of subjective attributes.
(15) Cutler, A. e_t al, (1977) Vol. I, ojd cit. p. 276.
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Concluding Remarks:-
Having established the distinctive features of the incidence
of Philosophical Anthropology with respect to a theory of ownership,
and especially the concept of private property, it is perhaps as
well to draw them together by way of a summary. In a very basic
sense the specific inadequacies encountered are but direct instances
of the more general influence of Philosophical Anthropology. An
example is apposite; in splitting material reality into subject and
object terms Philosophical Anthropology thereby constructs the
necessity of establishing some sort of relation between them; for
example, the notion of essence or predicate contains exactly such a
relation. The exact status of subject and object, person and thing,
together with the sort of relation which holds between them, is
never satisfactorily resolved within Philosophical Anthropology.
Either, the relation tends to reduce to the subject - in which
case the object is only the projection, or at most a locus for the
absorption, of the subjective (human) will - or, conversely the
subject is just an appendage of the object. Both positions are
only versions of the same subject - predicate - object structure.
The first, since it represents the stage whereby the predicate or
subjective essence is fixed in an external object, the essence
becoming transposed or translated as the object. The second,
because it represents the moment at which the object, being in
possession of the 'human' essence, becomes the real subject and the
human subject is reduced to the status of a dependent object.
Although both positions define the parameters of Philosophical
Anthropology they have, as you might expect, different consequences.
Whilst the first option introduces a consistent, albeit absurd,
idealism the second is, at least in practice, internally incoherent
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being unable to resolve the ambiguities introduced by reversing
subject and object terms. It is precisely because a resolution is
not forthcoming between the position, status and relation of subject
and object terms that the relation itself is reified as the expression
of the essential human existence; the notion of the property right
is first of all detached from, and subsequently emerges independently
of, the subject and object. Quite simply Philosophical Anthropology
forces the displacement of subject and object terms at the same time
as it preserves the idea of their relation as an ideal, all embracing
concept which contains the very essence of subjectivity. The
reified concept of a property right, therefore, is the logical
result of the consistent application of the logic of Philosophical
Anthropology and, more especially, the structure of subject —
predicate — object to the theory of ownership. It follows that
the abstract notion of 'rights' does not signal a fundamental
departure from, or revision of, the logic of Philosophical
Anthropology for the reason that rights are merely postulated on
the reified trajectory of the (human) essence.
Just as the two positions which go to define the limits of
Philosophical Anthropology have effects specific to them so too
does this last version. In fact the extension of the logic of
Philosophical Anthropology forms the groundswell for the deification
of the property right as the unique form of ownership, as the form
which guarantees human freedom. The way is then open for any
defence of private property to be justified in the name of human
liberty. All incursions on private property can be resisted, by
whatever means, for the simple reason that private property contains
all that is essentially human and, consequently, the very promise of
human freedom. This simple equation of the human essence and the
private property right, rooted of course in the theoretical structure
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of Philosophical Anthropology, forms the mainspring of one of the
most virulent political ideologies of our age and, as we shall
see, constitutes the lynchpin of anti-monopoly politics.
It has been established that the reification entailed in the
notion of private property rights abstracted from their referrents
does not escape the logic of Philosophical Anthropology. Quite the
reverse in fact since in reifying private property rights the logic
of Philosophical Anthropology is simply compounded or completed.
But what practical consequences follow on from this more articulate
position in terms of an analysis of the corporation? To theorise
the corporation on the basis of a distinction between rights and
material objects, that is, on the premise of their separation under
corporate forms of ownership, is to embrace both a vicious circularity
and an inescapable inadequacy vis-a-vis the corporation. This
follows since rights formulated within the ambit of Philosophical
Anthropology always entail subject and object terms and, therefore,
they cannot be totally divorced from the (material) objects and the
agents of possession to which they refer. For example, whilst
it is quite true that law does isolate the attributes of property
from each other, largely through the formation of the trust
(Common law) or the societas (Roman law), it still defines private
property as a relation between a (legal) person and some thing.
Insofar as this is the case then in separating certain of the
attributes of property from each other Anglo-American Common law,
for example, is doing no more than separating the attributes of
the (human) subject from each other and introducing a cleavage
(16) As we have seen this relation depends upon the fact
that it contains the essence of subjectivity.
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(17)within the concept of thingness. The essence of subjectivity
and the essence of thingness remain intact, it is merely the rights
which bring them together which are in any way fractured. This
means that there are two principal ways in which the corporation can
be regarded from the perspective of private property law. First
of all, the corporation may be treated as if it were a giant
conglomerate subject, embracing all the pertinent attributes of the
individual (human) subject acting in concert as a subject. Or,
secondly, the corporation may be viewed in terms of a series of
relatively discrete manifestations of subjectivity which may or may
not correspond to identifiable officers or shareholders of the
corporation. Thus, the corporation is seen in terms of a prospectus
of rights and duties. That these twin perspectives do in fact
resonate within law can be demonstrated by the existence of two
distinct forms of responsibility. First of all, the notion of
corporate responsibility indexes the idea of a corporate subject as
an appropriate locus for such responsibility. Secondly, the
existence of individual liability for corporate decisions references
the divisibility of the relationship of subjectivity and its
distribution within the corporate hierarchy. It will be argued
that neither of these formulations is any more successful than the
other in accounting for the basic features of the corporation and
that this flaw in the portrait of 'corporate' ownership forestalls
the effective regulation of corporate affairs. Furthermore, the way
in which responsibility is apportioned in different ways to different
(17) For an elaboration on the concept of 'thingness' see
Patterson, 0. (1979) 'On Slavery and Slave Formations'
N.L.R. 117. p. 38.
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types of corporate 'subjects' will have a direct bearing upon the
discussion of criminal liability and the existence of a substantive
offence under the terms of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Accordingly,
the equation of the human essence with the private property relation,
however that equation is conceived, demonstrates the extent to which
Philosophical Anthropology is a necessary support of the private
property relation and, in addition, a major reason for the inability
to satisfactorily accommodate corporate relations of ownership.
Finally, whilst a case can be made for the further 'influence'
of Philosophical Anthropology in other spheres, this is not argued
here. The role of Philosophical Anthropology is quite specific and
involves no more than a way of characterising the conception and
elaboration of ownership within 'law' understood in its widest sense.
It is not a transcendental force which structures law, state and
discourse according to its own internal predilections. It is simply
a condition of regarding ownership in a particular way, a form of
argument. Accordingly, the influence of Philosophical Anthropology,
if influence is the right word, consists in the manner in which
complex structures of ownership tend to be seen in terms of legal
subjects - whether in terms of determinate human beings or juristic
persons. Thus the use of the concept is no more than a convenient
way of describing a particular interpretation of ownership.
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CHAPTER IV
TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF OWNERSHIP.
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Since the very issue of anti-monopoly law involves the
general question of ownership and, more particularly, the specific
problems associated with the corporate form of ownership, then
arguably the accurate delineation of discrete types of ownership is
a basic pre-requisite for an understanding of anti-trust legislation.
Accordingly, this Chapter is concerned to outline the general
features of four 'types' of ownership. Two of these 'types' are
involved directly in providing an adequate description of the basic
dispute which characterised anti-trust legislation, whilst the other
two are included for reasons of 'comprehensive' coverage. The
assessment of these types is not intended as an exhaustive analysis
of particular types of social relations but is merely suggestive of
the potential utility of the typology in describing the basis of
anti-trust legislation and the further development of a general
theory of ownership. This point should be emphasised for there
is no way in which the sections on, for example, feudal and Soviet
relations of production are intended to stand as analyses of
feudalism and Soviet society respectively. They are merely intended
to suggest the way in which the typology could be utilised and thus
to demonstrate its potential scope and generality. This, admittedly
tentative, outline is deemed necessary for the reason that a general
typology is seen to be an essential prerequisite for the analysis of
anti-trust legislation. Furthermore, the typology is not supposed
to represent an empirical classification of discrete types of
ownership but to indicate instead the more general principles
which separate different forms of ownership from each other.
What then is the basic feature of this typology. The basic
principle can be most easily stated in terms of what it is not.
For example, just as Philosophical Anthropology makes man the
principle of all theory and practice, so too does man, or the human
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subject, become the principle of all ownership. The central role
accorded to man in all this leads on to the more fundamental objection
to Philosophical Anthropology described in Chapter III. But is it
enough to object? Or, does it require a more fundamental break
with the entire problematic of Philosophical Anthropology and a
crucial revision of the theory of ownership? The argument presented
in the previous Chapter suggests that a revision along radically
different lines is important, necessary and long overdue. The
remainder of this Chapter is addressed to precisely that objective.
But first; it remains to draw the fundamental distinction between a
theory of ownership formulated under the auspices of Philosophical
Anthropology and one outlined within sociological theory. The
distinction can be made by the observation that, for Sociology, it
is necessary to start from a completely different premise. That
premise is not the separation of the subject, man, from his essence
and the range of possibilities unfolded on the basis of that separation
but is instead the means whereby production is organised and controlled
and the special capacities which first of all lay hold upon and
subsequently set in motion the means of production. It is evident
that an entirely different premise is invoked by such a theory of
ownership and, it is argued, only on the basis of a truly general
typology of ownership can the pitfalls and limitations of a concept
of ownership hegemonised by the notion of private property and riven
through with the idealism of Philosophical Anthropology be transcended.
The prime task of this section is to construct a concept of
ownership which will both be adequate to the corporate form of
business organisation and inclusive of bourgeois, pre-capitalist, and
'post' capitalist relations of production. Above all this involves
tracing the various elements of ownership and the form of their
inter-relation. Whilst the various elements are common to all four
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types of ownership, their degree of isolation, independence, and
development varies directly with the form of their articulation.
These basic elements, however, are not intended to exhaust all
human history but are merely more or less adequate to the four
particular types of social relations outlined above. In other
words they are not equivalent to, for example, Balibar's universal
categories of production with all the 'structuralist' difficulties
attendant thereon.
Chapter two set out a concept of ownership comprising three
particular elements; elements which are, depending upon the form of
their articulation, more or less discrete. These elements are;
title, possession and control. The relation of (private) property
can be defined as the interrelation of these three elements without
reference to the primacy of rights and without introducing the somewhat
spurious distinction between rights, subjects and objects. Instead
it is the structure of their articulation which adequately accounts
for the specific forms of ownership associated with private and
corporate property and not the coincidence or separation of rights
and material objects. It will be argued, in due course, that this
separation, of subject and object, and their further co-incidence
in the concept of private property, is ultimately facile. What
then is the alternative composition of ownership?
The elements, or the components, which in combination define
'ownership' are as follows
1. Possession, the organisation of the means of production and the
relative control of a distinct 'labour' process. Under certain
conditions possession can loosely be equated with the technical
function of management. The relation - 'ownership of/separation
from' the means of production is the general relation of which
'possession' is a 'component'. For example, Cutler _et al use a term
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possession-in-separation which refers to the fact that managers
are also separated from the means of production. This is of course
true. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the
'management' structure, which to some extent defines the relation of
possession, and the position of individual managers who are separated
from, and therefore cannot possess, the means of production.
Possession in this sense refers to a part of the corporate entity,
to the management structure or the function of (relative) control
of a certain process, and not to the class location of managers.
There are partial grounds for seeing, in the concept possession,
an identity with the relation of real appropriation developed by
Balibar. Likewise, under other social arrangements, the tenant
also retains a form of actual possession because he is able to use
his tenancy in a manner determined by himself. Thus the crucial
element of the relationship of possession consists of the strategies
and calculations which comprise the use, or actual operation of any
particular 'process' of production.
2. Control, the distribution of the means of production to this or
that use. Distribution entails that 'control' be used in the fullest
sense of the word for it carries the more or less absolute 'power'
to dispose of the means of production within the confines of capital
accumulation. For example, control of the 'corporate' enterprise
can be lodged at various levels - the holding company, the corporation
itself, a 'parent' monopoly capital, or a minority group of shareholders
(subject only to qualifications imposed by the corporate charter
although in practice even these qualifications have been eroded or
avoided). Wherever it is lodged it refers ultimately to the
absolute power of disposal of the means of production although not
to their actual expenditure, which belongs to ' possession'-in-
operation. Again there are similarities between what is here called
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control and what Balibar refers to as the 'property' relation.
Similarly, the landlord is in a position to assign and distribute
tenancies. Therefore, the manner in which this is done is a basic
constituent of the relation of control.
3. Title, to benefit directly through having a title to, or a
monetary claim on, the 'company' in return for surrendering money
to be used as capital by the corporation. The power to use, the
power to exclude others from its use, and to some extent the power
to dispose of one's money-as-capital is exchanged for a title to
interest. In other words title refers to beneficial ownership -
which is not to say that title guarantees actual benefits, it refers
to a claim not to any necessary realisation of a cash benefit. At
the same time the relation of title references the fact that there is
a formal guarantee that 'sovereignty' over a given 'item' will be
sustained. For example, a claim by a shareholder or a derivative
right to an estate and so on.
To summarise; there is the general relation of 'ownership of/
separation from' the means of production; there are the components
or the specifications of that relation, possession, control and title;
and there is the particular mode of organisation, combination or
articulation of those components or elements. It is in this last
sense that private property can be defined as the specific co-incidence
or relation of those elements but not as those elements themselves.
Therefore, juridic relations do not reduce to economic relations since
private property is a relation between these elements, and consequently,
is distinct from them. Similarly, the reduction of law to economy
and the ensuing charge of economism can be avoided on this basis.
One particular consequence of regarding ownership in this manner
is that the problematic antithesis between public and private property
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and hence the fundamental terms of the debate concerning 'Nationalised'
versus 'free market' economy are altered. Instead a series of crucial
concepts are introduced, the most important being the relations of
ownership of the means of production, the manner of separation of
direct and indirect producers from the means of production and, the
form of articulation of these relations with each other. These
concepts obtain whether ownership is conventionally described as
public or private although the form of their interrelation may vary
accordingly.
Chapter three clearly rejected the utility of a theory of private
property bounded by the concepts of rights, persons and things. But
if the notion of rights and, therefore, the unique relation between
the subject and object of those property rights is rejected then
what is the alternative? The answer is simple. First of all,
there is the structure of articulation of the three basic components,
a structure which modifies and regulates the special character of
each component by the form of its interrelation with the others in
any determinate relations of production. Secondly, there are the
components or elements themselves, components which are also
relations but relations between two other relations: - ownership
and separation. That is to say the relation between ownership of/
separation from the means of production is not a unique relation
between an essential subject and object precisely because the concepts
of ownership and separation refer to relations and not agents or
subjects. Furthermore, since ownership is itself articulated
according to three different relations then by definition these
relations cannot reduce to a unique relation between a subject and
an object. Rather the concept of ownership requires the construction
of the respective notions of owner and thingness. As we have seen
the concept of private property assumes these items as given on the
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basis of an implicit Philosophical Anthropology. Therefore,
Ownership and separation are relations - irrespective of the subject
and object of property since they relate to or exclude each other;
separation equals lack of ownership to a greater or lesser extent
and Ownership equals relative lack of separation. Each relation -
title, possession and control - refers to a distinct form, or
relation, of ownership of/separation from the means of production
(1)
and to a specific form of calculation. It is manifest, then,
that each relation, of which ownership in general is a reflexive
outcome, does not primarily refer to a subject who owns and an
object which is owned because in the first instance the form of
ownership of/separation from the means of production is the crucial
point, not who owns what. Of course in any particular conjuncture
of the relations of production the relations of ownership/separation
do refer to specific agents and determinate means of production although
this is entirely different from specifying an essential subject on
one side relating to an object of which it is the unique subject on
the other.
Whereas Philosophical Anthropology makes man the principle of all
ownership and hence man is the basis on which all relations of
ownership are predicated, for sociology it can be argued that the
relations of ownership refer, first and foremost, to each other, to
the overall form of their articulation and, only then to the means
(1) It has been suggested already that the idea of a relation
of ownership, be it title, possession or control, is
bound up with and indeed depends upon, the way in which
calculations are made, calculations which, for example, secure
future revenues, solve production problems, and which
entail investment in particular areas. Thus the relation
and the form of calculation are, in one sense at least,
identical; the way in which calculations are made is both
an index, and a regeneration, of the particular relation of
ownership.
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of production and their respective agents. In a word the relations
of ownership are dependent upon the social context in which they are
generated rather than upon any primarily legal conditions of existence.
Thus, for sociology, corporate forms of ownership do not herald the
dissolution of ownership into discrete elements independently of their
general articulation since 'private property' does not simply dissolve,
leaving an anarchic crystallisation of autonomous elements of
ownership. The corporate form of ownership is a distinct type of
ownership rather than a mutation of the private property form. To
be sure, this concept of ownership (non-linear, non-uniform, non-
developmental) facilitates the proper theorisation of revolutionary
transformation, but not as an inevitable transfer of the means of
production into the hands of the workers, but rather as a highly
contingent moment bounded by the internal organisation of the form
of ownership. As such the form of ownership is a crucial determinant,
not an inevitable consequence, of the relations of production.
This means that the relations of production occupy a central place
for a theory of ownership. But these relations should be understood
in the widest sense as the social relations of the re-production of
material existence.
For example, the work of Henri Lefebvre suggests precisely
this sort of perspective. Take, for instance, the following
indication of his position:- ".. the concept of 'reproduction of
the relations of production' ... occupies a central position,
displacing and substituting itself for certain widely held
philosophical notions or scientific specialisations such as 'the
subject' (whether individual or collective, cartesian or otherwise)
'the object' ('the thing', 'the sign', etc.), 'structure' and
'function' etc. It does not stand for some obscure entity such as
naturality, historicity, 'happeningness' (evenementialite), spontaneity
123
or the unconscious; nor for some equally obscure metaphor such as
'aggregate', 'flux' or 'chain reaction'; nor for some mechanically
over-precise determination such as 'device', 'mechanism', 'feedback'
etc. If it (the reproduction of the relations of production) is
well determined, it denotes a complex process involving contradictions,
a process which not only repeats and redoubles those contradictions
but also displaces, changes and enlarges them. This is the only
relatively firm ground which exists; if one leaves it, one has no
(2)
choice but to return to the inadequate metaphors of 'flux' etc."
This, together with the work of Godelier on the dissolution of the
base/superstructure metaphor seen as a structured interrelation of
levels and perhaps the work of Gurvitch on forms of sociality and
even the writings of Elias go a long way to display the sort of
intellectual heritage that sustains the present enterprise.
The point should be re-iterated that this analysis is not
intended as an exhaustive study of feudal and bourgeois relations
of production. The only intention is to demonstrate the adequacy
of what is presented as a general typology of ownership in relation
to pre-corporatist relations of production and, in particular, to
what remains the primary article of faith of anti-monopoly movements -
'private property'. Bearing this point in mind it is now possible
to embark on such a study. The order of presentation will be
sequential, feudal, bourgeois, corporate and 'soviet', but this in
no way implies a linear succession of discrete modes of production,
(2) H. Lefebvre (1976) 'The Survival of Capitalism' London:
Allison & Busby, pp. 7/8.
(3) See Godelier M. (1978), 0£ cit. , Gurvitch, G. (19^7) ££ cit
and Elias, N. (1970) 'What is Sociology' London: Hutchinson.
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nor a necessary path of development one to the next. Further,
the mere identification of elements should not be seen as the genesis
of a process which has, as its goal, either the radical separation
of those same elements or any other end state, for example, an
(4)
ideal or reformulated concept of bourgeois private property.
The mode of analysis neither implies nor admits of any necessity
nor any incipient teleological progression. These caveats having
been entered it is possible to address the elements and the form of
ownership implied by, or contained in, feudal relations of production.
'Feudal' forms of ownership.
Even a cursory examination of the writing on 'feudalism' will
reveal that some sort of juridic intervention in the economy is
considered basic to the definition of feudal relations of production
over and against the apparently 'economic' inclination of capitalist
relations of production. Exploitation is couched within legal and
political forms of 'hierarchy' when feudalism is in focus but these
juridic forms are quickly jettisoned in favour of an economic analysis
when capitalism comes within the sights. Accordingly, the notion
of a juridic intervention seems to be a basic assumption of the
literature on feudalism. But this assumption implies a prior
separation between relations which can be assigned to the economic
'level' and those which belong to the juridic 'level'. So much is
self evident for the relation between the two levels to be seen as
an intervention of law/state or political authority with respect to
the economy. The problem with this conception of law and economy
(4) For example, both Macpherson, C. (1975) 'Capitalism and the
changing concept of property' in Kamenka and Neale (1975) (ed)
op cit and Tay, A. (1978) 'Law, the citizen and the State' in
Kamenka & Tay (1978) (eds) ojd cit, talk in terms of the
reformulation of the concept of private property.
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as separate levels which can entertain relations with each other has
been examined in Chapter two. Suffice it to say at this juncture that
in 'feudalism' the juridic level is often brought in to act as a
supplementary determinant, or explanation, of the silences for which
(5)
the economic has no answer, for example, land tenure and ground rent.
An example of just such a 'political' intervention can be detected
in the work of Marx. Hindess and Hirst argue that Marx has recourse
to the 'political' instances of coercion in order to account for the
fact of exploitation under conditions where the direct producer is
not separated from the means of production. A political/legal
hierarchy is invoked to accommodate exploitation under feudal relations
of production with the important corollary that exploitation is no
longer defined primarily as an economic concept but is instead
heralded as a political concept. It then follows that the form
in which rent is paid is no longer crucial to the characterisation
of the precise nature of exploitative relations since those relations
are fixed by a political or legal instance and thereby remain
unaffected by the form in which rent is paid. In short the relations
of exploitation are directly attributed to the authority of the
monarch located at the centre of a feudal retinue of lords and based
on their means of political, legal and ideological co-ercion. Hindess
and Hirst, take exception to the characterisation of exploitation in
purely 'political' terms although they also try to steer clear of
identifying the economic level in purely technical terms and of
demarcating the 'political' level as a space or absence delimited
and vacated by the economic. In this last respect they clearly
(5) See Cutler, A. (1975) 'The concept of ground rent and capital
in agriculture' Critique of Anthropology Vol. 4/5 (pp. 72 - 89).
See also Hindess, B. & Hirst, P. (1975) op cit.
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disagree with Balibar.
Although Hindess and Hirst quite correctly castigate Marx for
the reliance on a 'political' explanation of exploitation under feudal
relations of production it seems difficult to envisage exactly how
they can avoid postulating a certain primacy of the political/legal
k
hierarchy, albeit a political/legal hierarcy conceived as a condition
of existence of feudal relations of production. And yet this is a
position which they vigorously uphold and extend in a later collaborative
enterprise.This position is upheld notwithstanding the fact that
there are considerable problems with the separation of determinate
relations of production from their conditions of existence; and the
separate generation of the social practices whereby those conditions
of existence are achieved. Furthermore, by its very nature, this
separation would tend to re-inforce the characterisation of determinate
relations of production in purely economic and technical terms leaving
their political and legal conditions of existence, if not out of
account, at least out of the reckoning as social relations of production.
This being the case, Hindess and Hirst are then in a position to argue
that the political/legal conditions of existence can become primary
in the characterisation of feudal relations of production. A position
which they come close to arguing in the specification of title as a
fundament of ownership. More consequentially the separation of law
and economy implied in most analyses of feudalism mirrors the separation
of subject and object achieved within Philosophical Anthropology with
the result that the necessity of a legal intervention is derived in
much the same way for feudalism as it is for private property.
The intersection of Philosophical Anthropology and the respective
(6) Cutler et al (1977) ojo cit.
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positions on the law and economy relation will be outlined later.
For present purposes it can be argued that the failure to explain
feudal relations of production without reference to an external
juridic intervention is a necessary consequence of the influence of
Philosophical Anthropology on the concept of ownership. This means
that the specification of two separate levels, economic and juridic,
and the influence of Philosophical Anthropology on the concept of
ownership are parallel and find their joint expression in, for example,
accounts of feudal relations of production and, in particular, ground
rent.
At first sight it seems easy enough to draw a rough parallel
between the form of ownership encountered in corporate production
and that present in feudal production. After all the tenant or
serf does have a degree of formal possession of the means of production
in the sense that he occupies, operates, and uses the means of
production. As Patterson makes clear the serf is capable of being
. . (7)
a proprietor.
Furthermore, the feudal lord also embraces both title to the
means of production and a kind of residual control over the distribution
of the means of production. The elements are, broadly speaking,
similar. The similarities, however, end there. The feudal lord
retains for himself - or in some instances a delegated functionary -
the direct management of the estate. Estate management, therefore,
is lodged at the level of the feudal lord who thereby becomes the
locus of the appropriate decision making calculus. The form of
calculation remains the same, and this is the crucial point, whether
the feudal lord directs in person or through a delegated functionary.
(7) Patterson, 0. (1979) Slavery in Human History, New Left Review,
117, p. 40.
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Effective possession, therefore, is lodged with the feudal lord.
The tenant on the other hand is, or appears to be, separated from
all three forms of ownership - control, title and possession -
although it is quite true that he does retain a degree of actual
possession through his use of the means of production. Possession,
then, is fractured as a result of the form of its interrelation with
control and title. This will be discussed in more detail later.
It is sufficient to note at this point that the various relations
of ownership are in a distinct structure of articulation one with
the other.
It is important to realise that whilst the identification of
the different relations of ownership is relatively easy, the isolation
of the form of their articulation is more difficult and possibly more
important. To reduce one particular arrangement of the elements of
ownership to another on the basis of the similar specification of the
components themselves, or the formal or positional parallels in their
interrelation is to commit the cardinal error of enforced historical
continuity. It cannot be overstressed that the structure of
articulation of the relations of ownership/separation is the distinctive
feature of any set of productive relations. It follows that the
proper analysis of the specificity and interrelation of the elements
of ownership/separation depends upon the adequate isolation of the
structure of their articulation.
Starting from the concept of the separation of the direct producer
from the means of production Hindess and Hirst, argue the existence
of a twofold separation:-
1. A legal separation of the direct producer from the means of
production, a separation which seems to be a function of title seen
as a right of exclusion, a prohibition on others from using the means of
production and a condition of rent being paid at all.
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2. A real separation of the direct producer from the means of
production, a separation which is dependent on the form in which
rent is paid. It is by means of the form which rent takes that
the landlord is able to control the direct producers by controlling:
(i) the whole economy of the land to which he has title; (ii) crucial
elements of the means of production and, therefore, of the access to
subsistence of the direct producer; and (iii) the reproduction of
(8)
the direct producers' means of production".
For Hindess and Hirst, what they term the 'legal separation'
induces a first or preliminary separation between those who own land
and those who require land and it is this separation which is a
condition of existence of the real separation which is in turn clinched
through the actual intervention of the landlord in the process of
production. Title and the ability to control the distribution of
tenancies and the whole economy of the estate, are lodged at the
level of the landlord. The tenant, therefore, is left with the
actual possession - in exchange for rent - of the means of production,
with the ability to work and use them. The form in which rent is
paid governs the effective separation of the direct producer from
the control of the means of production taken on a whole and thereby
ensures that control is lodged elsewhere.
For Hindess & Hirst, then, legal title is the first condition of
the separation of direct producers from the land and it is legal
title which establishes what estate management can only Confirm/
extend. In a very basic sense control and possession follow on from
legal title, they derive from its primacy and its priority. Legal
title is pre-eminent and the process of production can only establish
that pre-eminence in a more sure, more involved manner.
(8) Hindess 8c Hirst, (1975) ojd cit. p. 236.
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That this position is not without its difficulties can be
seen by Hindess & Hirst's equivocation on exactly this issue. On
the one hand they argue: "Feudal landed property as title, as an
enforced right of exclusion, is a sufficient means to bring free
(9)
men under feudal exploitative relations". Whilst on the other
they argue as follows: "The political/legal instance is limited
in its intervention to the determination and defence of property
rights in land. The subsumption of the direct producer has been
derived only in the first instance from the monopoly ownership of
land, from the right of exclusion. Subsumption rests on economic
control. Legal title does not make a landlord, and landlordship
does not guarantee subsumption. We have not derived subsumption
from the political/legal subordination of the direct producers to
the landlord - FLP and seignorial power are not equivalents".^^
This apparent conflict can only be resolved by arguing a strict
separation between feudal relations of exploitation and their
conditions of existence and yet conditions of existence are by
definition prior conditions of exploitation and so in one sense they
do derive exploitation from legal separation. Even this limited
avenue is denied them when they introduce what one suspects they
supposed all along; the fact that, "It is the economic subsumption
(11)
of the direct producer on which the feudal mode of production rests".
Thus economic subsumption appears to generate its own conditions of
existence - the 'legal' separation of the direct producer from the
means of production - from whence real economic subsumption is derived.
(9) Hindess & Hirst, (1975) ££ cit. p. 237.
(10) ibid p. 241.
(11) ibid p. 242.
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This is indeed a strange circularity which perhaps derives from
their attempt to render 'legal' specificity within the confines of
a mode of production, an attempt which they later yield as being
misguided but rectify on the basis of an unacceptable extension of
the notion of conditions of existence.
This particular way of looking at law and legal title within
the parameters delimited by the notion of conditions of existence
of determinate relations of production cannot account for the distinct
forms of interrelation of the basic relations of ownership. It is
perhaps evident that there is a contradiction between the apparent
primacy of legal title as a condition of existence and the analysis
of control argued by Hindess & Hirst. The analysis of control
suggests that the primary feature of feudal landed property is the
control of the estate. It is possible that this difficulty is a
direct consequence of the inadequacy of the concept of conditions
of existence. For example, we have seen that the concept of
conditions of existence is inadequate to a persuasive analysis of
law and economy for the reason that it relies on the abstract
functionality of the conditions of existence of determinate relations
of production for their concrete specification. 'They are
"functional"; therefore they are', is the form of argument ultimately
employed. This inadequacy is sustained in relation to the analysis
of feudal relations of production; for what sense does it make to
talk of a legal separation in the first place when land is ultimately
held by force and it is the physical dispossession of potential
tenants and the forms of their perpetual dispossession and separation
which is the basis of the real separation of direct producers from the
(12)
means of production. In the context of a proper analysis of the
(12) For example, See Poggi, G. (1978) 'The Development of the
Modern State', London: Hutchinson, p. 30.
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forms of separation of direct producers from the means of production
taken together with the consequent forms of ownership of the means of
production it makes little sense to talk of dispossession or separation
worked out primarily as a distinctly 'legal' separation, as a separation
achieved by the intervention of a legal apparatus or a separation
worked out within distinctly 'legal' relations or at the level of
legal discourse. On the contrary, ownership is an internally
articulated concept which cannot be grasped if it is dissected
according to its legal and economic aspects each seen separately
and linked through the functional concept of conditions of existence.
The specific feature of the relations of feudal production is
the interrelation of 'management' and control functions, the 'autonomy'
or 'dependence' of the relations of possession and control.
Accordingly the tenant retains the actual possession of the means of
production although the particular form in which control and possession
are articulated ensures that possession is effectively circumscribed
through the efficient control of the estate by the landlord. In
other words possession is by no means absolute but is instead limited
and subordinated by its structured relationship with control.
If possession is defined as the relative control of a certain
labour process then quite clearly the landlord is the agent of
possession through the very notion of 'tenancy'. Therefore, it
is necessary to attribute specific mechanisms to the functions of
'control' and 'possession'. For example, at the level of the
assignment of the means of production to a particular use, the
landlord is quite clearly in a position to control the disposition
of the means of production and to some extent to control the extension
of credit. Similarly, the tenant is able to determine certain aspects
of the work process, method, time scale and so on. But the ability
to assign the means of production is closely associated with the
133
effective organisation of the estate. For example, the form in
which rent is paid is a crucial determinant of the ability to assign
the means of production to a particular use. As Hindess and Hirst
demonstrate, the payment of rent in kind, through labour expended on
non-rented or demesne land, achieves two things: first, it directly
relates the landlord to the process of production as the agent of
co-ordination of a labour process and, secondly, through the capacity
to balance the proportions of rented and non-rented land, he is able
to determine the amount of labour expended in lieu of rent and,
indirectly, the labour time available for rented land and the tenants
conditions of subsistence. Thus the criteria used to assign the
means of production crucially affect the tenants possession of the
means of production; control and possession are mutually implicated.
Further, since the ".. landlord can control the reproduction of the
direct 'producers' own units of production through the size of the
(13)
units let, the form of the tenancy and the level of the rent",
this means that the size of units rented need not necessarily
correspond to viable subsistence plots. The landlord is in a
position to control the actual process of production through the
supply or co-ordination of the elements of production essential for
subsistence but lacking in the original rented package. Control
directly impinges on, or establishes the conditions for, effective
possession. Likewise the growth of tenanted units can be checked
before or if those units reach a position of independence vis-a-vis
the 'essential' organisational role of the landlord. The landlord
is also in a position to control general requirements - water and
pasture - together with large scale capital intensive projects -
(13) Hindess & Hirst (1975) ££ cit. p. 239-
13*f
drainage and mills. Both of these give the landlord considerable
leverage over the relative control of the production process and
hence establish the basis for the effective possession of the means
of production. The provision of credit by the landlord serves only
to compound and extend the control exercised by the landlord in the
process of production since even under the sharecropping system the
landlord rather than the tenant controls the choice of crops. As
Marglin notes, even nominal independence was of little value since,
(14)
"Debt was not a business arrangement but subjugation".
As we can see the forms of calculation associated with possession
and control are distinct, as forms of calculation, and interrelated
in terms of their effects. The components of ownership whilst they
retain a formal or positional similarity with respect to feudal,
bourgeois and corporate relations of production are effectively
altered by the form of their interrelation. This would seem to
indicate that the structure of articulation is the important concept
with which to grasp the specificity of any form of ownership of the
means of production.
As a result of the subordination of possession to control, the
forms of calculation associated with possession, (management) are,
in the first instance, relatively limited, referring only to minor
or formal decision making process, and, in the second, hedged about
by the more general calculus of the control of the estate. Thus,
the decision on the assignment of the means of production _to
specific uses is closely associated with the decision criteria as to
how the means of production should be organised. Similarly, it can
be argued that under certain conditions 'title' itself is fractured
(14) Marglin, S. (197^0 'What do Bosses Do? The Origins and
Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production'. Review of
Radical Political Economics 197^ part II, p. kb.
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since it is subject to competing determinants. This division of
title between two agents in no way affects the specification of
title as a component of ownership since there is no unique fusion
or association of an agent with each element of ownership. The
important point is that the basic elements of ownership are present
under feudal relations of production and that the form of their
arrangement is, as we shall see, distinct from that encountered
under bourgeois and corporate relations of production. Each form
of ownership can be adequately grasped through the identification
of the distinct structure of articulation of the elements of title,
control and possession.
Bourgeois forms of ownership.
•Feudal' ownership has been defined as a specific articulation
of three basic relations, title, possession and control. In order
to define bourgeois relations of ownership it is necessary, therefore,
to describe the different articulation of the relations of ownership
involved in the bourgeois form, to detail the changes in the relations
themselves, and, finally, to account for the 'emergence' of a distinct
type of ownership. This emergence is perhaps inevitably connected
with the so called development of the factory and manufacture in
general. Accordingly, an examination of the work of Marglin provides
a summary which is both interesting and pertinent.
For example, Marglin argues that:
"The capitalist division of labour ... was the result of a
search not for a technologically superior organisation of work, but
for an organisation which guaranteed to the entrepreneur an essential
role in the production process, as integrator of the separate efforts
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(15)
of his workers into a marketable product".
Here we have a remarkably clear statement of the re-organisation
of the relations of ownership and the crystallisation of the function
of management. True the problem of the self-conscious insertion of
entrepreneurs into the production process remains but, nevertheless,
Marglin confronts the basic question of the forms in which ownership
is specified. Possession thus becomes a crucial aspect of ownership
aside from its prior delimitation by control. Accordingly, the
relations of laissez-faire production are laid bare. Possession of
the means of production is thereby increasingly removed from the
direct producers and stands more and more in a position of independence
vis-a-vis the direct producers. Therefore, possession can be
specified as a distinct relation predicated upon the direct
management of the means of production. More than anything else
then the re-location of possession away from the direct producers
on one side and away from a direct implication in the forms of
calculation specified by control on the other defines the essential
feature of the bourgeois form of ownership. Whilst the specific
relations of title, possession and control can be defined by forms
of calculation which become increasingly distinct, the manner of
their articulation with each other describes the space for the
insertion of an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is thus a locus for
the integration of distinct relations of ownership hedged about by
discrete forms of calculation. This locus is perhaps more commonly
understood in terms of the relation of private property and as the
basic unit of laisser-faire economics. Accordingly, Bourgeois
relations of ownership may be analysed by reference to two major,
(15) Marglin, S. (197*0 ££ cit. p. 3*t.
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and essentially competing, tendencies. First of all, the
respective isolation of possession, title and control and their
re-specification as relations. Secondly, the re-unification of
the relations of ownership in accordance with 'entrepreneurial
stewardship' (which amounts to the effective re-organisation of
these relations).
It is not necessarily the case that each element of ownership
becomes increasingly developed or complex resulting in an inevitable
relation of more or less complete separation of the elements from
each other and from the structure of their interrelation. This may
be an outcome but it most assuredly is not a developmental process.
There is no reason in principle why certain elements cannot 'regress'
or remain 'undeveloped', through being subsumed under another
'dominant' relation of ownership. Another way of putting the point,
is to argue as Marglin does, that technological superiority is not
the criterion for innovation since innovation depends instead upon
economic and social institutions and, in particular, on the control
of production and the constraints imposed in turn on control. Far
from being part of an inexorable progression from a lower to a higher
form of production^capitalist technology is dependent upon the form
of ownership of the means of production. In other words, forms of
ownership are not forged in the white heat of technological change
but are instead the basic parameters of technological development.
Thus, the form of ownership is not an automatic reflex of the
inevitable thrust of technology.
A measure of the problematic nature of transformation can be
seen in the conditions of crystallisation of the relation of possession.
As Marglin remarks: "Without specialisation, the capitalist had no
essential role to play in the production process Separating
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the tasks assigned to each workman was the sole means by which the
capitalist could, in the days preceeding costly machinery, ensure
that he would remain essential to the production process as integrator
of these separate operations into a product for which a wide market
existed".^ ^ ^ In other words, the effective possession of the means
of production was, for certain groups of workers at least, retained
by the direct producers. The relation of ownership - possession -
had to both emerge, be detached from one particular arrangement
of the relations of ownership, and be affirmed in a distinct relation
with title and control, in order for a distinct managerial 'function'
to exist. That this 'emergence' is neither a one off leap from one
structure of ownership to another nor but one moment in the
development of private property is demonstrated by the highly
contingent character of each relation of ownership and each form
of their articulation. For instance as Marglin points out: "The
minute specialisation that was the hallmark of the putting-out system
only wiped out one of two aspects of workers' control of production:
control over the product. Control of the work process, when and
how much the worker would exert himself, remained with the worker -
(17)
until the coming of the factory".
In short the relation of possession has no unique human subject,
agent, associate or correlate. It is truly a relation of ownership
seen as a structured articulation, a relation which is altered by
its further interrelation with other relations of ownership.
Possession refers to the relative control of a work process and as
(16) Marglin, S. (197*0 ££ cit. P« 38.
(17) Marglin, S. (197*0 ££ cit. p. *f*K
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such, depending upon the general structure of ownership, can be
lodged with the direct producer, the manager, the entrepreneur or
indeed with any combination of agents, supports or human subjects.
There is no one unique functionary corresponding to the relation of
'possession'. Hence there is not a qualitative leap from feudal to
bourgeois to corporate relations of production based upon the insertion
or demise of a human entrepreneur. There exists instead a complex
process of conflict, struggle, contradiction and tension that governs
the form in which ownership is at any one moment structured. It is
very much this element of conflict and struggle which ensures that the
mode of ownership is transformed in its very expression; the form
of ownership in 'laying hold' of the means of production and setting
them in motion establishes, re-establishes and transforms the balance
between the constituent components of ownership. Thus possession
is a particular form of the relation between direct producers and
the means of production and is the outcome of struggle between
various classes and fractions - direct producers and bourgeois
entrepreneurs - and of the tension between the relations of ownership.
Ownership, and especially the elements of control and possession,
is a fundamental moment in, and of, class struggle. Marglin again
puts this in particular context: "The key to the success of the
factory .... was the substitution of capitalists' for workers'
control of the production process; discipline and supervision could
and did reduce costs without being technologically superior".^^^
Factory discipline, then, is part and parcel of the logic of
possession of/separation from the means of production. Scientific
management and especially Taylorism, is but the form of calculus
(18) Marglin, S. (1974) 0£ cit. p. 46.
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associated with effective possession of the means of production
and it is a central part of the extension of 'control' over the
labour process through the establishment of the logic of work
discipline. Identification of the relation of effective possession
of the means of production and the managerial calculus that goes
along with possession is by no means an admission of the validity
of the managerialist thesis on the separation of ownership and
control. It is perhaps as well to outline in detail the pertinent
differences between this position and the thesis of managerial
autonomy.
The conventional response to the managerialist thesis argues
that whilst, under a certain arrangement of the relations of
production managers are a professional salaried stratum^their
economic and business calculations are, nevertheless, informed
by the logic of capital accumulation and profit rather than by a
unique constellation of managerial goals. For example, optimising
or satisf cing are often quoted as surrogate objectives pursued by
management even when in direct contravention of the logic of profit
maximisation. But the real question is not primarily whether
managers follow capitalist logic - (a logic which ultimately can
induce a certain conformity) - but rather involves the status of
the decisions which managers are called upon to make. Whilst it
is quite true that managers may have an important autonomy vis-a-vis
control and title and, given that this autonomy is based on the
different form of calculation which structures possession independently
of title and control, this autonomy only applies to a restricted
area of decision making and a specific form or means of calculation.
Of course, the degree of autonomy will depend upon the overall
articulation of the relations of ownership and, therefore, will vary
iVl
as between 'bourgeois' and 'corporate' relations of ownership.
The important point, however, is that the status of managerial
decisions cannot be reduced to that of decisions affecting control.
If that were the case then managers would have a crucial autonomy
vis-a-vis other agents of ownership. Nor can management be reduced
to the aims of capital accumulation and profit since managers are
then seen as more or less automatic reflexes of the abstract logic
of capitalism and are denied their specific role in the relative
control of the labour process. Broadly speaking the first position
is argued by managerialism and the second by its opponents. What
is common to both positions is that each, in its own way, denies
the existence of the relation of possession and, ironically, the
existence of a specific managerial structure governing the possession
of the means of production. Possession vanishes into the more
general logic of control and, therefore, managerialists and anti-
(19)
managerialists cannot be distinguished on this basis. On
the contrary, managers are no more, no less, than a group of supports
for specific forms of calculation implied in the concept of possession
of the means of production. They can no more be transposed into a
position of absolute control than they can be seen as the incarnation
of the spirit of capital accumulation and the profit motive. Both
positions fail to realise the essential specificity of the relations
involved, particularly the relation of possession, and, therefore,
the manner in which they are subject to quite definite rather than
general interconnections.
(19) Take for example Ralph Miliband who, broadly speaking,
is an opponent of managerialism. He argues that
'possession' and 'control' are but different strategies
within an overall 'capitalist' consensus. Miliband, R.
(1973) 'The State in Capitalist Society', London:
Quartet, p.
-]k2
This would mean, therefore, that 'possession' emerges as a
discrete form of calculation within bourgeois relations of ownership
and may or may not describe an entrepreneurial or a delegated capacity.
Whether or not the individual capitalist exercises this capacity or
puts it out to a specialised functionary, the logic of possession is
established as is the particular articulation of possession, title
and control around the personage of the entrepreneurial locus.
Accordingly, the relation of possession varies in terms of the more
general organisation of ownership and in particular depends upon the
type of ownership in question.
We have established that technological change is bound by the
particular form of the organisation of the means of production
specifically, by the intervention of management with respect to the
possession of the means of production and by the forms of calculation,
supervision and discipline associated with the logic of possession,
the form of ownership delimits the deployment of technology. Or
to quote Marglin "... the primary determinant of basic choices with
respect to the organisation of production has not been technology -
exogenous and inexorable - but the exercise of power-endogenous and
resistible".
Thus, Bourgeois forms of ownership can be analysed according
to two competing tendencies:-
1. The respecification of the relations of ownership and, in
particular, the reformulation of the relation of possession based
for the first time on a relation of its relative independence
vis-a-vis control; and
(20) Marglin, S. (1974) ojd cit. p. 60.
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2. the consequent location of a place for the entrepreneurial
agent as the locus for the intersection of the various relations
of ownership.
As we have seen a particular feature of bourgeois relations of
ownership is represented by the advent of scientific management.
For example, Taylorism, registered, above all else, the articulation
of forms of calculation which could ensure that 'possession' of the
means of production was finally and completely removed from the direct
producer and secreted in a management structure delimited and
sustained by forms of calculation and control. In this sense
Sohn-Rethel remarks on Taylor's "... singleness of purpose in
wanting to transfer the whole skill and experience possessed by
the craftsmen of metal trades upon the management ... (skill and
experience) ... thereby became a possession of the managers to deal
with in the interests of capital; they could carve it up, mechanise
(21)
the subdivisions and even automate it as a whole". Thus the
separation of the knowledge from the direct producer constituted
a basic condition for the effective possession of -the means of
production by the managerial structure. It was only on the basis
of this prior separation that management gained the means to wield
technological coercion on the workers through their control of
'the important decisions and planning which vitally affect the
plant'. In effect Taylorism 'delivered' the means whereby
management could 'possess' the means of production. Although Sohn-
Rethel makes a critical error in arguing that scientific management
was necessary to ensure the control of capital over production since
(21) Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978); 'Intellectual & Manual Labour',
London: Macmillan, p. 153-
1 kk
he implies that 'possession' is only a means for exercising control
rather than a distinct relation of ownership. He appears to miss
the point that scientific management represents a level of decision
making and a form of calculus quite distinct from the criteria which
in form and delimit the decision making concerning capital transfer.
As we have seen, decision criteria of 'possession' are quite distinct
from criteria associated with the 'control' of the means of production.
Scientific management and possession do not .just follow on from,
or subordinate themselves to, the establishment of economic control.
Possession is neither the 'form' of control nor is it the functional
means for the exercise of control. Whilst it is true that control
and possession are mutually implicated in an overall articulation of
ownership they do not reduce to or collapse into each other. In the
end the pitfalls of such a reduction can only serve to replicate the
exceedingly tortuous reiteration of managerialism and anti-managerialism
It will no doubt be apparent that when scientific management is
considered it is as an index of the theoretical articulation of a
movement that took place in the interstices of bourgeois and
corporate forms of ownership. Possession, as a form of calculation
and criterion of ownership, first 'emerged' within bourgeois forms
of ownership only to be developed more completely under corporate
forms of ownership. Scientific management is perhaps properly
located as a fundamental thrust of transformation as between
bourgeois and corporate forms of ownership. Or, to put it more
briefly, scientific management overlaps, or is mapped onto both
bourgeois and corporate forms of ownership and it is so mapped
precisely because of its intimate relation with possession, a
relation which first 'emerges' within bourgeois forms of ownership.
1^5
Corporate relations of ownership.
Much has been written on the 'corporation* since the classic
work of Berle & Means, 'The modern corporation and private
(22)
property'. Although a lot has been written on the subject
the discussion has been characterised, on the whole, by an obsession
with three basic themes. First of all, the argument, highlighted
by Berle & Means in 1932, that Capitalism has been attenuated by
the separation of ownership and control has become the centrepiece
of any discussion of the nature of 'managerial Capitalism'. For
the most part this discussion rests upon the identification of
distinct managerial goals. Proponents of 'managerialism'
maintain that such goals are socially responsible and the corporation
is even regarded by some as basically 'soulfull'. The important
point for this perspective is that managers do not, necessarily,
reflect the requirements of profit maximisation and 'finance'
Capitalism and hence modern industrial society is not, essentially,
a capitalist social structure. The dispersal of stock ensures
that benefits are widely and generously distributed and the
crystallisation of managerial goals represents the 'social' and
responsible character of the corporation. On the other hand,
opponents of managerialism argue two things. First, that even if
distinct managerial goals exist they are effectively overuled by
the basic requirements of finance capital which are realised through
a system of interlocking directorates. Managers are thus 'forced'
to comply with the logic of capital accumulation. Secondly, it is
often argued that the separation of ownership and control is overdrawn
(22) Berle, A. & Means, G. (1932) 'The Modern Corporation and
Private Property' New York: Harcourt Bruce.
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and that managers may 'own' a significant amount of stock and in
any case manage in the basic interests of capital accumulation.
Thus managerial goals are 'seen to co-incide with those of profit
maximisation. This argument has been examined in some detail
already. Accordingly, it need only be re-iterated here that both
of these perspectives on 'managerialism' reduce, quite inevitably,
to a series of sterile platitudes. The discussion degenerates thus
largely because of the incomplete picture of the nature of 'ownership'
and 'control' which remains, after all, the lynchpin of the entire
dispute.
A second view of the corporation involves the way in which the
social and economic functions of the concept of private property
have apparently changed in such a way as to facilitate, rather than
hinder, the growth of the corporate empire. Committed, more or
less, to an instrumentalist conception of 'law' this position starts
off from a particular conception of private property and then seeks to
describe the use of the private property form by the corporation.
For example, this sort of perspective is implicit in the work of
Berle and Means and is made quite explicit in a revised introduction
by Berle. He argues that "Increased size and domination of the
American corporation has automatically split the package of rights
and privileges comprising the old conception of property.
Specifically, it splits the personality of the individual beneficial
(23)
owner away from the enterprise manager". Thus, whilst Berle
correctly notes part of the tendency namely, the separation of
beneficial ownership of rights to a share in corporate profits from
(23) Berle & Means (1967) "The Modern Corporation and Private
Property", New York: Harcourt, Bruce, p. (XIX).
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the (managerial) ability to determine how those profits are
generated, the separation takes place on the basis of the private
property form. Accordingly, whilst the corporate assets 'belong'
to the corporation as a legal entity_jthe beneficial enjoyment of
revenue generated in consequence of those assets is seen as a
personal right charged upon the corporation. The corporation is
fixed in terms of a package of subjective attributes determined by
the basic structure of the concept of private property. The legal
concept of private property remains intact but its constituent parts
are allocated to several different actors. Above all else this
represents the quite widespread conviction that the basic structure
of law and especially private property are unaltered whilst its
social function is fundamentally transformed. This sort of
perspective has been examined already in the form of a critique of
Karl Renner but perhaps it should be emphasised that this particular
perspective is an extremely important determinant of the nature and
evident failure of anti-trust legislation.
Finally, there is a more or less consistent attempt to view the
corporation as an agency, an actor, or a locus of decision making
seen in its own right. To be sure there is a great deal of
variation in the way in which the corporation is portrayed. For
example, the corporation may appear as the incarnation of big
business or monopoly capital or, perhaps more modestly, the actual
corporate enterprise may be seen as an enterprise subject or agent
endowed with the capacity to control, organise and distribute the
industrial product. Although as John Scott makes clear of Cutler
et al's notion of the enterprise unit as a locus of decision making
calculus they .. "fail to realise .. that effective possession may
rest with any actor, individual or collective, and that the
enterprise is not necessarily the only collective actor capable
(24)
of effective possession". Needless to say, Scott's concept
of social actor is perhaps unnecessarily restrictive and is also
subject to precisely the same sorts of criticisms levelled at the
concept of an enterprise agent namely, that it dissolves all too
readily into some form of surrogate subjectivity. To be fair,
Cutler e_t al, do realise that the equivalent of 'effective possession'
may reside with any 'actor' since they see the category of agents
capable of 'possession' as a function of the legal system in question.
Thus the legal system sets up particular agents of (economic )
possession which may vary as between legal systems. Nonetheless,
the criticism of the general privilege accorded to the enterprise
unit or agent is well made. Similarly, the concentration of
'corporate' power within a few major corporations has generated the
(25)
idea of what Holland calls a 'meso-economic sector. This sector
of the economy thus becomes the all important 'actor' in society, a
kind of ultra big big business or the essential form, logic or core
of monopoly capital. Accordingly, this sector controls the commanding
heights of big business and multinational corporations. There again
Perlo argues that there are strong ties, cemented by interlocking
directorates, which link financial institutions in an inner circle
C 26)
of co-ordinated power. But the very notion of interlocking
(24) Scott, J. (1979) 'Corporations, Classes & Capitalism',
London: Hutchinson, p. 34.
(25) Holland, S. (1975) 'The Socialist Challenge', London:
Quartet.
(26) Perlo, V. (1957) 'The Empire of High Finance', New York:
International Publishers.
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directorates assumes that the interlock has a centre, a single
locus which provides the basis for the co-ordination of industrial
affairs, and political and social affairs. Furthermore, Galbraith's
concept of the technostructure assumes that there is a predominant
feature of the corporate structure which provides the core of the
(27)
economy and industrial society generally. The idea that there
is a single centre of industrial society, a determinative principle
(Hirst), is subject to quite specific criticisms not least because
it reduces all forms of sociality, however discrete, to one fundamental
essence. But there is a more compelling reason for rejecting this
position as a proper conceptualisation of corporate affairs. By its
very nature the corporate form of ownership is characterised by a
radical disjunction between its composite relations and any connections
are quite specific and contingent. To the extent that these portraits
of the 'corporate' economy attribute a central importance to the
corporation as the predominant actor in industrial society or else
isolate one single set of social relations as the primary determinant
of industrial organisation then they each misunderstand the basic
structure of the corporation. For example, even Stone argues that
( 28 )
the corporations are the important actors in modern society.
To be sure, there are considerable differences between the respective
adherents, which is not surprising since there is a long tradition
which sustains this particular perspective. Indeed many of these
bear a more than passing resemblance to the pioneering work of C.
(29)
Wright Mills. Nevertheless, insofar as they share the idea that
(27) Galbraith, J. (1967) 'The New Industrial State' London:
Hamish Hamilton.
(28) Stone, C. (1975) ££ cit.
(29) Wright Mills, C. (195^) 'The Power Elite' New York:
Oxford University Press.
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there is some form of coherence to corporate relations and that
these relations are constituted around a centre, an essential
social actor (the power elite, big business, monopoly capital, the
meso-economic structure, the technostructure, the corporate essence,
the technological imperative and so on) then they are less than
adequate representations of corporate relations.
Over and against those perspectives which attribute a pertinent
effectivity, even an anthropomorphic nature, to the corporation it is
argued here that the corporation is best understood as a distinct
articulation of social relations of ownership. The basic structure
of these relations has been described already. Under the 'corporate
form', however, they are organised on a radically different basis
and their content as social relations is altered quite significantly.
How then shall we define these relations? The concept of
'control' is a difficult one and it has proved virtually impossible
to sustain any agreement over what it means. For example, Scott
refers to 'strategic control' as the basic parameters within which
corporations act whereas Berle & Means see control as the power
to determine the composition of the board of directors and as such
it can be vested in a variety of sources, the 'formal' owners, the
effective majority or minority of shareholders, management or,
finally, the apex of a pyramid of interlocking corporations.
Similarly, the concept of control is often used to refer to the
power to determine a quite general set of policy objectives,
Parmelee, Goldsmith & Larner/^^ Also, there is a more or less
(30) See Goldsmith, R. & Parmelee, R. (19^0) 'The Distribution
of Ownership in the 200 largest Nonfinancial Corporation'
Monograph of T.N.E.C., 29} Washington: Government Printing
Office, and Larner, R. (1970)'Management Control and the
Large Corporation', New York: Dunellen.
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consistent attempt to draw a cleavage between 'strategy' and
'operations' as distinct types of decision making, De Vroeyr &
(31)
Eisenberg. Accordingly, the discussion of 'control' is
characterised by incomprehension and even incommensurability.
Whatever the particular merits of these perspectives there is a
general failure to realise that control is essentially a social
relation of_ ownership. Therefore, control is often juxtaposed to
ownership in the famous dispute relating to the separation of
ownership and control. Likewise Scott, following Giddens & Clement,
argues that strategic control is mediated through legal institutions
(32)
and relations. And control is even seen as a form or a potential
which is inherent in other social relations, possession or ownership.
For example, Scott & Berle & Means adopt this view.^"^
Over and against this sort of interpretation, it is argued that
control is not just a sphere or type of decision making since decisions
invariably result in the making, breaking and re-organisation of social
relations (debtor, creditor, severance, supervision, sub-contracting,
redeployment and so on). Therefore, control is a social relation
which interconnects definite aspects of the social process of
production. Accordingly, control is a genuine relation which brings
(31) See De Vroey, M. (1975) 'The Separation of Ownership and
Control in Large Corporations' Review of Radical Political
Economics, 7/2 and Eisenberg, M. (1969) 'The Legal Roles
of Shareholder and Management in Modern Corporate Decision
making', California Law Review, 57/1.
(32) See Giddens, A. (1923) "The Class Structure of Advanced
Societies', London: Hutchinson and Clement, W. (1975)
'The Canadian Corporate Elite', Toronto: McClelland.
(33) Scott, J. (1979) ££ cit. and Berle, A. & Means, G. (1967)
op cit.
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together resources and uses. To some extent it involves what
Poulantzas describes as the ability to assign the means of production
to a particular use. For 'corporate ownership' control is constituted
through a definite form of calculus which equates diverse factors in
a sum which reaches far beyond any unique constellation of boardroom
personnel and the corporate entity. For example, the decision to
invest or conversely not to invest in a particular product or
geographical site carries with it the inevitable restructuring of
social relations in no way 'formally' connected with the identifiable
corporation with which we are initially concerned. Control is thus
much more than control of the corporation or even the corporate
empire since it involves a whole range of factors which affect
other social processes. We are not so much concerned with which
group has control as with how control is executed. That is to say
with the way in which decisions are made, the calculations which
inform them and their status vis-a-vis other sorts of decisions.
Accordingly, whether or not control is by a majority or minority of
shareholders or whether a corporation is controlled by management is
considerably less important than the social relation of control
itself, its scope and its content. Similarly, for Scott to argue that
there is a transition from personal to impersonal forms of possession
and control tells us next to nothing about the social relations of
possession and control. To be fair he does draw a distinction
between the modes of control, which appear to designate the author
of control (minority, majority, management and constellation of
interests), and, the mechanisms of control, which describe how
control is executed. But it is arguable that the distinction is
untenable for there is a very real sense in which the way control
is exercised is the proper locus of control, it is the very calculations
which inform 'strategic' decisions that are at the heart of control.
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Who is in control is at best an interesting irrelevance.
Insofar as 'corporate' control is concerned we are talking
then in terms of the criteria by which calculations are made
concerning the choice of locations and products for investment,
the division of the overall profit and the general objectives
concerning the labour force, finance, etc. It involves what
Aglietta terms the creation of a head office as an agency of
(34)
co-ordination. Likewise, possession is the social relation
of direction and 'use' of a determinate process of production
involving a complex series of calculations and strategies designed
to get production moving. Once production is in motion the relation
of possession is necessary to keep it moving. As such it includes
all forms of direction of the 'labour' process whether it be through
strategies of work study, worker representation/control or by more
centralised plant 'management'. Similarly, the 'level' to which
possession refers may be that of the enterprise unit, the single
production unit (Poulantzas), the factory, the functional department,
or a centre of profit (Aglietta), depending upon the exact form of
industrial organisation in question and whether it is more conglomerate
(35)
than corporate.
Title, refers basically to the system of transfers of assets.
Thus the forms of calculation which govern the circulation of capital,
stocks, shares, etc. comprise an essential relation of ownership.
Insurance companies, stock market expectations, the 'world' market,
scale of returns and so on, are each important elements in determining
(3^) Aglietta, M. (1979) 'A Theory of Capitalist Regulation:
The U.S. Experience', London: NLB.
(35) Poulantzas (1973) ££ cit. and Aglietta ibid.
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the transfer of liquid assets between enterprises. As a legal
entity the corporation has the formal legal ownership of its
C 353-)
it is a legal agent. In return investors and stockholders
receive a right to a portion of some of the benefits which may
accrue to the corporation. But the relation of title is much
more than the fragmentation of private property and the distribution
of rights to individual investors and to corporations respectively.
As a relation of ownership, title is governed by the logic and the
forms of calculation which assign and re-cycle the market for
assets. This form of calculation is distinct from the sorts of
calculations which comprise possession and ownership. Although
it is true to say that they are interrelated in specific ways.
For example, the so called 'power' of large institutions or investors
to buy and sell stock makes itself felt as a factor of calculation
by management but not as a hydraulic force impinging upon the
corporation. What is important is that the issue of legal
'ownership' and legal rights is bound up with the system of transfers
of this particular nature. Law is not just a condition of transfer,
nor is it something which facilitates the exchange. The very
notion of legal title is bound up with the relation of ownership
which we call 'title'. In one sense at least law i_s the system
of transfer. Conversely, 'title' is not exhausted by its legal
constitution since the very notion of a relation of ownership
requires the operation of a distinct form of calculus part of which
involves the (legal) transfer and division of rights and so on.
In a very basic sense these three relations of ownership are
characteristic of the corporate 'economy'. But the way in which
they are interrelated may vary considerably. For example, both
Poulantzas and Aglietta have noted shifts in the structure of
(35a) By definition,the corporation is a legal entity
distinct from its members which may own its own
property. The shareholders merely 'own' titles
to interest but not the company per se. See
Hadden, T. (1977) on cit, 'Penningtons Company
Law' (1973) London: Butterworths and Kelsen, E.
(19^5) op cit.
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corporations. For Poulantzas, the conglomerate form of business
t
has demonstrated a partial re-integration of 'separate' sub-corporations
in a more centralised unit of control. Whereas Aglietta detects a
shift away from functional sub-departments toward more regionally
autonomous centres of profit; they both detect different trends
but the main point is that the relations of ownership are inherently
relations of tension. Thus the forms of calculation characteristic
of the particular relations, as well as their overall configuration,
are perpetually shifting. There is a persistent tension between
the calculations which inform decisions concerning the transfer of
assets and those which determine 'control' and 'possession'
respectively.
Soviet relations of ownership.
In terms of the general typology, Soviet relations of ownership
can best be described through a consideration of the work of Charles
Bettleheim as expressed in, for example, "The transition to Socialist
( 37)
Economy" and "Economic calculation and forms of property".
Here the author takes great pains to consider the construction and
location of what he calls the enterprise or economic subject.
In the process, Bettleheim confronts the nature of state 'property'
and forms of 'legal' ownership in a manner which is not without its
problems. Indeed, Ralph Miliband makes a forceful criticism of the
(36) Poulantzas (1975) and Aglietta (1979) ££ cit.
(37) Bettleheim, C. (1978) 'The Transition to Socialist
Economy', Brighton: Harvester, and
Bettleheim, C. (1976) 'Economic Calculation and forms of
Property', London: R.K.P.
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consequences of Bettleheim's formulation of economic agents as
class relations. These features will be outlined in due course.
At the moment though it is necessary to set out the specific
continuities between a general typology of ownership and the work
of Bettleheim insofar as it instances one aspect of the more general
examination of Soviet relations of production.
At an entirely formal level, it is perfectly possible to assign
the relations of ownership to positions within Soviet relations of
production. Quite simply then; title, through the concept of
state property, would seem to reside with the 'state'; control too,
in the form of economic objectives and resources allocation, is
secreted within the 'state' structure and, possession is located at
the level of the individual enterprise or unit of production. So
far so good. Now the criteria for allocating funds _to the enterprise
as a whole are effectively dissolved (as independent forms of
calculation) on the basis that there can be no external (independent)
finance, no elaborate calculation of investment decisions based on
revenue, and no independent .. 'rentier' calculus. These
calculations are subsumed instead under decisions regarding
internal resource allocation, at the level of the economic plan
regarding production priorities. Accordingly, the calculations
associated with control and title are mutually implicated under
Soviet relations of ownership with the very important corollary that
title is but a formal relation of ownership rather than a fully
articulated form of calculation. Title is emptied of all but its
formal status as a relation of ownership. Thus the abolition of
legal title appears to exhaust the commitment to the abolition of
private property. But as Bettleheim is at pains to point out
".. exploitation can be undertaken as much by those who intervene
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as 'possessors' of the means of production (the managers of the
enterprises), as by those who are supposed to 'control' them in
the name of state property".
It can readily be concluded, then, that the crucial aspect
of ownership emerges in the interrelation of possession and control.
These twin relations of ownership become the axes around which
competing definitions of class or classless society seem to revolve.
This means that the debate concerning the exact nature of Soviet
relations of production - whether they are state Capitalist,
intermediary or even Capitalist - is often located with respect to
whether or not there is a state bourgeoisie controlling the
calculations affecting resource allocation and investment decision
making, and the class location of the agents who 'possess' the
means of production or the enterprise units. Although it can be
argued that it is the relations of possession and control which are
crucial to an analysis of the structure of ownership under Soviet
relations of production and, consequently, to an analysis of the
exact nature of Soviet society. Whether Soviet society is defined
as classless depends in an important sense upon the form in which
the relations of ownership constitute the ownership of/separation
from the means of reproduction of material existence. The form of
ownership is indeed fundamental to a discussion of any 'society'.
As an example of the analysis of Soviet relations let us turn
then to the work of Bettleheim. Bettleheim quite correctly argues
that, "In the majority of the 'socialist countries' possession of the
means of production reverts to the enterprises".Possession is
(38) Bettleheim,CL(1976) ojd cit. p. 93*
(39) Bettleheim, C. (1976) ojd cit. p. 82.
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defined here as the ability to control and put in to operation a
determinate process of appropriation of nature (real appropriation).
So much is in accord with the position unfolded within a general
typology of oivnership. Where Bettleheim diverges is on the question
of the enterprise subject. He argues that "When this possession
is consolidated by corresponding legal relations, the enterprise is
established as a 'legal subject' ... (and that) .. consequently, this
possession tends to assume the legal aspects of property".
There are several points of interest here. Not only does Bettleheim
assume a prior distinction between economic and legal relations,
together with the contingent formulation of the enterprise as a legal
subject, but he also seems to conflate the categories of effective
possession and the relation of legal title in the unitary relation
of private property. At least two possible explanations are available
for this. Either, Bettleheim is referring to the remnants of a
bourgeois legal form active in constituting the enterprise as a
legal subject in post-revolutionary society; or, this conceptualisation
of the relations of transitional society is inescapably trapped within
the parameters of an implicit Philosophical Anthropology. To be
sure the incidence of Philosophical Anthropology is evident in both
cases although it must be said that the particular effects of
Philosophical Anthropology differ substantially for each.
For example, the theory of non-correspondence of certain economic
relations with legal relations and the non-coincidence of economic
and juridic subjects is at the heart of Bettleheim's dilemna on
precisely this issue. For to admit of the former is to argue at
least two things. First of all, a purely technicist conception
(^0) Bettleheim, C. (1976) ojd cit. p. 82.
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of the relations of production and, secondly, the separation of legal
and economic relations in order for one to lag behind or, fail to
correspond with, the other. Now such a structure of argument is
akin to that characteristic of Philosophical Anthropology. A much
closer affinity between Philosophical Anthropology and the particular
work of Bettleheim can be traced through the concept of economic and
juridic subjects each seen as separate forms of subjectivity. As
Bettleheim recognises; "In fact, when rights of disposal and control
are institutionalised in favour of a limited group of producers (....)
such rights can give rise to the equivalent of a kind of ownership
by this limited group, even though, in theory, the means of production
(Zf 1 )
over which these rights are exercised are public property".
Bettleheim merely confirms this ambiguity when he goes on to discuss
the circumstances under which a 'juridical personality' is conferred
(42)
on an economic subject. It has been forcefully argued elsewhere
that the concept of the subject is basic to Philosophical Anthropology
and, therefore, is inherent in the form of ownership demarcated by
the concept of private property. In this way the concept of the
subject and private property provide for continuity between economic
and juridic subjects. So much so that to even speak of economic
and juridic subjects is at best a misnomer. This follows for the
reason that the very existence of an economic subject necessarily
connotes the concept of a juridic subject since they are but two
expressions of the same subjective essence formulated under the
auspices of Philosophical Anthropology. It should by now be self
(41) Bettleheim, C. (1978) o£ cit. p. 54.
(42) For example, see ibid, p. 74.
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evident that the question of the co-incidence or divergence, of
economic and legal entities conceived as subjects is a false
question since the use of the concept of subject ensures an
immediate affinity between the legal and the economic. Moreover,
it is a 'false' question inscribed within very definite parameters.
The specification of economic subjects in the work of Bettleheim,
taken together with the notion of an enterprise subject in Cutler
et al, each, in their own way, betray the reliance on an implicit
Philosophical Anthropology. The consequence of this is the inscription
of a whole series of essentially false problems on the agenda. For
example, the question of the lag of legal behind economic relations
or the problem of whether an effective possession be defined as a
private property right at the very least are inappropriate questions.
For this perspective all questions of the respective correspondence
of law and economy ultimately reduce to the specification of the
conditions under which one mode of discourse is translated into
another; 'economic' into 'legal' and vice versa. It follows
inexorably from this that for Bettleheim & Cutler et al the crucial
issue is not whether enterprise subjects can be inserted within legal
forms and accorded a distinct legal status because the formulation
of the enterprise, and the economic 'sphere' in general, in terms
of 'subjects' ensures the coincidence of economic relations with the
categories of legal discourse. It is not so much that the relations
of ownership are analysed according to the existence of economic and
legal realms (such that the coincidence of one with the other can
become crucial) it is rather that once economic or enterprise subjects
are introduced then this immediately indicates that relations of
production can be specified in terms of legal discourse. However,
the existence of economic and legal discourse sustains the prior
division of material reality into economic and legal realms.
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This means that to argue a relation between law and economy is to do
no more than imply that the concepts of one can be translated into
the other more or less without residue. It is argued here that,
however the law/economy relation is conceived the category of the
sub.ject or enterprise agent ultimately allows for the effective
translation of one form of discourse into another. Furthermore, once
the problem is seen in terms of the relation between law and economy
then the concept of the subject provides the only basis upon which
law and economy can be consistently related.
In order to comprehend the precise source of the difficulties
encountered by Bettleheim's analysis of Soviet relations of ownership
it is necessary to re-examine the way in which law and economy are
supposed to cohabit. In particular, it is vital that the work of
Pashukanis, concerning the interrelation of law and economy, be
re-opened to allow the appropriate parallels to be drawn between
the role of the legal subject and the manner in which law and
economy are held to interrelate.
To look at the structure of the argument in rather more detail,
paying particular regard to the more general implications that
follow on from it, the argument is as follows. As soon as the
issue is seen in terms of a relation between Law and Economy then
this immediately implies the prior existence of law and economy as
separate ontological realms. That is to say the manner in which
the question is posed implies the distinct ontological status of
Law and Economy. Now the form in which the law/economy relation
is specified, the manner in which the question is 'apparently'
solved, implies the existence of discrete epistemological terrains
linked by the translation of the terms of one into the terms of
the other. For example, the work of Pashukanis commences on the
basis of a formal analogy between an examination of the commodity
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in Marx's Capital and the examination of the form of Law. The
question is at first purely conceptual - whether the structure
of commodity exchange can be accommodated within legal discourse.
The problem is 'solved' on the basis of the translation of the
form of argument used in 'Capital' to the categories of legal
discourse. The difficulties encountered in effecting a perfect
translation lead to the specification of legal relations as an
independent ontological category necessary for the exchange of
commodities, as a condition of existence of determinate relations
of commodity production. It is on this point that we can see a
reason for the ambiguous formulation of law within the work of
Pashukanis as both the form of equivalent exchange and its material
condition of existence. Quite simply Pashukanis shifts ground,
from the question of formal parallels between forms of discourse
to the specification of legal relations as concrete conditions of
existence for economic relations. In a word the form in which
the solution is posed - the conceptual parallels between forms of
discourse - reverts to the simple reiteration of the manner in
which the question is posed - the discrete ontological status of
law. Pashukanis conflates the solution with the question for
the reason that the manner in which the question is posed renders
it unanswerable. Indeed once the problem is posed in this way,
as an ontological separation of law and economy, then there is only
one consistent solution. That solution is arrived at with reference
to the basic parameters of Philosophical Anthropology. The solution
to the problem of the law/economy relation is thus because it provides
the only means whereby the concepts relating to law and those relating
to economy can be subsumed within a larger domain. Namely, the
category of the subject, a category which ensures that the economic
and juridic spheres are part and parcel of the overall affinity
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of the subjective essence. Law and economy - whether conceived
as epistemological £r ontological domains - are but different
manifestations of the same subjective essence. Philosophical
Anthropology thereby provides a solution, but it is a solution
obtained at an unacceptable price - the reduction of all forms
of ownership to the relation of private property conceived, of
course, on the basis of an essential subject. Quite paradoxically
then in attempting to transcend the base-superstructure metaphor and
to provide a solution to the law and economy relation Pashukanis ends
up by embracing the only possible solution once the problem is posed
in this particular way - namely as a relation of Law and Economy.
For Pashukanis that solution is ultimately the fact that the form
of law is interdependent with the form of commodity exchange for
the reason that both are instances of the same division of the human
subject from his essence achieved within Philosophical Anthropology.
The concept of equivalence can then be interpreted as the hidden
hand that ultimately induces conformity between the economic and
legal spheres, as a common essence which ensures that apparently
discrete phenomena are but different manifestations of the same
essential structure. It has been a persistent theme within the
thesis that the entire notion of the Law/Economy relation must be
rejected, for reasons already adequately recounted, and a more
efficient premise adopted. It is argued that the concept of
ownership of/separation from the means of reproduction of material
existence provides such a premise.
This necessary diversion concerning the law/economy relation
completed, a diversion so crucial insofar as an accurate assessment
of Bettleheim is concerned, it would be expedient to return to the
more substantive work of Bettleheim. Work which unfolds on the
basis of the more general concerns hitherto recounted. Perhaps the
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point should be made that the relation between Philosophical
Anthropology, on the one hand, and the law/economy relation, on
the other, is far from exhausted by this brief diversion. Indeed
their interrelation will be re-examined at a later juncture.
To return then to Bettleheim's work on Soviet society by way
of the criticism of his work by Ralph Miliband. Miliband, correctly
notices the tendency within the work of Bettleheim to derive class
relations from the relations of ownership in a manner which affords
the subsequent necessity of bringing in purely subjective criteria
to determine class membership in Soviet society. For instance,
Miliband remarks of Bettleheim "What he seems to be suggesting
is that, where there exists a division of labour according to which
some people, located in the state or party apparatus, exercise a
•directing function' they constitute a 'state bourgeoisie' engaged
(1+3)
in 'class struggld with 'the proletariat'". Bettleheim
clearly recognises the difficulties of reducing all agents bearing
directive functions to a common bourgeois class inheritance. But
the recognition is made only on the condition of introducing purely
subjective criteria involving the 'purposes' or 'proletarian
practices' of party cadres within the administrative apparatus.
The criterion of class membership is then centred on the question
of ideological affinity with the proletariat. This is hardly a
sufficient basis on which to construct a class map. Indeed as
Miliband notes of the means used to establish proletarian affinity;
"What these proletarian practices are remains unspecified. But the
picture presented here is one where some cadres, lodged in one or
(43) Miliband, R. (1975) 'Bettleheim and Soviet Experience'
New Left Review, 91 5 P« 62.
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other apparatus of power are members of the state bourgeoisie;
while others, lodged in the same apparatuses of power are not.
But this clearly deprives the notion of state bourgeoisie of any
(MO
but the most arbitrary and subjective meaning."
To be sure the problem of class location is a complex one
outside the scope of the present formal indication of Soviet
relations of ownership. What is of particular importance in all
this is the fact that the category of the subject, introduced in
order to deal with the complexity of economic centres of decision
making and their further interrelation with juridic subjects and
state property, surfaces yet again in the analysis of the class
location of managers. Once again whenever economic subjects are
introduced then it is necessary to indicate the particular bearers
of that subjectivity, the location of managers in respect of the
class map. Now the distribution of class relations depends upon
the internalisation of competing subjectivities - the subjectivity
of the economic subject or the subjectivity of proletarian practices.
In a word class location depends upon the ideological affinity of
the bearers of different kinds of subjectivity. As a result the
economic subject isbo.rne by the subjective aspirations of individual
'managers' who are but discrete incarnations of that larger subjective
essence. But it is no less an economic 'subject' for all that.
Analysis of the work of Bettleheim thus clearly demonstrates
the deep seated reliance on two major themes. They are, first of
all, the idea that enterprises can possess the means of production
(if5)
by virtue of their existence as economic subjects. And,
(MO ibid, p. 62.
(M?) See, for example, Scott's argument that ... "legal forms cannot
have effective possession because they cannot act" (Scott (1979)
op cit. p. 33) and the corollary that possession is always an
attribute of real social groupings or collective actors.
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secondly, the idea that law and economy are separate forms of
'subjectivity'. It should be apparent that each of these themes
registers the effect of an implied Philosophical Anthropology.
Indeed the co-incidence induced by the category of the subject
between these respective themes has been alluded to already.
There is though another point of more general interest, that is,
the further correspondence of Philosophical Anthropology with the
idea of a law/economy relation. The point is of crucial importance
at this juncture for the simple reason that Soviet, or any 'transitional
society apparently registers the disruption or dislocation of the
base/superstructure. Transitional societies are, therefore, all too
prone to deal in legal survivals, on one side, and autonomous economic
subjects, on the other. Two positions which effectively paralyse
discussion. For example, the work of Bettleheim evinces this sort
of tendency. The argument will be that both of these positions in
some sense 'derive' from a common inheritance of Philosophical
Anthropology and that they each represent but a particular variation
of a more profound continuity.
To summarise and extend the particular affinity of the law/
economy relation and Philosophical Anthropology it is necessary to
argue two points. First of all, they each depend upon a common
heritage that is to say they both imply the prior distribution of
material reality into, in the first case, Law and Economy - in
order to give the relation of law and economy - and, in the second
case, persons and things (subject and object) - in order to give
the relation of private property. The analysis indicates the
parallel construction of purely formal continuities, for example,
the prior division creates a space for 'legal' intervention to be
possible. In a word the manner in which they pose the question
is exactly the same and thus creates the very possibility of legal
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intervention. The second point concerns the 'form' in which the
pre-established problem is apparently 'solved'. Now the 'form'
in which the solution is offered is necessarily diverse in respect
of the discrete positions adopted on law and economy. For example,
certain positions reached on the law/economy relation would seem to
leave the 'form' of law alone - Karl Renner and Cutler e_t al are
two instances of this strand of thought. Both Renner and Cutler
et al allow for private property to embrace the reality of corporate
relations of production and they do so on the condition that private
property is but an empty frame to be filled by an orderly sequence
of determinate social relations. Thus the two forms of dealing
with the corporation open for this position are first of all, the
extension of rights to adorn a new economic reality. In this
formulation although the subject is displaced, nevertheless it is
preserved, in the sense that private property rights are distributed
as between discrete bearers of the corporate, that is to say
subjective, essence. The subjective essence remains at the back of
a whole series of fractured rights bourne by various personnel within
V—'
the corporation and by persons related _to the corporation through,
for example, their status as rentier agents. Hence the displacement/
preservation of the subject. And secondly, the specification of the
corporation as a subject, within the relation of private property
requires that the concept of the subject is simply extended to
include the corporation. The consequences of these respective
positions together with the types of responsibility implied in each
have been discussed already. They are included here as examples
of the way in which the concept of private property implies the
prior separation of law and economy and, in this case, their
functional interrelation. More consequentially the form of law
is left intact. For Renner the form of law survives and the content
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is functionally implicated with the economic substratum and,
for Cutler e_t al, the form of law is preserved on the basis of
the functional correspondence between law, as a condition of
existence of determinate relations of production, and the determinate
relations of production themselves. Thus the conception of ownership
in terms of property rights can be quite easily accommodated within
the notion of conditions of existence since there is only one
question to be put to the concept of 'property rights' namely, is
it a condition of existence of) determinate relations of production?
Or, more to the point, is it functional for the economic substratum?
Leaving the form of law out of account is to imply that law and
economy are separate and that the inherence of Philosophical
Anthropology in the concept of private property is left unquestioned.
The influence of Philosophical Anthropology is re-inforced therefore
on the basis of the functional interrelation of Law and Economy.
Conversely, when the 'form' of law is addressed in its
reciprocal interrelation with the economic then the continuities
between this position and Philosophical Anthropology are of a
different, though persistent, kind. For Pashukanis, the form of
law is interdependent with the form of commodity exchange, but the
concept of interdependence can only be formulated on the basis that
both law and economy are instances of the same division of the
(human) subject from his essence. The law/economy relation is,
therefore, forged on the basis of their mutual expression of the
separation of the subject, man, from his essence and they are
related insofar as they are indices of the same essential source.
The particular significance of this sort of relation lies in its
ability to explain the apparent specificity or autonomy of law
as a mere surface phenomenon as a mere variation in the form in
which the same underlying structure - the human essence - is manifest.
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This position has been examined in more detail elsewhere; it
needs only to be re-affirmed that the category of the subject
ensures the identity of law and economy unfolded within the auspices
of Philosophical Anthropology.
In both cases the concept of the subject is a necessary support
of, and the most consistent solution to, the law/economy relation.
In the first case it operates, via the concept of private property,
to re-inforce the separation of law and economy - only to re-emerge
as the only basis on which law and economy can be integrated.
In the second case it exists from the start as the basis on which
law and economy are separated - as forms of subjectivity - and
then becomes the condition on which they are re-aligned - through
their equivalent status as subjects.
To conclude, the view that private property is encapsulated
in the unique relation of subject and object and the idea that law
and economy are in relation one with the other are co-extensive
not discontinuous. Furthermore, to the extent that the relation
of subject - predicate - object - defines Philosophical Anthropology
and given that a relation between law and economy entails the
possibility of a legal intervention with respect to the economic
then Philosophical Anthropology and juridic interventionism
are one of a piece. The precise implications of this for anti-
monopoly law should be apparent although they will be spelt out in
considerable detail in due course.
It is possible to locate Bettleheim's work in relation to its
inescapable affirmation of the fundamental principles of Philosophical
Anthropology, namely, the theorisation of the economic in terms of
subjects and the implicit separation of 'law' and 'economy'.
Both of these have particular effects, first of all in the survival
of a discrete legal form as a necessary context, or framework, for
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the economic the persistence of the private property relation
and the distortion of a theory of ownership crowned by the notion
of a 'legal' intervention is affirmed. Secondly, the theorisation
of the economic in terms of subjects ensures that a theory of
ownership is riven through with the categories of Philosophical
Anthropology and, therefore, of private property and law. In
effect the former 'legitimates' what has already been achieved by
the second; for to argue the existence of economic subjects is to
invoke the immediate continuity between economic relations and the
categories of private property and law. So much so that the
insertion of economic within legal relations is practically
redundant.
Practical and political consequences follow on from this,
not least of which being the inappropriate specification of the
relation of possession. For Bettleheim the mere existence of a
directing function is taken as evidence of the emergence of a state
bourgeoisie, evidence which is re-inforced by the internalisation
of the subjective standpoint of the enterprise itself by the
bearers of that directing function. Agents of a very specific
mode of calculation associated with the relation of possession are
therefore confused with a very definite class formation i.e. a
state bourgeoisie. There are obvious parallels here with the
thesis of managerialisrn, a thesis which likewise supplies an
independent class standpoint to a category of agents of ownership,
a class standpoint that is supplied with appropriate aspirations
and particular affinities and which ultimately rests on the voluntary
interaction of competing subjectivities. Further, both Bettleheim
and the theorists of managerialism achieve a crucial conflation, a
conflation of the relations of possession and control. For
Bettleheim, agents of possession are just as much a part of the
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state bourgeoisie as agents of control and, in each case, the
sole protection against co-optation into the state bourgeoisie
is the preservation of 'proletarian affinity'. It matters little
whether it is a question of an agent of possession £r control, all
that matters is the ideological standpoint, and the appropriate
'in. .oculation' against integration. Likewise managerialism assumes
that agents of possession by virtue of their discrete social status
exercise crucial decisions affecting the control of the enterprise.
In this the exercise of distinct forms of calculation and decision
criteria apparently negates the control of the overall allocation
of the means of production. It does so because managers have a
discrete subjective standpoint and ideological affinity all of
their own, moreover, they are able to achieve this independence
because their 'control' is crucial.
Politically, to argue the separation of law in the sense of
its continuation as a discrete form which can 'stamp' social
relations and to imply its inherence in the economic by virtue of
the categories of Philosophical Anthropology is to fail to achieve
the fundamental features necessary for the 'ownership' of the means
of production by the direct producers. The persistence of a
legal form - either as a separate level or as the means whereby
the economic is represented in terms of subjects - prevents the
formulation of a general theory of ownership necessary for the
proper specification of how the means of production can pass into
the hands of the direct producers.
Above all else this section on Soviet relations of ownership
has demonstrated the abiding need to purge any discussion of
ownership of the inheritance of Philosophical Anthropology. In
other words the category of the subject together with the pre-emptive
separation of law and economy - as a condition of their interrelation -
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have specific consequences for any theory of ownership. These
consequences are far from abstract theoretical queries since they
crucially affect the way in which an analysis of the social relations
of any society are confronted. Furthermore, the very possibility
of 'socialist' relations depends, in a direct sense, on what it
means to own the means of reproduction of material existence.
More consequentially it can be readily concluded that the problem
of any transition from one form of social arrangements to another
is dependent upon the form of ownership. This argument has an
immediate impact on the very question of anti-monopoly Law.
Conclusion;
What has so far been demonstrated is a typology which highlights
the form of ownership as the crucial concept with which to grasp
the distinctive features of social relations of production. As
such the form of ownership is internally articulated and discontinuous^
ordered rather than essentially uniform and continuous. The form
of ownership, therefore, is the lynchpin for a proper understanding
of the pertinent differences between, for example, entrepreneurial
and monopoly capital or between private and corporate 'property'.
Now, insofar as anti-monopoly law is forged on the basis of the
re-affirmation of private forms of ownership and laissez-faire
competition over and against corporate forms of ownership then it
becomes evident that the form of ownership is at once crucial to
the characterisation of anti-monopoly movements and law and to the
assessment of their effectivity. Given that the form of corporate
ownership is the object of anti-monopoly hostility its persistence
goes a long way toward locating and assessing the effects of the
anti-monopoly movement, anti-trust legislation and regulation generally.
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Thus anti-monopoly law can now be analysed according to two
criteria :-
1. the form of ownership
and 2. the problem of transition of one form of ownership
to another.
The concept of transition is capable of explaining the essential
features of anti-monopoly law, the anti-trust movement and regulatory
enterprise and, in its adequate specification, is capable of
accounting for the basis and the possibility of a 'legal' intervention
in economic affairs. In other words it provides a coherent, rather
than eclectic, basis on which to analyse anti-monopoly law, the
corporation, 'private property', pre-bourgeois forms of ownership,
anti-monopoly movements, corporate and white collar crime. To
take only the example of anti-monopoly law what one is really
talking about is the question of the transformation of the bourgois
form of ownership to the corporate form of ownership theorised on
the basis of specific instances of resistance to, or reaffirmation
of, one form of ownership rather than another; no more, no less.
It should by now be clear that several things have been attempted;
1. To provide a general theory of ownership which specifies
three basic relations of ownership.
2. To examine four distinct forms of the articulation of these
basic relations of ownership - bourgeois, corporate, feudal and
'Soviet'.
3. In doing so to provide a basis for the proper analysis of
the parameters of anti-monopoly law namely bourgeois and corporate
forms of ownership.
It has been argued that not only is this the most appropriate way of
analysing anti-monopoly law, but that it represents the only way that
a deeper sense can be rendered to anti-monopoly law.
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A short excursus on the legal concept of ownership;
A sociological typology of ownership is obviously quite
distinct from the more normal account of ownership undertaken on
the basis of jurisprudential concerns. Although the two sorts of
analysis are different there are, nevertheless, some similarities,
most notably in the terminology used - title, possession and
ownership. These verbal similarities, however, should not hide
the very real difference between the two, particularly since it is
argued that the legal concept of ownership often stands in the way
of an adequate portrait of the 'corporate' relations under discussion.
In order to highlight some, but by no means all, of the differences
involved a brief discussion of the respective work of A. M. Honor/
and Hans Kelsen concerning the concept of ownership will follow in
the hope that it will illuminate some of the more important differences
between the two sorts of approach. Needless to say space precludes
the discussion from being in any sense an exhaustive appraisal of
their work. A. M. Honore has produced a most useful summary of
the concept of ownership.He describes a 'full' or 'liberal'
concept of ownershop which is common to all mature legal systems.
This full or liberal ownership, whilst not merely a bundle of rights,
is in fact an aggregate of legal incidents or, more simply, a list
of elements. He argues that whilst the list is standard the
incidents may vary both in content and in scope. The pertinent
incidents are as follows: the right to possess, the right to use,
the right to manage, the right to income, the right to capital,
the right to security, the power of transmissibility, the absence of
(46) Honore, A. M. C1961) 'Ownership' in'Oxford essays in Jurisprudence—
ed. Guest, A. G. Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 10? - 147.
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term, the prohibition of harmful use, liability to execution, and
residuary character. Although all eleven incidents are necessary
for full or liberal ownership there are, nonetheless, different
degrees of ownership per se, certain definite combinations of
incidents which fall short of liberal ownership but which go to
make up a sort of ownership. This is clearly a distinctive and
persuasive analysis of ownership which parallels certain of the
arguments entailed in the typology of ownership namely, that
'ownership' is to some extent a general concept which admits of
discrete components and degrees which vary. There are two differences,
however, the first of which is trivial, the second major. First of
all, as far as the typology of ownership is concerned there is no
absolute form of 'liberal' ownership common to all mature legal
systems or types of civilisation. There is no necessary or
universal connection in this regard. It is quite true that Honore
does not argue the necessary place of a liberal concept of ownership,
simply the universal presence of the concept within mature legal
systems, but this does not detract from the validity of the point.
The liberal form of ownership is accorded a priority by Honore"
which would be denied by the typology. Secondly, whilst the legal
incidents that Honore' has in mind are aggregated to form a full or
liberal concept of ownership, the typology admits of no a priori
form of ownership comprising an exhaustive list of pre-formulated
incidents. To be sure, Honore" states that one can own 'things' or
'claims' to different degrees depending upon discrete combinations
of legal incidents, and indeed there may be more than one 'owner',
but the possible combinations are finite and the degree of ownership
depends upon which legal incidents are aggregated and not primarily
upon how they are interrelated. Furthermore, the variation in the
17Mb)
degree of ownership is only relative to a prior and definitive
combination of incidents namely, full or liberal ownership.
is
The point of elaborating a typology of ownership/to emphasise,
first of all, the content of the relations of ownership - how and
what sorts of calculations are made and so on - and, secondly, the
manner in which these relations are interrelated to form a definite
type of ownership. Honor/ is more concerned to establish variations
upon a theme of liberal ownership, to specify the restrictions upon
full ownership, than to examine the existence of radically different
types of ownership. Honore's vision of ownership entails definite
consequences and generates considerable problems regarding the
ownership of land. For example, Honore states that in the early
Middle Ages land in England could not plausibly be said to be 'owned'
because the standard incidents of which I shall speak were so divided
between Lord and tenant that the position of neither presented a
(47)sufficient analogy with the paradigm case of owning a thing".
Accordingly, the desire to see the liberal concept of ownership as
a paradigm case prevents the proper theorisation of a distinct type
of 'feudal' ownership. The fault is by no means peculiar to Honore
for similar attempts to regard types of ownership or property as
simply variations or restrictions upon a single theme of 'liberal'
ownership have been made by Alice fay and C. B. MacPherson.
The purpose of this exercise is not primarily to criticise
Eonore's 'theory' of ownership but merely to describe the basic
differences between this sort of theory and the typology of ownership
(^7) Honore, A. M. (1961) op cit. p. 109.
(^8) See Tay, A.E.S. (1978) in Kamp.nka, E. e_t al (eds)
'Law and Society' London: Edward Arnold and also
Macpherson, C. B. (1975) in Kamrnka, E. and Neale,
R.S. (1975) 'Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond',
London: Edward Arnold.
17Mc)
enunciated earlier. As we have seen these differences are
/
considerable. There is a further sense, however, in which Honore's
description of ownership is relevant to the issues under discussion.
For example, in describing the way in which 'law' can theorise upon
different types of ownership and does provide a more or less adequate
'context' for the elaboration of the corporate form, Honore demonstrates
that law is not hopelessly overwhelmed by the inexorable growth of
de facto concentrations of power. The way in which he describes
the corporation in terms of a variable collection of material objects
and claims is a case in point. Likewise, his definition of ' title'
as the conditions of fact which must be fulfilled in order for a
person to acquire a claim to a thing is pertinent. But it must
be emphasised that in order to account for the concept of the
corporation the full concept of ownership is fractured into a series
of disaggregated incidences. Similarly, the basic relation of
private property is also dissected in order to produce an 'adequate'
portrait of the corporate form of ownership. The point at issue,
therefore, is whether the manner in which these 'incidents' are
interrelated, together with an adequate portrait of precisely -what
it is which is interrelated, is amenable to Honore's analysis of
ownership. In other words it is arguable that the way in which
these 'incidents' are interrelated within different types of
ownership accounts for the qualitative difference betv/een them.
It is not merely a question of a list of legal incidents and their
different aggregation for the manner of aggregation is fundamentally
important as is the content of these incidents and their nearly
infinite variability. Moreover, Honore" perhaps sums up the basic
limitation of a legal theory of ownership, however complex, when he
states that: "The final picture is that of a set of related
institutions of great complexity which are best studied against the
17Md)
background of the basic model - a single human being owning, in the
(i+9)
full liberal sense, a single material thing". It is argued
here that attention to such a 'background' obscures the distinct
corporate form of ownership and reduces it to a mere distortion of
an ideal type of full liberal ownership; a variation upon a single
theme rather than a radical departure.
The example of Hans Kelsen on 'ownership' is perhaps more
intriguing. Although not exactly putting forward a theory of
ownership, he, nevertheless, makes a number of pertinent remarks
upon the so called distinction between the physical person and the
juristic person. These remarks pertain both to the concept of
private property and to the idea of a corporate personality.
Insofar as he talks of ownership per se, however, he points out that
just because an individual actually possesses something this does not
mean that he is its legal owner; there is a difference between
actual possession and ownership. Furthermore, he argues that
Pashukanis must in fact have an extra-juridic concept of ownership
simply because individuals 'own' goods prior to exchange and thus
prior to the co-incident form of legal ownership. Whether or not
this is a proper interpretation of Pashukanis' position - and the
problem has been attributed above to the dual determination of law,
once by its function and once by its expression of a social relation -
Kelsen reaches a conclusion which only holds in an extremely limited
sense. He concludes that ownership in an organic and extra-juridic
sense is a contradiction in terms. Insofar as this is a tautology
(^9) Ilonore, A. M. (1961) ojd cit. p. 1^-7 •
(50) Kelsen, H. (1955) 'The Communist theory of law', London: Stevens
& Son, p. 93.
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then Kelsen is correct. But there is no reason why this must
follow, providing the concept of ownership is established in a way
which is altogether distinct from the juridical concept of ownership.
It is argued here that a distinct concept of ownership has been
established.
Kelsen's work is more pertinent to the issue involved where
he analyses the concept of a legal person. He defines the legal
person as follows. "The legal person is not a separate entity
besides its' rights and duties, but only their personified unity
or - since duties and rights are legal norms - the personified unity
(51)
of a set of legal norms", and "The person exists only insofar
as he 'has' duties and rights; apart from them the person has no
(52)
existence whatsoever". The person is merely the locus or
the bearer of rights and duties. Therefore, neither the physical
person nor the juristic person is a human being, for this latter
concept belongs to biology rather than law. Accordingly, the
idea of a prior - subject, an original human being or labouring
subject designed to ground the relation of private property and
put it beyond man made law, is an evident absurdity. It follows
that there is no logical reason why the so called antithesis between
natural and fictive persons should persist within law. Furthermore,
law should have little difficulty in construing the corporation as
a legal person because it is not necessary to reduce the corporation
to the status of an actual human being endowed with human capacities.
Kelsen then goes on to state the important fact that the corporation
(51) Kelsen, H. (1945) 'General Theory of lav; and state',
Cambridge: Massachusettes, p. 93»
(52) ibid, p. 94.
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as such only legally exists through its statute. Moreover, once
established the corporation can be said to 'act' in one of two
ways: either by imputing human actions to the corporation viewed
as a legal person or by establishing the partial legal order which
designates human beings as 'organs' of the corporate person.
Therefore, Kelsen's statement that only the behaviour of human beings
can be regulated by a legal order is circumvented by arguing that
duties and rights are represented indirectly to human beings via a
partial legal order - a corporate charter or statute. The corporation
mediates between human beings and a National legal order.
The foregoing exegesis of Kelsen's portrait of the legal person
would appear to confirm the way in which law typically construes the
corporation by reference to a double standard of responsibility -
collective and individual. In this sense Kelsen argues that "The
attribution of human behaviour determined by the legal order to a
community constituted by this same order, is not carried out with
consistency because it is not always carried out according to the
(53)
same criterion". As a statement of the confusion which often
surrounds the conception of the corporation within law this is
particularly appropriate. Kelsen does not escape the dilemma
entirely for he also equivocates before emphasising the centrality
of human beings and the way in which the corporation mediates their
rights and duties. Whether the corporation is best viewed as an
aggregate of rights and duties pertaining to actual human beings
or as a legal person in its own right is clearly important.
Irrespective of which perspective prevails there is an important
limitation encountered by each. As we have seen already law seems
(53) Kelsen, H. (19&7) 'Pure theory of Law'
Berkeley: U.O.C.P. p. 181.
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to oscillate between characterising the corporation as a person -
in a variety of senses and with a plethora of consequences - or in
terms of the actions of its individual human 'organs'. It has been
argued here that neither conception is any more successful than the
other in ascertaining or accounting for the complexity of corporate
relations. Kelsen's notion of the legal person as a 'personified'
unity is hardly an adequate mechanism for grasping the profound
interrelationships which make up the corporation. The very idea
that the corporation can be conceived as a unity is at the heart of
the problem irrespective of whether that unity comprises an aggregate
of human actions or legal norms. Whilst clearly distinct from the
sort of position which views the corporation as an analogue of an
actual human being Kelsen's idea of a legal person is no more





It has been argued, throughout that any assessment of anti¬
trust legislation must take place against the background of an
implicit contest between 'competition' and 'monopoly' and, thus,
between two relatively distinct types of ownership. Whilst it is
quite true that specific articles of anti-trust legislation do not
always reference this contest directly, it will be argued that
anti-trust legislation cannot be properly understood unless, and
until, it is realised as part of an overall strategy designed to
defend free enterprise against the dangers inherent in monopoly.
Therefore, the underlying theme behind any examination of monopoly,
price fixing, market division, rebating and so on, is the ongoing
change in the form of ownership and the structure of industrial
organisation which, in a very real sense, permit the almost infinite
permutation of monopolistic 'forms' and, thence, monopolistic
practices.
The changing form of ownership is indeed important, for the
specialisation of ownership relations entailed therein, means that
the market is no longer represented directly to independent
entrepreneurial units, in the manner so often espoused by classical
economic theory. Rather, the form of ownership plays a large part
in the organisation of both the 'internal' corporate environment
and, in various forms of monopoly, the wider market structure.
Furthermore, the strategies by which the corporate form structures
and dominates the market for a range of products and by which
agreements with formally separate organisations are entered into,
with regard to the division of these particular markets, are
inseparable from the way in which the corporation is organised.
It is not that the monopolistic corporation is insulated from
market pressures, so much as that the market and the 'corporate'
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form of ownership actually interpenetrate. The market is not
represented as an external force, endowed with any number of
determinative capacities, but is effectively constructed through
a series of discrete calculations characteristic of definite
relations of corporate ownership.
A consideration of the form of ownership is quite basic to
the assessment of anti-trust legislation. There are, however, a
number of specific issues and dilemmas which characterise anti-trust
legislation and which must form part of a general discussion of the
changing form of ownership. These particular problems will be
addressed as issues internal to the more widespread proliferation
of what can only be termed anti-trust enterprise: that is to say,
the ongoing controversy and organisational basis which sustains
and perpetuates the perhaps uniquely American fascination with
anti-trust legislation. Accordingly, questions such as - 'can
law regulate economic affairs?' - assume an importance all the
more exaggerated for their normally not being asked or, more
accurately, for not being pursued with any degree of sustained
attention. Not only is the question 'can law regulate economic
affairs?' seldom addressed but, rather - because it contains the
seeds of a particular weakness inherent in the very idea of a
specifically legal regulation of economic affairs - it cannot even
be asked. The question is almost as meaningless as it is crucial,
for the reason that law is fundamentally constrained by its role
as a formally separate apparatus of regulation. Therefore, even to
ask the question is to invite a negative response.
Broadly speaking, this Chapter is concerned to map out the
general features of anti-trust legislation outlined during a period
of rapid change in the form of industrial ownership. It is not so
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much concerned with the more contemporary use of law to control
pollution or to ensure socially responsible corporations (although
these issues are considered) as with the historical development of
anti-trust legislation during the last years of the 19th and the
earlier part of the 20th Centuries. This period is chosen because
it highlights,quite dramatically, the attempted use of law to
control a fundamental change in the form of ownership.
What, then, are the pertinent details concerning the structure
of anti-trust law? In 195^+ Judge Wyzanski made the following,
rather revealing, comment in the course of the United States v.
United Shoe Machinery Corporation case:
"In the anti-trust field the courts have been accorded, by
common consent, an authority they have in no other branch of enacted
law .... They would not have been given, or allowed to keep, such
authority ... if courts were in the habit of proceeding with the
surgical ruthlessness that might command itself to those seeking
absolute assurance that there will be workable competition, and
to those aiming at immediate realisation of the social, political,
(1)
and economic advantages of dispersal of power".
This comment is intriguing for a variety of reasons, not least
because Judge Wyzanski would seem to be suggesting that law is a
potentially ferocious weapon vis a vis monopoly power, and that
this ferocity is kept in check only by the reasonableness of
juridic interpretation and by the fearful anticipation of the
political backlash which would attend any really ruthless
(1) United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corporation,
110 F. Supp. 295, 3^8 (D. Mass. 1953); 3^7- U.S. 521
(195*0-
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enforcement. The latter part of this particular interpretation
is shared by the so called revisionist historians, and, in
particular, by Pearce & Kolko but, nonetheless, is flawed in
(2)
certain very important respects. Amongst other things, this
Chapter will attempt to demonstrate a number of ways in which this
interpretation is defective. First of all, it will be argued that
the structure of law is such that it places severe limits on the
suitability of anti-trust legislation for its avowed purpose of
controlling monopoly, irrespective of whether and how such laws are
enforced. Secondly, it will be demonstrated that at certain
periods the enforcement of anti-trust legislation has been pursued
with 'surgical ruthlessness', and indeed with some measurable
success, but that the central feature of monopoly - the structured
interrelationship of markets and enterprise units - remains intact.
Finally, it will be suggested that the mechanism which inhibits anti¬
trust legislation is not primarily self restraint or fear; still
less is it a community of reasonable and like minded men. Rather,
the main reason lies with the essential structure of 'law' and,
in particular, the legal conception of ownership. The argument
is not that law has no effect whatsoever, for palpably law does
have very real effects on economic conduct, but that law is
prevented from touching the core of corporate relations of
ownership. The suppression of law in this respect occurs for
quite specific reasons which pertain to the nature and situation
of law, rather than to any exogenous and, therefore, resistible
variable. For example, power, purpose and conspiracy are often
(2) See Pearce, F. (1976) ojd cit. & Kolko, G. (1965) ££ cit.
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used to 'explain' the apparent failure of anti-trust legislation
but such explanations are 'wanting' in a number of respects.
At its base the issue of anti-trust legislation involves two
questions. First of all, is the principle of legal intervention
an appropriate means for the regulation of an economic system based
ostensibly on laisser-faire economic theory? That is to say, what
is the precise role of law with regard to economic affairs?
Secondly, are legal categories and concepts relevant to the regulation
of economic conduct? Or, in other words, what is the exact scope
of law vis a vis 'economic' relations.
In the first respect, anti-trust legislation does indeed
generate a rather perplexing dilemma. Anti-trust legislation is
responsible for maintaining and defending a free enterprise system
based on private entrepreneurial interests, decentralised decision
making and, on a legal framework which enables free uninhibited
contest. Thus, anti-trust legislation is supposed to intervene in
order to maintain the apparently automatic self regulation of the
free enterprise system. But it is possible to construe the setting
of limits involved in such legal intervention as an unwarranted,
even illogical, encroachment on the uninhibited pursuit of free
competition. There is, of course, a possible distinction to be
made between the role of law, insofar as it may provide a series
of enabling provisions for the pursuit of entrepreneurial endeavour
and, the quite explicitly interventionist stance of law in the sense
that it sets limits to such endeavour. This distinction will be
discussed later. Nevertheless, once it is accepted that anti¬
trust legislation does involve setting limits _to economic endeavour
(as it quite explicitly does) rather than merely specifying certain
enabling provisions which permit or encourage competition, then at
least two interpretations of anti-trust legislation are commonly
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afforded. Anti-trust legislation is viewed either, as a comprehensive
charter of economic liberty, preserving free and unfettered competition
as the rule of trade or, on the contrary, as a "destructive principle
... in irreconcilable opposition to the premises and principles of
(3)
operation of the free enterprise system".
Law would appear to be presented with considerable difficulties
in even 'thinking' about intervening in economic affairs. The
problem is quite easily stated. The paradox faced by anti-trust
legislation reduces to the requirement that free competitors are
preserved at the same time as the effect of their (free) competition
is limited. More precisely, the problem, for anti-trust legislation,
is how to assert free enterprise by statutory forms of regulation
and state intervention. To be sure, this paradox has taken up a
great deal of attention in the interpretation and contextualisation
of anti-trust legislation. But there is a very real sense in which
it stems from a partial conception of the 'economic' as some sort
of self regulating mechanism, against which legal regulation and
government intervention in general can only appear as destructive,
even as an anathema, to the adherents of classical economic theory.
It is arguable, however, that this paradox is merely a result of
regarding the relation between 'law' and 'economy' in a particular
way. Accordingly, the distrust of legal regulation and statutory
involvement is no more than a direct corollary of the idea that
law intervenes in a self equilibriating economic sphere. Law and
economy are, thus, separate instances, for it is only on this
condition that (legal) interference can be seen as the bete noire
of the sovereign economy. Not only does this particular conception
of the relationship between law and economy discount the role of law
(3) Petro, Sylvestor (1962) Fortune; (Nov.)
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as a framework which sets up economic actors and enables free
enterprise but, more importantly, it supposes that a laisser-faire
economy can be defined, and indeed operate, in exclusively economic
terms and, by analogy, as a predominantly economic reality. On
the contrary, it has been demonstrated elsewhere that the 'legal'
and the 'economic' cannot be represented as separate instances
without generating severe problems of priority. Perhaps the most
serious of these problems is revealed, in a practical sense, by the
way in which anti-trust legislation is often regarded as an
interventionist apparatus capable of remedying defects generated within
a separate economic sphere. The fact that anti-trust legislation
is less than successful in this objective is seldom traced to the
viability of using law in this way but is instead, all too often,
reduced to the fallibility of individuals or institutions and to
(4)
the corruption of political control.
There is a widespread conviction that, as part and parcel of
the 'law', anti-trust legislation does have an impact on the conduct
of economic affairs. This view is upheld with some persistence,
despite the somewhat checquered history of anti-trust legislation
in action. But this is not to say that there is no controversy
over exactly what law should or should not do. On the contrary,
this issue would appear to preoccupy the majority of commentators
on anti-trust legislation. There is, though, a degree of complacency
with regard to the issue of whether law can achieve a definable
objective, once it is agreed upon. For example, the question which
appears to haunt any discussion of anti-trust legislation is not so
(4) One exception is perhaps the work of Stone; Christopher (1975),
'Where the Law Ends', New York: Harper, which will be discussed
later.
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much whether law can regulate 'economic' relations but, rather,
in which direction, to what effect and how far law should regulate
economic affairs and business conduct in general. Therefore, the
determination of the limits which should be placed upon these assumed
powers of legal regulation would seem to displace the prior
consideration of whether or not law can regulate 'economic' relations
with any measure of success or penetration. Accordingly, law is seen
as all powerful and ubiquitous, rather than limited and marginal.
It is almost as if the regulation of the regulators takes precedence
over the regulation of corporate structure.
Of course, the question - can law regulate economic affairs? -
is perhaps an impossible one to ask since law and economy cannot be
consistently represented as separate instances. But it is a
question which must be asked if anti-trust legislation is to have
any meaning, other than as a mere cynical gesture by congress.
Further, whilst this question should pre-occupy any discussion of
the legal regulation of monopoly, nonetheless, it betrays a
questionable heritage since it implies a discrete realm of social
structure inhabited solely by law. As we shall see, the general
discussion of anti-trust legislation seems to ignore the viability
(4a)
of 'law' as a regulatory agency. Moreover, even if the question
were asked, it would appear to depend upon a specific conception
of the nature of law which is at best limited and at worst erroneous.
It has been argued, therefore, that law falters before the
objective of regulating corporate relations precisely because of the
way in which it is regarded; namely, as a separate institutional
form able to review and thence to regulate the conduct of economic
affairs. But if lav/ cannot be 'baptized' in this way as a separate
instance, how then does it become involved in the conduct of
economic exchange and in the form of ownership? It was indicated
(4a) Although see below p. 201 et sea.
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earlier that a distinction could be drawn between the role of
law as a regulatory agency and its integration with other social
relations. There is a difference between the sort of legal
context required for the operation of 'economic' relations and the
restriction and limitation of those relations by forms of legal
regulation and administrative agency. Law as an appropriate
context and law as a regulatory agency are two very different
ways of looking at the nature of law. Whereas the existence of
the legal structure of private property may enable the furtherance
of corporate business forms, insofar as the same structure
characterises the analysis of corporate ownership, inherent in
anti-monopoly law, it will be argued that it is far from being
appropriate to its avowed task of regulation. Accordingly, whilst
relations of production can 'operate' and, to some extent, 'exist'
through the concepts and relations specified in, for example,
company law - when law is 'raised' above the level of its mutual
implication with the 'economic' and cast as an instrument of
regulation or prohibition quite separate from that which it is
designed to regulate - then the die is cast. It will soon be
apparent that the very separation of law from corporate forms of
ownership appears to haunt anti-trust legislation and, in turn,
seems to foreclose the possibility of effective legal regulation of
corporate relations.
This, essentially misplaced, faith in the viability of a
discrete agency of legal regulation is amply sustained in the
constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers. It is
misplaced in this particular case because it is arguable that
corporate relations can only be regulated effectively at the
interface of their operation; at possession, title and control
relationships. To be sure, this regulation may involve a discrete
18J+
regulatory agency but that agency cannot assume the primary
responsibility for such regulation, nor can it be a sufficient
means for regulation independently of the primary articulation of
ownership relations. Thus, company law could be said to 'work'
in terms of corporate relations of production because the operating
exigencies mean that the primary responsibility is placed with the
relations of possession, control and title, but that a residual
role is left for 'law' as a form of adjudication and guarantee for
title and contract. If this relationship is reversed, as in anti¬
trust legislation, then the full contradiction of the 'fallacy of
discreteness' is revealed with quite disastrous consequences for
regulation. Regulation is then endowed with the primary
responsibility for controlling the relations of ownership characteristic
of corporate structure; preventing monopoly and forestalling
collusion. Law is quite simply unable to accept such responsibility
and, for that reason alone, is severely limited as a regulatory
agency.
If the issue of the legal regulation of economic affairs
imposes severe limits on the role of anti-trust legislation then
the content of the particular concepts characteristic of Anglo-
American and European theories of legal ownership clinches the
further restriction and operation of an inappropriate principle,
namely, the legal regulation of economic relations. In a word,
the way in which law is used is as important as the fact that law
is used to regulate economic conduct.
Chapter four revealed a considerable objection to the idea
that the corporation can be regarded as a discrete entity derived
by analogy with the human subject and assigned all kinds of human
attributes, physical capabilities and acting capacities each inserted
within legal forms. This essentially anthropomorphic conception
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of the corporation would appear to confirm the political prejudice
that corporations per se are capable of political action.
Accordingly, the rather unhappy division between legal and natural
persons has further facilitated the assimilation of the corporation
as a human subject. As Stone remarks, "... whenever the law spoke,
expressly or implicitly, in terms of, 'no person shall . ..', that
(5)
rule was smoothly, if unreflectively, transferred to corporations";
a sentiment which has been reiterated elsewhere by Hayek.
Indeed, the conflation has proceeded to good effect but with precious
little justification. For example, this sort of position not only
informs sections of the radical movement, insofar as it drifts into
rhetorical tirades against big business (analysing social structure
as if it is simply the reflex of corporate aspirations) but, it
also circumscribes the legal response to corporate relations.
This sort of 'legal' response indicates the way in which anti-trust
legislation, and the concept of private property, are bound up
together, most notably, in the areas of the corporate boundary,
conspiracy and the intentional corporate actor respectively.
The Boundary.
The boundary is very important for the legal redress of
monopoly 'power' and collusion because it is viewed, at one and the
same time, as the earmark of size and as the medium for any sort of
collusion between separate organisations intent on fixing prices
or carving up markets.
(5) Stone, C. (1975) ££ cit. p. 28.
(6) Hayek, F. (19^-9) ojd cit.
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Therefore, the boundary occupies a central, although perhaps
unacknowledged, place in the legal regulation of corporate 'power'.
But the concept of the boundary is, to say the least, a very uncertain
one evincing as it does, a clear space inhabited solely by a corporate
essence.
The conventional legal response to the issue of corporate
boundaries consists in regarding them as either legitimate or
illegitimate, but the question of whether the boundary is a relevant
measure is seldom considered. Thus, Justice Brandeis was able to
write extensively on the 'curse of bigness' as if bigness were easily
(7)definable and, in turn, the fundamental aspect of monopoly.
Where the concept of the boundary becomes more explicit, it is
considered as an element necessary to the definition of parallel
response, collusion and price fixing. For example, the existence
of a boundary is essential for the finding of collusion between
separate organisations. In this respect, it is often noted that
treating collusion more severely than size, as such, actually
encourages the proliferation of mergers. Therefore, boundaries
are important for two main reasons. First of all, because
boundaries appear to demarcate a 'proper' market size, as if
boundaries are crucial in this respect rather than contingent and,
secondly, they also define separate spheres of business activity
such that collusion between distinct organisations can become a
meaningful concept. Accordingly, it will be argued that the
concept of the boundary is less than persuasive as a test of
competitive behaviour and free enterprise.
If the concept of the boundary is vitiated in respect of
corporate relations of production how then can these relations be
(7) Bickel, A.M. (19^7) 'The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice
Brandeis', Chicago: U.O.C. Press.
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adequately described? Attention to relations of ownership removes
the necessity of referring to boundaries as forms of demarcation.
Therefore, dissolving the relevance of legal or factual boundaries
enables the analysis of corporate structure as a fluid, changing
form of organisation. Accordingly, there is no reason why the
corporation need be restricted to empirically definable boundaries.
Although if the corporation is regarded thus, can it actually be
specified as a separate entity, for surely the result of dissolving
the privilege accorded to the boundary is that the corporation
becomes inseparable from society at large. Therefore, all social
existence would seem to be predicated upon a ubiquitous corporate
'family'. There are, then, two principal options for this sort of
perspective. Either, social structure is simply a reflex of
corporate organisation or else,the corporate form of organisation
is a kind of sociological a-priori which informs all aspects of
sociality, corporate and non-corporate alike. This last alternative
is perhaps implicit in the contemporary discussion of corporatism,
which sees a widespread proliferation of the corporate form throughout
society in general and, in particular, in the conduct of political and
'economic' relations.
In order to avoid the reduction of social structure to corporate
relations of ownership it is necessary to be quite clear on the nature
of ownership relations. Obviously some form of demarcation between
'social structure' and 'corporate' organisation is required if the
worst excesses of what Poulantzas has described as anti-monopoly
politics are to be avoided: that is to say, the mobilisation of a
potentially infinite population of all those disadvantaged in some
(8)
way by monopolies. To be sure, the problem of demarcation,
(8) Poulantzas, N. (1975) ojd cit.
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along with the spectre of some sort of instantiation of spheres
of sociality as levels, appear as important restraining items on
the analytical agenda. It is arguable, however, that denigating
the priority of the boundary; as a legitimate mechanism appropriate
in itself as a form of regulation, as a vantage point from which to
define collusion and, finally, as an empirically or legally given
state of affairs, is altogether different from arguing the complete
identity of big business and social structure. In principle
demarcation is perfectly possible on this basis, but it is part and
parcel of the definition of relations of ownership. Thus, the
corporation does not appear as a single entity characterised by a
unique corporate essence or personality. Rather, the corporation
is best considered as an articulation of relations of ownership.
In these terms there is no reason why the corporation need be a
single entity with identifiable boundaries. It is almost as if
the corporation degenerates into a series of more or less discrete
relations of ownership. Any identity resides in the configuration
of these relations, which need not be equivalent to any easily
identifiable corporate entity or personality. For example, the
structure of Standard Oil, I.T.T or General Motors is by no means
exhausted by their physical being or their formal specification.
On the contrary, the relations of ownership generate a whole series
of interrelationships which are at once broader and more specific,
relating particular aspects of possession, title and control to the
more general form of calculation characteristic of the 'market'
situation.
On the other hand, the issue of demarcation as such does not
necessarily prevent the reduction of social structure to the corporate
entity. For example, even as a separate entity, the corporation
can be set loose to inscribe its various interests as formally
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separate political and social institutions. Social structure can
then be viewed in terras of asymetrical power relations, whereby the
corporation comes out on top and the rest is reduced to an appendage
of corporate aspirations. Therefore, the way in which corporate
relations of ownership are distinguished from social structure is
important. The fact that anti-trust legislation is saddled with
a particularly rigid conception of the monopolistic corporation as
constrained within easily identifiable boundaries, together with a
specifically legal conception of the conditions whereby boundaries
can be breached - collusion, conspiracy and intent - means that
the legal response to monopoly is at best limited.
From the foregoing remarks it will be readily apparent that
the corporate form of ownership entails the effective suppression
of boundaries as obstacles to the pursuit of corporate activity.
Moreover, the consequent denegation of the 'subject', together with
its essentially limited sphere of action, is necessarily implied in
the corporate form of ownership. Notwithstanding the essential
structure of corporate relations of ownership, the conventional
legal/administrative response is perhaps twofold. The first
response is to attempt to limit boundary size by preventing mergers
and by dissolving monopolies. In this sense the provisions of the
191^ Clayton Act are expressly directed at the objective of
forestalling mergers. Thus, section seven of the Clayton Act
prohibited the acquisition of the stock or share capital of one
corporation by another, wherever the effect may be substantially to
lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Originally
applying only to the acquisition of the stock of another corporation
section seven was amended in 1950 to include the assets of any
(9)
corporation. The legislation was seen as a method for preventing
(9) The relevant provisions were amended in the Celler-Kefauver
Act 1950.
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major corporations from emerging as 'trusts' through the acquisition
of stock, and later assets, of competing corporations and, thereby,
dominating the industry through the devices of a holding company.
Whilst the Clayton Act was seemingly clear in this objective, the
relative lack of action under section seven meant that, to all
intents and purposes, 'mergers' went on apace. Likewise, the
dissolution of monopolies is often regarded as the ultimate sanction
behind the Sherman Act. In practice however, things were rather
different. For example, the Attorney General's Committee was
moved to state that in the first sixty years of the Sherman Act's
history, the .. "courts have in only 2k litigated cases entered
decrees requiring divorcement, divestiture or dissolution".^0^
Nevertheless, there were three important cases involving the
dissolution of so called 'single firm' monopolies. These were;
United States v. Aluminium Co. of America (19^5)5 United States v.
Pullman Co. (19^3/^7); United States v. United Shoe Machinery
Corporation (1953/5^)• As well as being constrained in principle,
anti-trust legislation was, therefore, considerably restrained in
practice. The important point being that even if these provisions
had been strictly enforced then their effect would have been at
best marginal and at worst irrelevant. This for the reason that
the 'boundary' generates an inaccurate picture of corporate relations
and, in the remedy of dissolution, an inappropriate redress. The
second sort of response is to argue that boundaries should be made
impermeable and able to countenance neither collusion nor conspiracy.
This sort of response will be discussed in more detail later.
(10) U.S.A. Dept. of Justice: Attorney General's National
Committee to Study the Anti-trust Laws, (1955)* p. 35^ •
U.S. Government: Washington D.C. (Henceforth: AGNCAT).
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It is sufficient to say, at this juncture, that the boundary is
seen here as the effective guarantor of truly independent spheres
of decision making.
Both sorts of response to the problem of the trusts view the
existence of an effective boundary as significant. Whilst the
first heralds the boundary as a factor which can limit the extent
of monopolisation the second attempts to forestall any breaches in
the boundary defences. In some respects, then, the boundary is
seen to operate both as an hermetic seal and as a site for the
struggle against monopolisation. To an extent the two objectives
contradict one another, for the very faith expressed in the boundary
as an important constraint on monopolisation is compromised by the
existence of strategies designed to secure the boundary against
potential abuse. This is indeed a persistent tension within anti¬
trust legislation. On one side, there is the abiding faith in,
and affirmation of, the boundary principle as the guarantor of truly
independent arenas of decision making and entrepreneurial endeavour,
both necessary and sufficient for the existence of free enterprise.
On the other, there is the gradual recognition that the mere
existence of a boundary per se, whilst necessary, is insufficient
as a last frontier of private enterprise unless there is quite
considerable protection from abuse. What this amounts to is the
expansion of a blind faith in the capacity of free enterprise to
regenerate itself, if given an even break, over and against the
deeply held suspicion that given half a chance 'autonomous'
corporations will be compliant in a conspiracy which threatens
their very autonomy. From this last perspective, it is insufficient
to provide a context for, and a limit to, private centres of decision
making, since a far more rigorous regulation of their interaction is
required if private enterprise and free competition are to be
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guaranteed. Both types of general response seem to agree upon the
fact that law and economy are interrelated. Where they differ is
over the capacity of privately owned production units to conduct
themselves according to the dictates of a free enterprise economy.
Sylvester Berki, summarises the difference thus, "Are we interested
in competition as a way of life, stressing the role and freedom of
each competitor, or are we interested in obtaining the performance
associated in theory with competition, the efficient allocation of
(11)
resources and the implied rates of relative factor returns".
There are then, two clear links at work behind the legal response
to monopoly. The first is between the regulation of abuse and the
consequent increase in the role, but not the necessary realisation
of legal/bureaucratic intervention in legal affairs. The second,
exists between the provision of a legal context (a set of statutory
limitations) and the increased circumspection and formal certainty
with which law tends to regard economic conduct.
At this stage it is necessary to examine in more detail the
interrelationship of 'legal' and 'economic' interpretations inherent
in anti-trust enterprise. In particular, the argument requires a
more detailed examination of the trinity of the major federal laws
governing interstate activity: the 1890 Sherman Act; the 191^
Clayton Act and the 191^ Federal Trade Commission Act.
Legal and Economic interpretations of anti-trust legislation.
The relation between law and economy is indeed complex. So
much would be granted by those intimately bound up with the operation
(11) Berki, S. (ed.) (1966) 'Anti-trust Policy' Boston:
D.C. Heath, p.(vii).
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and working potential of anti-trust legislation. Thus Lewis
observes that, the Sherman Act .. certainly lacks something
(12)
as a process for working out the pattern of an economic order",
by which he seems to despair of the ability of the Sherman Act to
grasp economic reality and to comprehend economic theory. Again
the view that economics exists as a means of keeping anti-trust
(13) . .
law from being wholly irrational, appears to invert the pessimism
of Lewis whilst at the same time tending to re-inforce the general
distribution of reality into discrete academic spheres, 'law' and
'economics'. Lewis and Turner thus succeed in reaffirming the
conventional divorce of 'theory' from 'practice', which holds that
anti-trust legislation does not work in practice, rather than the
more pertinent fact that it cannot work in principle. Whilst
Lewis addresses the Sherman Act as an impossibly abstract theoretical
formula, Turner has more faith in the interjection of economics as
a dose of reality. What they each seem to imply is that anti-trust
legislation is all well and good as a theoretical principle of free
enterprise, as a benchmark of free enterprise and as an apparatus
of formal prohibition. When it comes down to the practical regulation
of contemporary economic reality, however, things are altogether
different. Over and against this sort of interpretation, it is
argued here that the nature of anti-trust legislation is such that
it cannot be sectioned into theory and practice, that the main
reasons for the failure of anti-trust legislation are due, respectively,
(12) Lewis, B.W. (19^8) 'Discussion' American Economic Review (38) p. 2'
(13) Turner, D.F. (1963) 'Principles of American Anti-trust law'
International & Comparative Law Quarterly (6) p. 1.
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to the. strategic choice of law as the mechanism of regulation and to
the conceptual inheritance with which law addresses the corporation.
Therefore, law does not simply capitulate in the face of the practical
difficulties of dealing with corporate interrelationships. Indeed,
far from any such capitulation, the history of anti-trust legislation
is littered with any number of genuine attempts at forestalling anti¬
competitive behaviour. Rather, anti-trust legislation is vitiated
in the very process of attempting to get to grips with corporate
relations of ownership: first of all, by the idea that law is in
some sense a separate agency of review and regulation and, secondly,
by the conceptual equipment which provides the parameters of legal
regulation namely, intent, conspiracy and private property.
In one respect the contest staged between 'legal' and 'economic'
interpretations of monopoly marks the transition of anti-trust
statute law into the bourgeoning' of anti-trust enterprise. That
is to say, there is an ongoing attempt to square economic requirements,
efficiency, expansion, development and so on, with legal regulation;
a continuing process of interpretation of anti-trust legislation,
together with the development of bureaucratic forms designed to
cope with the institutional complex required for active regulation
and intervention, rather than the altogether simpler, because formal,
process of prohibition. It is notable that the introduction of
essentially economic criteria is made relevant in respect of
interpretation under the 'rule of reason', whereas the conventional
structure of legal thought is more easily situated in relation to
the per se doctrine. Thus, the controversy surrounding the
introduction of greater flexibility under the guise of the rule
(1*0of reason designed to assess intent, practices and consequences,
(14) Chief Justice White, Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v.
U.S. 221U.S (1911).
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rather than monopolisation per se, perhaps encompasses the translation
of law into a regulatory machinery equipped to deal with the
inevitability of monopoly and required to mitigate only its worst
excesses. Additionally, this particular discussion exposes certain
contradictions within the basic structure of anti-trust legislation
which are responsible, both for its restriction as an effective
agency of regulation and for its frustration as an agency of socio¬
economic change.
The historical resonance of this debate is found, specifically,
in the dislocation between the general thrust of anti-trust statutes,
which affirm competition and their interpretation, which is more
often than not concerned with the quality of competition than the
actual existence of free competitors. There are, of course,
certain exceptions to this quite general trend. For example, in
the 1936 Robinson-Patman amendment to section two of the '\3'\k Clayton
Act, the juridical concept of 'intent' is so attenuated as to dissolve
entirely into an analysis of the commercial effects of price
. • • (15)
discrimination. At the same time though, the amendment was
expressly designed to protect the existence of small traders from
the ravages of wholesale marketing chains and to insulate individual
competitors against the full effects of fierce competition. The
political exigencies involved in protecting small business, at all
costs, to some extent encouraged such apparent 'peculiarities' and
will be discussed in a later Chapter.
It is still quite common to describe the Sherman Act, "... as
a charter of freedom (which) has a generality and adaptability
(13) Neale, A.D. (1966) 'The Anti-trust Laws of the U.S.A'.
Cambridge: University Press.
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comparable to that found to be desirable in constitutional
provisions". It is this adaptability which apparently enables
the Sherman Act to stand, both as a unique expression of economic
liberty, a charter of economic freedom, and as a framework for
regulatory agencies. This generality in effect spawns the two
•sides' of anti-trust, providing substance for those who would
argue for the prohibition of all manifestations of monopoly (but
not necessarily monopoly as such) and for those who merely attempt
to reserve the benefits incidental to competition within an overall
context of oligopoly.
What, then, is meant by the rule of reason and the per se
doctrine? Interpretation according to the rule of reason and
the per se doctrine both stem from the generality in the phrasing
of the Sherman Act. This generality provides for a choice with
regard to the meaning of the concepts monopoly power and monopolising.
Whereas interpretation according to the rule of reason refers to
zones of legality/illegality, depending upon whether or not the
restraint of trade in question is likely to harm the public
interest, the per se doctrine renders certain restraints of trade
illegal outright, for example, price fixing or monopolisation.
Therefore, the per se doctrine heralds a relatively certain, although
perhaps rather formal, prohibition of particular sorts of economic
arrangements, whilst the rule of reason ushers in wide discretion
as to what constitutes the public interest and competitive
performance respectively. There is no easy demarcation of the
respective warrants of the per se doctrine and the rule of reason
because each, in its own way, stems from and claims heritage in the
(16) Chief Justice Hughes: Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States,
288 U.S. 3^, 339 - 360 (1933).
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Sherman Act. For example, Louis B. Schwartz, argues that the
Sherman Act appears to state that all restraint of trade is illegal
(17)
and, therefore, should be prohibited. The courts interpretation,
however, tended to restrict the applicability of this prohibition to
undue or unreasonable restraints of trade. This is particularly
true of the celebrated Standard Oil and Tobacco cases of 1911.
Here, the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and about seventy other
corporationsand partnerships had been charged with conspiring in
restraint of trade and commerce. This conspiracy stemmed from the
original collusion of J.D. Rockefeller, W. Rockefeller and H. Flagler
in, or about, the year 18?0 and involved a number of practices.
For example, rebates preferences, and other discriminatory practices
in favour of the combination by railroad companies; restraint and
monopolisation by control of pipe lines and unfair practices against
competing pipe lines; contracts with competitors in restraint of
trade; unfair methods of competition, such as local price cutting
at the points where necessary to suppress competition; espionage of
the business of competitors, the operation of bogus independent
companies, and payment of rebates in oil; the division of the
United States into districts so that competition would be entirely
eliminated and so on.
In 1907 the court decided in favour of the United States and
against, respectively, seven individual defendants, Standard Oil
(New Jersey), thirty six domestic companies and one foreign company.
(17) Louis B. Schwartz, General Dissent to Attorney General's
National Committee to study Anti-trust Laws (1955) p« 391,
op cit.
(18) Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, e_t al v. U.S. 221 U.S. 1,
273, 3^f, 509, ^3.
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Thus, thirty eight companies were held to be parties to the
combination entered into in 1899 in restraint of trade, which
was also held to be in violation of section 2. of the Sherman Act
as an attempt to monopolise. The Supreme Court upheld this
decision in 1911 and affirmed considerable relief (divestiture)
but, nevertheless, qualified the meaning of sections one and two
of the Sherman Act. Chief Justice White enunciated the pertinent
opinion to the effect that only undue restraints of interstate or
foreign trade or commerce are prohibited by sections one and two
of the Sherman Act. Justice Harlan responded, in a partial dissent,
that this presumably meant that the defendants could from then on
continue to restrain commerce provided that they were reasonable
about it and that they took care to ensure that any such restraint
was not undue. The meaning of the Sherman Act was thus contested
even within the Supreme Court but the so called rule of reason,
nonetheless, eventually emerged as the more orthodox interpretation.
Likewise the judgement in the U.S.A. v. American Tobacco Company
affirmed that'only acts, contracts, agreements, or combinations which
operate to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting
competition, or unduly obstructing the due course of trade, or
which, either because of their inherent nature or effect, or because
of their evident purpose, injuriously restrain trade, fall within
(19)
the condemnation of the Sherman Act'.
For the most part, the decisions of the court in this initial
period appeared to demonstrate that certain restrictive practices
of large combinations could not be stopped because of a de facto
interpretation according to the rule of reason. It is often argued,
(19) United States of America v. American Tobacco Company
221 U.S. 106. No. 118 (1911) S.3.
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accordingly, that the Clayton Act of 1914 was designed with the
express intention of making mergers, tying agreements, exclusive
dealing and price discrimination illegal per se, wherever their
effect may be to significantly limit competition. Ostensibly at
least, this constituted a shift toward the per se doctrine,
particularly in view of the quite explicit rejection of widespread
economic investigation of circumstance as inappropriate. Thus,
Walter Adams wrote: "The Clayton Act is a prohibitory, not a
regulatory statute. By its enactment, Congress did not intend to
authorise the courts or the (Federal Trade) Commission to determine
whether particular mergers are good or bad or in the public interest.
Instead, Congress acted on the presumption that a substantial
foreclosure or elimination of competition was in itself a derogation
of the public interest". But the Act still left considerable
discretion as to what constituted a substantial lessening of
competition. Conversely, it has been argued that the effect of
the Clayton Act was to lead to a reinterpretation of certain restraints
of trade specified in the Sherman Act as illegal per se. For example,
agreements to fix or influence prices, divide markets or arrange
boycotts. Whereas under certain circumstances, mergers could be
justified, price fixing was apparently illegal per se. Accordingly,
A.E. Kahn has argued that there has always been a double standard
in the anti-trust laws, in that, restrictive agreements between
separate firms are treated more severely than proprietary
( 21 )consolidations enjoying the same and even greater market power.
(20) Walter Adams; 'Attorney General's National Committee to
Study Anti-trust Laws' (1955) op cit. p. 127/8.
(21) Kahn, A.E. (1953) 'A Legal and Economic Appraisal of the "New"
Sherman and Clayton Acts', The Yale Law Journal, 63 (3) pp.
293 - 347.
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Arnold, has gone further and suggested that anti-trust legislation
actually encouraged capital centralisation because it led to the
replacement of 'soft' combinations (collusion, conspiracy) by
(22)
'hard1 combinations (concrete mergers).
The history of this period of anti-trust legislation is
characterised by a more or less explicit contest regarding the
meaning of the relevant Acts. Legal historians have indeed dealt
with the stages of this contest in considerable detail. For present
purposes, however, it is sufficient to demonstrate that there was
some sort of contest between two quite general interpretations.
On the one side, there was a general approach which apparently made
no reference to any sort of economic gestalt and, on the other, an
approach which assessed 'intent' in relation to economic performance,
efficiency and so on.
In relation to the issue of legal and economic interpretations
of anti-trust legislation and, in particular, their respective
concepts of monopoly, the work of Eugene Rostov and E. S. Mason
is especially important. For example, E. S. Mason seems to be
arguing the conventional thesis that legal and economic interpretations
of monopoly and hence of anti-trust legislation are distinct if not
wholly incompatible. Whereas 'law' is concerned to establish and
prevent specific limitations upon competition, 'economics' is more
likely to address itself to questions of market power ana control of
the market. In this respect it is significant that, for law, the
appropriate antithesis is between monopoly and free competition and,
for economics, the relevant distinction is between monopoly and pure
competition. Free competition is defined as a situation in which
(22) Arnold, T. (1937) 'The Folklore of Capitalism' New Haven:
Yale University Press.
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no actual or potential competitor is limited in his action by the
agreement or harassing tactics of large rivals. Pure competition,
on the other hand, is a state of the market whereby no buyer or
seller can unilaterally influence the price of goods bought and sold.
As Mason puts it, lawyers are preoccupied with rules whereas economists
are addicted to models. The difference is real and it should be
remembered that monopoly as such has never been illegal under the
terms of anti-trust legislation. On the contrary, law has tended to
direct itself at the abuse of market power rather than at market
power per se. The difference is also pertinent, having a number of
specific effects upon the interpretation of anti-trust legislation.
These effects will be described later. The difference between legal
and economic approaches, however, is much more important than it would
first appear, for it underlies the far more basic issue of the purpose
of anti-trust legislation. As we shall see 'legal' and 'economic'
interpretations of. 'monopoly' are often associated with radically
different policy objectives.
Why then is Mason's work relevant to the discussion of the nature
of anti-trust legislation? He argues that even in its earliest
'common law' days law was more concerned to establish the existence
of a monopoly because of the existence of a conspiracy or due to the
exclusion of other competitors. This preference was exercised over
and against the idea that monopoly was to be found in the 'control'
of the market. For example, Mason states that "... whatever are
considered to be the evils resulting from monopoly - enhancement of
price, deterioration of product, or the like - a monopolistic
situation, or an attempt to monopolise, is evidenced to the courts
primarily, if not exclusively, by a limitation of the freedom to
compete. The original meaning of monopoly, an exclusion of others
from the market b3r a sovereign dispensation in favour of one seller,
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has continued to mean exclusion, in the broad sense of restriction
of competition (he goes on) there has beeh a growing
tendency to declare every contract between competitors which restricts
competition unenforceable and, since the Sherman Act, illegal, whatever
the extent of the control made possible by the contract. In the case
of mergers the monopoly or attempt to monopolise is discovered
primarily in predatory practices designed to hamper the competition
of outsiders and not in control of the market". Thus, for law,
monopoly means the restriction of the rights of others to compete
through the use of restrictive or abusive practices. Economics,
however, holds monopoly to consist of the simple control of the
marketo From this simple distinction between the two Mason goes
on to assert the superiority of an 'economic' approach to the problem
of monopoly. This superiority depends, in part, upon the implicit
suggestion that the market may be controlled in ways which escape
legal sanction, although far more important is the way in which such
an approach is more effective because it is more selective. A
properly constructed economic appraisal would be able to ascertain
the 'real', that is the economic concept of, monopolistic situations.
Accordingly, the 'economic' interpretation is clearly counterposed
to the 'legal' notion of monopoly on the grounds that economics is
superior to law in this respect at least. Whereas law is seen as
a blunt instrument, 'a standard of evaluation in the judgement of
public policy', economics is regarded as a finely tuned tool of
analysis.(22b)
In order for Mason to argue this superiority he would have to
(22a) Mason, E. S. (1957) 'Economic concentration and the monopoly
problem', p. 3^/51 Cambridge: Harvard U.P.
(22b) Mason, E. S. (1957) ibid p. 333.
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demonstrate that economics jis more successful in assessing monopoly
than law. Not only does Mason admit that economics is no better
than law in this respect but where he does insist upon the inherent
superiority of an 'economic' approach the argument is entirely
circular: economics is better at regulating monopolistic situations
because it has an economic concept of monopoly as 'market power'.
Furthermore, this concept of market power is itself equivocal.
First of all, Mason openly acknowledges that - "As a firm grows,
transactions that could conceivably be organised through the market's
price mechanism are transferred to the administrative organisation
of the firm". In other words there is a basic difference
between the market, which involves 'bargaining transactions among
legal equals', and the corporation, which encompasses 'managerial
or rationing transactions involving the relations between administrative
superiors and inferiors', and this difference is eclipsed with the
growth of the corporation. This may be all well and good as
a description of how the corporation absorbs some of the functions
of the market but what sense does it make to then go on and talk about
the market power of particular corporations as if the market and the
corporation are separate spheres! Secondly, and this is perhaps a
similar point, Mason concedes that .. "firms are not undifferentiated
profit maximising agencies which react to given market situations
in ways which are independent of their organisation". But if
the corporation is a complex administrative unit does this not mean











important respect in that it discounts the organisational apparatus
in favour of a neo-classical conception of the market as an arena
in which one can be powerful?
Finally, and in a somewhat later article, Mason admits that his
distinction between legal and economic interpretations of anti-trust
legislation is overdrawn. He recognises that the degree of market
control and business performance in general did influence judges
decisions, albeit in ways which remained implicit. He then goes on
to argue the far more interesting point that so called 'economic'
criteria have been inserted in 'legal' concepts of monopoly and that
these have been extended further to encompass considerations normally
associated with an 'economic' approach to the issue. The process
is both twofold and ongoing. This particular aspect will be discussed
later.
So far the argument has been restricted to a rather technical
examination of Mason's preference for 'economic' criteria of control
and monopoly. It is necessary to ask, however, whether this is
really pertinent to a discussion of anti-trust legislation and whether
Mason's preference for an 'economic' approach is at odds with the
basic structure of anti-trust legislation? The question is
important. For example, if anti-trust legislation were merely an
attempt to regulate the economy in terms of 'efficiency' and so on
then Mason's point would be well made if a little overstated. But
it is argued here that anti-trust legislation cannot be reduced to
a regulatory apparatus of this kind without generating serious
problems concerning the nature of anti-trust law. It is all very
well to argue, from the standpoint of economic policy, that
competition is good because of its effects and in spite of its
consequences, but this needs to be set against the fact that,
historically, anti-trust lav; views competition as an unqualified
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good in itself and because it guarantees freedom and democracy.
This point is quite basic to the argument that anti-trust legislation
was above all else concerned with the actual form of corporate
(22g)
ownership which, under certain conditxons, generated monopoly.
Monopoly was to some extent a secondary issue compared with the form
of ownership involved namely, the trust. Mason, therefore, confuses
the objective of anti-trust legislation with one of its so called
•tests'. As Mason himself points out, anti-trust legislation was
never envisaged as a regulatory device designed to use information
relating to price, market share and so on irrespective of the formal
arrangements by which prices were 'fixed' and market share achieved.
Monopoly, in the sense which Mason describes it, was not the primary
concern of anti-trust law. To treat it as if it were is to wholly
misconceive it in terms of a purely technical response to the
'problem' of monopoly as defined by classical economic theory.
Accordingly, he is restricted to measuring the benefits which are
assumed to attach to the notion of competition coupled with the
more or less vague overture to the concept of the public interest
defined in an economic sense.
Overall, Mason's work is interesting for the way in which he
approaches the subject and for the manner in which he differentiates
(22f) This does not indicate an acceptance of the equation
of competition and freedom, merely the fact that this
equation was seen as central to the existence of anti¬
trust legislation. For an interesting discussion of,
and disagreement with, the logic of equating freedom
with competition see Cohen, G. A. (1981) N.L.E 126.
(22g) The point should be made that there is no necessary
correspondence between the corporate form and the
existence of monopoly but that monopoly cannot be
understood properly outwith the parameters
delimited by the concept of the 'corporation'.
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'legal' and 'economic' interpretations of anti-trust legislation.
In treating 'monopoly' as a purely technical problem amenable to
administrative regulation, however, he completely misunderstands
the basic structure of anti-trust legislation. He even admits as
much in the introduction when he concedes that the growth of the
corporate form of organisation has 'played havoc with the ideals and
possibilities of Jeffersonian democracy' and that the 'techniques of
economic analysis are not particularly relevant' to this problem.
Mason does succeed in elaborating some of the ways in which anti¬
trust law has 'evolved' from a formal apparatus of prohibition into
a mere technical device within a general arsenal of administrative
regulation. But this does not detract from the more basic point
that such a portrait of anti-trust legislation is out of sorts with
its original structure.
In the last resort the particular way of regarding anti-trust
law cannot be entirely divorced from the manner in which the free-
enterprise economy is justified. After all, the supposed defence
of free-enterprise is to some extent inseperable from the supposed
benefits of that which is being defended. It makes sense, therefore,
to examine the question of how the free-enterprise system is justified.
E. V. Rostow's work is especially important in this respect primarily
for the way in which he emphasises the link between 'democratic
freedom' and free enterprise.
There seem to be two distinct but interconnected ways of
justifying the free-enterprise economy. First of all, it may be
judged in terms of its efficiency and regarded as relatively, if not
absolutely, successful - according to criteria concerning output,
(22h) Mason, E. S. (1957) ibid, p. 15.
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prices, wages and so on. Secondly, it can be judged by its
capacity to generate or secure democratic liberty. These
justifications are sometimes used in tandem and at others in
isolation. For example, Rostow clearly recognises the importance
of the latter sort of justification in the following statement.
"In all its arrangements, American society manifests a preoccupation
with the problem of power. Persistently, almost instinctively,
its policy is always to avoid concentrations of authority as a
threat to the possibility of freedom. Capitalism stands with
federalism, the separation of powers, the disestablishment of
religion, the anti-trust tradition, the autonomy of educational
bodies, and the other major articles of the American creed, in
C 22i )
expressing a deep suspicion of authority". Although at the
same time he tends to dispute the idea that there is an exclusive
relationship between laisser-faire Capitalism and efficiency when he
states that there is no logical reason why the state cannot organise
production on an efficient basis. Mason, on the other hand, whilst
accepting the importance of justifications from the standpoint of
political liberty, seems to discount their force and relegate them
to a bygone age of Jeffersonian democracy. Indeed the entire
thrust of his work confirms his preoccupation with the former sort
of argument from 'efficiency'. As we have seen the difference
between the two sorts of justifications is important for a proper
analysis of anti-trust legislation.
Whatever the particular merits of economic and judicial
interpretations of anti-trust legislation, (and the discrete
(22i) Rostov;, E. V. (1959) 'Planning for Freedom'
New Haven: Yale U.P.-p.
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justifications which often underscore them) there is a readily
definable difference between primarily legal and essentially
administrative forms of Regulation. To be sure anti-trust
legislation is 'administered' - and the role of the Federal Trade
Commission and the anti-trust division of the department of justice
are significant institutional forms of administration - just as
administration of the economy may take a legal form. But the
important point to recognise is that anti-trust law was primarily
and unequivocally wedded to the prevention of specified limitations
upon competition which, if left unchecked, would subvert democratic
freedom. Therefore, the 'libertarian' justification of free
competition clearly and unambiguously underpinned the anti-trust
tradition. On the other hand, more contemporary issues of
regulation, which derive in part from a particular way of interpreting
anti-trust law, take as their point of departure the administrative
canon of efficiency. The economy is seen in terms of models which
generate certain effects which can be 'mapped' onto the performance
of the actual economy in the interest of defining the degree of
realisation of public goals. Accordingly, whereas anti-trust
law was originally concerned with the justification of free
competition because it was viewed as a necessary bastion of democratic
freedom and individualism, Administrative regulation is more concerned
with the 'economic' justification of free competition on the grounds
of its efficiency in terms of growth, price, opportunity, flexibility
and so on. The difference is not absolute in any historical sense
for the two ways of looking at anti-trust lav; have intersected in
a number of ways. Indeed it can be argued that there has been a
variable relationship between the two in which legal concepts may
be qualified by so called 'economic' criteria and 'economic'
considerations inserted into legal doctrines of intent, conspiracy
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and so on. Nevertheless, the fact that the actual course of the
anti-trust tradition meandered between typically legal and economic
interpretations does not in the end detract from the argument that
the strategic ends of the statute were originally linked indissolubly
to questions of political liberty.
An example of the interrelation of legal and economic 'concepts'
occurs, for Rostov;, in the rigorous inference of intent from economic
power irrespective of the practices whereby such power was acquired.
His argument is twofold. Not only would such a process of inference
serve to achieve at least some of the strategic ends of the Sherman
Act but he argues that since a number of landmark decisions in 19^8 -
C 22 *)
Paramount, Schine and Griffith - these ends have been achieved.
It will be argued later that the issues of 'power', 'purpose' and
parallel response are both difficult and openly contested within the
anti-trust tradition and that Rostow's interpretation of the developments
in 19^8 are at best equivocal. Nevertheless, following the logic
outlined by Rostov;, if intent could and should be read off from the
mere existence of economic power this clearly privileges the evidence
pertaining to economic power and especially the market to which that
power was supposed to refer. As with Mason's argument, this would
entail a considerable shift from the original aims of anti-trust
legislation by privileging 'economic' interpretations of monopoly
over legal concepts of freedom from interference. More importantly,
there is no reason to suppose that this approach would be any more
successful in combating monopoly nor the corollary - that law is
hampered by its failure to embrace economic tests of monopoly 'power'.
For example, it can be argued that a reliance upon 'economic'
definitions of the market and market power would provide, in Walter
(223) Paramount Pictures v. U.S., 33^ U.S. 131 (19^8)
Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. U.S., 33^ U.S. 110 (19^-8)
U.S. v. Griffith, 33^ U.S. 100 (19^8).
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Adam's words, a cornucopia of escape hatches for there are innumerable
ways of defining the relevant market and an infinite number of
constructions of economic 'power'.
There is a final sense in which the distinction between economic
and legal concepts of monopoly may contain within it some indication
of the quite limited role of 'law' in combating monopoly. For, if
monopoly, industrial concentration, oligopoly and the like are
inevitable in some way or other then the very idea that 'law' can
limit their growth is facile in the extreme. Of course much depends
upon how regulation is looked at. If it is merely an attempt to
police the unacceptable effects of modern industrial society -
whether these are perceived against a moral backcloth of 'good'
business conduct or against an economic model of efficient allocation
of resources - then regulation may be possible in the quite limited
sense of the word. If, on the other hand, regulation refers to the
way in which industrial society is organised and to the elimination
of the consequences of such organisation upon the possibility of
independent democratic and entrepreneurial freedom then in being
limited regulation is rendered quite useless. Which sort of
regulation is held to inform the strategic ends of anti-trust
legislation is basic to any assessment of the viability of such
regulation.
It is argued here that the aims of anti-trust legislation
were quite specific and involved an attempt to prevent the growth
of a form of ownership deemed to be an anathema to democratic
society. The pioneers of the anti-monopoly movement and anti¬
trust legislation were loath in the extreme to recognise the
inevitability of the corporate form and yet both Mason and Rostov/
seem to accept some sort of inevitability of oligopoly or industrial
concentration as quite natural, and merely seek to regulate its
20l(j)
unacceptable consequences. Their commitment to the idea of
inevitability is not entirely unequivocal. For example, there are
perhaps three different ways of arguing that the inevitability of
•oligopoly' and so on renders legal regulation ambiguous. In the
first and the strongest sense, it can be stated simply that if
monopoly is inevitable then controls are useless. It is seldom
stated as baldly as this and is usually concealed within some statement
referring to monopoly as the logical result of free competition and,
therefore, controls can at best mitigate its worst effects. Secondly,
as Mason argues, if the corporation is fundamental to social life
then to touch it deeply is to disturb fundamental social processes.
Therefore, regulation can only be marginal. Not only does
this discount the role of history in terms of how the corporation
came to be fundamental but it also seems to regard the strategic
ends of anti-trust legislation in the future anterior. Thirdly,
E. V. Rostow makes the point that criminal convictions cannot
restructure industrial society and, therefore, administrative
regulation is more appropriate. This point is quite typical of
the so called advocates of 'structural' remedy but they seldom consider
that these sorts of remedies involving dissolution or simple reduction
in the size of the operating units does not, of itself, destroy the
corporate form upon which any restraint of trade or monopoly may
depend. Furthermore, Rostow's laudatory review of the history of
anti-trust enforcement would leave one to doubt his assertion that
it has been a history of relative success. This point will be
discussed later.
Over and above the specific problems encountered by each of
these arguments concerning the inevitability of some sort of
(22k) Mason, E. S. (ed.) (1959) "The Corporation in Modern Society',
Cambridge: Harvard, U.P. p. 2.
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industrial concentration or centralisation there is a degree to which
they miss the point. For example, insofar as it has been argued here
that the issue of monopoly is inseparable from that of ownership then
the inevitability of monopoly, such as it is, is indissolubly wedded
to the inevitability or otherwise of the corporate form of ownership.
But it has been argued that the corporate form of ownership is not
an inevitable outgrowth of laisser-faire ownership. If this is
correct it follows, therefore, that monopoly is not inevitable nor
is industrial concentration and so on. If this is the case then any
limitations of 'law' cannot depend upon the inevitability of that
which it is supposed to control or prevent - monopoly and so on -
but must refer to the basic structure of anit-trust legislation.
Mason is clearly unhappy concerning the thesis of inevitability.
For example, he evinces a healthy disdain for the concept of 'monopoly'
capitalism and argues against the idea that industrial concentration
is increasing. First of all, he cites the existence of four million
independent business units as a counterveiling force both to the
argument of inevitable or increasing concentration and to the
(221)
unbridled extent of corporate power. Secondly, he states that
there is no evidence that concentration has been increasing. Clearly
the two are separate in that concentration may be inevitable but not
increasing nor yet total. It is also unclear who Mason has in mind.
Whilst Berle and Means did espouse a notion that industrial concentration
was increasing it can be argued that the factual b^.sis of concentration
*
is less important than the organisational strategies by which production
is conducted. These strategies may subsume so called independent
business units and subvert their incipient status as a counterveiling
power without any visible sign of concentration or centralisation.
(221) He uses figures from 19^6.
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The thesis of industrial concentration - whether inevitable,
increasing, omnipotent or whatever - is perhaps beside the point.
Despite reservations about the direction of industrial concentration
Mason still retains an implicit conception of the inevitability of
oligopoly. For example, he recognises that technical and organisational
influences may decree oligopoly and, following Schumpeter, that this
may be a necessary condition for an effective technological spur to
•real' competition from new products, processes and so on. Therefore,
whilst he denies that concentration has been increasing inexorably he
accepts that some sort of oligopoly is inevitable and even beneficial.
It has been argued in this section that whilst there is a
substantial difference between 'legal' and 'economic' interpretations
of anti-trust legislation and, more especially, in their respective
conceptions of 'monopoly', the distinction is often overdrawn. It is
true that the two may herald different sorts of regulation but the
connection with one or other heritage is by no means clear cut.
Moreover, it is suggested that any greater emphasis upon primarily
'economic' factors would lead neither to more effective regulation
nor would it help to attain the strategic ends of the Sherman Act.
Indeed the reverse is the case for greater attention to economic
criteria of monopoly would belie the proper and original purpose of
anti-trust law. Finally, it is argued that the major limitation of
law in respect of the regulation of 'monopoly' consists in the manner
in which 'law' conceives of the corporation. The corporation is not
seen as an inevitable outgrowth of laisser-faire society, nor is it
viewed as a peculiarly 'economic' concept beside which 'law* is
hopelessly inadequate. On the contrary, it is the way in which
law perceives ownership and the concepts which are utilised to combat
certain forms of ownership which are at the root of the problem.
Anti-trust law would not be strengthened by a greater interjection
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of 'economic' forms of measurement, it would merely be diverted
from its true aim.
Discretion.
There may be a temptation to read the contest between so
called 'legal' and 'economic' interpretations of anti-trust
legislation in terms of the infringement of fixed and
determinate concepts of law by the wholly alien concept of
discretion. Not only is the issue more complex than this
reading would allow but there is a sense also in which discretion
(23)
is inherent in law as such. Therefore, discretion would
appear to be somewhat limited as a means of distinguishing the
respective claims of the rule of reason and the per se doctrine.
On the contrary, in fact the distinction resides in the sort of
criteria by which discretion is exercised rather than in the relevance
of discretion itself. For example, the rule of reason makes the
(23) Pepinsky., H. E. (1976) 'Crime 8c Conflict' London:
Martin Robertson.
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entire business history of the defendant a relevant topic for
consideration by the court. Likewise, there are an almost infinite
number of mitigating factors which may 'allow' considerable latitude:
the existence of good/bad intentions behind the restraint of trade;
the economic consequences of decreeing divestiture or dissolution
on the industry in general; the political, military and 'imperial'
importance of the defendant and, the essentially contestible nature
of expert economic testimony. All of these items may have a bearing
on the eventual outcome according to an interpretation in line with
the rule of reason. Insofar as anti-trust legislation is governed
by the rule of reason, then anti-monopoly policy would seem to be
conducted with a view to preserving the benefits incidental to the
existence of free competitors. It is perhaps significant that
Eugene Rostow makes the following comment, "orienting the law around
this central axis - the concept of limitation on competition in
defined markets - we conclude that by and large our anti-trust law
(2k)
is adequate to its task". Any practical assessment of the
degree of limitation of competition, therefore, is subject to a
number of factors which may be held to mitigate the limitation to
a significant degree. For example, the way in which the market
is defined may result in the balancing of the limiting effect by
other factors incidental to competition; technology, performance,
efficiency, purpose and so forth. This much indicates that the
rule of reason approach is clearly associated with regulating the
complex equation between the assumed benefits of competition, on
one side, and the existence of abuse, on the other. It is a
regulatory and administrative response to the concrete development
(2^) Rostow, E. (1955) Partial dissent to Attorney General's
National Committee to study the Anti-trust laws, op cit.
p. 389.
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of the free enterprise economy.
The sort of discretion which attaches to the per se doctrine
is altogether different. This doctrine is aimed at the formal
prohibition of certain acts or market situations in themselves
and would appear to be markedly fixed rather than flexible.
Nevertheless, the pre-eminence of the concepts of conspiracy and
intent involves a measure of discretion in the attachment of authors
to any conspiracy in restraint of trade and to the specific intent
to monopolise trade. This is particularly true of the Sherman
Act discussed below. To be sure, the per se doctrine may seem
to bite much harder on 'anti-competitive' behaviour than does the
rule of reason, but the reliance upon essentially legal criteria
means that the issue of legal regulation of economic affairs is
posed even more starkly.
The Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act comprises two quite basic sections. Section
one states that, every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to
be illegal. Section two states that, every person who shall
monopolise or attempt to monopolise, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolise any part of the trade
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Moreover, section three states
that, every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of
trade is illegal in itself and section eight makes it clear that
'person' or 'persons' includes corporations and associations.
On the face of it this would seem to provide persuasive evidence
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for a per se approach to anti-trust legislation. The particular
warrant for the encroaching popularity of the rule of reason is
to be found in the use of the common law to 'interpret' the
underlying meaning of the Sherman Act. This is especially true
of the judicial construction of Chief Justice White in the Standard
Oil case described above. Although it is equally clear that section
one of the Sherman Act still depends upon the concept of conspiracy
and that section two points up the importance of the concept of
intent; in this sense the twin concepts of conspiracy and intent
are important supports of the Sherman Act irrespective of any
particular construction thereof.
Conspiracy.
So far as anti-trust legislation is concerned the concept of
conspiracy has two main referrants: intra-enterprise conspiracy
and inter-enterprise conspiracy. Intra-enterprise conspiracy
refers to the fact that the corporation can conspire with itself
in three ways. First of all, it is entirely plausible that a
corporation, as a legal subject, may conspire with officers acting
on its behalf or, again, a conspiracy may be formed between the
officers who comprise the corporation. Secondly, a 'parent'
corporation may conspire with its subsidiary corporations or else
a number of subsidiaries may conspire with each other. Finally,
intra-enterprise conspiracy includes the possibility that a person
or persons (including corporations) may own stock in two or more
separate corporations and can, therefore, form the basis of a
conspiracy between them. Each conspiracy refers, of course, to
some definite restraint of trade or attempt at monopolisation.
It is quite clear that each form of intra-enterprise conspiracy
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depends upon the identification of certain subjective predicates
of the corporation. This much holds whether these predicates
are condensed as the corporate subject, dispersed to discrete
representatives ojf the corporation (its officers in other words)
or else exercised by stockholders. In each case the accurate
specification of these predicates is absolutely essential to the
finding of a conspiracy. This is also the case for inter-enterprise
conspiracy. Quite simply then, conspiracy requires certain
subjective supports capable of conspiring. Insofar as the
corporation itself is viewed as an active agent of the conspiracy
then it is as a subjective conspirator. If, on the other hand,
corporate personnel are involved then it is in their capacity as
bearers of the corporate subject, specific supports of the predicates
of the corporate essence. That is to say, in their role as
corporate personnel (managers) or title holders (stockholders) and
not in their capacity as free individuals.
The importance of the corporate role is often crucial. As
Stone remarks, "... the law goes even beyond demanding proof of
wrongdoing of any corporate agent, and insists on a connection
(proved by a preponderance of the evidence) with someone fairly
(25)
high up in the corporate hierarchy". Therefore, there is a
clearly delineated attempt to penetrate to the heart of the corporate
essence, insofar as it is to be found in certain key guardians,
namely, top management. The attempt is far from successful - for
example, the Delaware Supreme Court made the following comment:
".. it appears that directors are entitled to rely on the honesty
and integrity of their subordinates until something occurs to put
(25) Stone, Christopher (1975) ££ cit. p. 53*
them on suspicion that something is wrong. If such occurs and
goes unheeded, then liability of the directors might well follow,
but absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors
to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to ferret out
wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists".
Insofar as there is a tendency to 'insulate' top management from the
unacceptable face of corporate activity, on the grounds that they
cannot be held responsible for what they don't know (Stone) and,
given that there is a fundamental cleavage between possession and
control relations, then this particular strategy is perhaps less
than successful in fixing corporate responsibility to identifiable
authors.
Section one of the Sherman Act clearly requires a plurality
of actors, a convocation of co-conspirators, before it can be
violated. Therefore, the Act depicts the corporation as a subject
or, as an aggregate of subjective predicates. This follows because
the Sherman Act does not proscribe restraint of trade as such but
only every contract, conspiracy or trust in restraint of trade.
Moreover, restraint of trade cannot be a substantive offence, under
the provisions of the Sherman Act, with the result that some form
of identifiable collusion between separate actors is essential for
a successful prosectuion under section one of the Act. It is
commonly understood that if a corporation commits a substantive
offence then the agents of the corporation responsible for the
perpetration of the crime are guilty of conspiracy. It does not
follow, however, that restraint of trade by a corporation implies
a similar conspiracy between discrete 'layers' of the corporate
(26) Graham v. Allis-ChalmersMfg. Co. 188 A.2d 125, 130 Del.
(1963), Quoted in Stone ibid, p. 63.
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hierarchy. In short, it is by no means clear that a corporation
can conspire with itself in restraint of trade and in violation
of a section one offence. This doubt would seem to be borne out
by the fact that by 1955 there had been no recorded decision in
favour of a section one charge of intra-enterprise conspiracy by
a corporation and its officers. In over sixty years not one
charge succeeded unless it was accompanied by other charges and
accompanying evidence of overt conspiracy in restraint of trade.
Section two offences are rather different since monopolisation
is a substantive offence with the result that corporate personnel
can be found guilty of a conspiracy to monopolise trade. Likewise,
conspiracy between subsidiaries, or between a subsidiary and the
parent company, and a conspiracy resulting from commonly held title
to the stock of discrete corporations, can be upheld as section one
offences. Thus the courts held that, "The test of illegality under
the Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint on
interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily from
a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under
common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are otherwise
independent. Similarly, an affiliation or integration flowing from
an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators from the
sanctions which congress has imposed. The corporate interrelationships
of the conspirators .. are not determinative of the applicability of
(27)
the Sherman Act". A very clear statement which seems to mark
out an extremely far reaching role for the Sherman Act. Nevertheless,
this potency is predicated upon the concept of conspiracy. As we
have seen the concept of conspiracy would appear to dissolve the
relevance of corporate interrelationships and, arguably, the only
(27) United States of America v. Yellow Cab. Co. 322 U.S. 218
(19^7) 227.
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secure basis for any form of regulation. Instead, restraint of
trade by corporations is viewed entirely as a matter of conspiracy
between distinct actors. Even if the provisions of anti-trust
legislation are interpreted strictly, in a way which enables law
to bite hard on anti-competitive behaviour, then the attempt is
perhaps unnecessarily restrained by the conceptual equipment
available, respectively, conspiracy and intent. Further, when
the concept of conspiracy depends upon the existence of some sort
of boundary between a parent and a subsidiary company, or between
subsidiaries or between a corporation and its executive officers,
then the picture of corporate interrelations implied theirin merely
confirms the inadequacy of law as an agency of regulation.
The discussion of intra-enterprise conspiracy highlights the
difficulties involved in conceiving of the corporation as a subject
in its own right as well as viewing it as an aggregate of discrete
subjective attributes. These difficulties are compounded when
law attempts to describe the basis of a conspiracy between one or
more permutations of these respective 'subjects'. It is with
regard to inter-enterprise conspiracy, however, that the potentiality
of law as a regulatory agency faces a more important test. Inter-
enterprise conspiracy involves what has come to be known as the
issue of 'conscious parallelism'; the idea that companies may
pursue a parallel course of action without recourse to an overt
conspiracy. This course of action may include such items as
pricing policy, output level, market share and so on. Conscious
parallelism is so called because it involves two aspects; first, a
knowledge of 'competitors' conduct and, secondly, uniformity of
business behaviour or, what amounts to the real manifestation of a
suitable synonym for collusion. This particular issue penetrates
to the heart of anti-trust policy since it raises the question of
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whether conspiracy can be 'read off' from the presence of economic
effects normally indicative of overt collusion or, conversely,
whether an active conspiracy, a genuine meeting of the minds, is
essential for the finding of conspiracy under the anti-trust laws.
A question which appears to crop up again and again, therefore, is
'should law bite on uncompetitive situations without being restricted
k • i i 4- <28)by rigid legal concepts.
Interpretation of inter-enterprise conspiracy is far from
uniform. For example, in 19^8 the Federal Trade Commission
announced that, ".. when a number of enterprises follow a parallel
course of action in the knowledge and contemplation of the fact that
(29)
all are acting alike, they have, m effect, formed an agreement".
An interpretation which had been upheld by the Supreme Court in the
same year to the effect that concerted action constituted a
combination within the meaning of the Sherman Act.^^ On the
other hand, the Supreme Court made the following declaration in
195^, "But this Court has never held that proof of parallel business
behaviour conclusively establishes agreement or, phrased differently,
that such behaviour itself constitutes a Sherman Act offence.
Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behaviour may have
made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward
conspiracy but 'conscious parallelism* has not yet read conspiracy
( 31 )
out of the Sherman Act entirely".
(28) Neale, A. (1966) o£ cit.
(29) Federal Trade Commission, Notice to the Staff: In Re:
Commission Policy toward Geographic Pricing Practices
(Oct. 12, 19^8).
(JO) Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 7l6n
17, (19^8).
(31) Theatre Enterprises Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.
et al 3^6. U.S. 537, 5^1 - 5^2, (195^).
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To be sure, the implied dispute is between two rather fragile
contestants. Indeed, as Rostow remarked, a case of purely tacit
or conventional collusion, that is, devoid of such additional
evidence as forraal/informal understandings, policing measures,
(32)
correspondence, and so on has never reached the courts.
Moreover, Neale indicates that 'reading off' collusion from the
mere existence of economic effects indicative of parallel action
is largely restricted to a charge under Section 5 of "the Federal
(33)
Trade Commission Act. That is to say, as an alternative means
to prevent the continuation of a tacit agreement after conspiracy
is established by more conventional (legal) means. Any inclusion
of a comprehensive analysis of the economic effects of a restraint
of trade is thereby subordinated to the primary finding of an overt
conspiracy in the normal (legal) manner. Accordingly, conscious
parallelism is restricted to secondary relevance. By the same
token there had been no primary charge relating to individual
sellers following the lead of a more 'powerful' competitor, that
is, in the absence of any separate agreement or conspiracy established
at law.
There is a rather perplexing array of opinions on the early
interpretation of 'conscious parallelism'. In this sense Neale
provides a useful summary of the position. He argues as follows:
agreement or conspiracy in restraint of trade can be proved
conclusively by circumstantial evidence, 'so long as a chain of
evidence can be built up for which the only plausible explanation
(32) Eugene v. Rostow et al. AGNCAT (1955) ££ cit. pp. 40 - 42.
(33) Neale, A. (1966) oja cit. p. 94.
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is a common understanding or plan'. That much is established at
*
law. Anti-trust law, however, knows no doctrine of 'constructive
conspiracy'. That is to say, 'the existence of a restrictive
agreement cannot be proved simply by showing that the effects usually
associated with such an agreement have occurred'. A great deal of
discretion exists between these two interpretations of the basis of
a conspiracy. But conspiracy still requires a genuine meeting of
the minds. Accordingly, it is often suggested that the best form
of defence to a charge of conspiracy would be to offer a plausible
alternative interpretation of parallel action rather than to challenge
the fact of parallel action as such.
At bottom the issue of conscious parallelism involves the more
general contest between those who would view the impairment of
competition as actionable per se and those who would rather restrict
anti-trust legislation to the apparently rigid concepts of conspiracy
and intent. Obviously, in order to rely on the impairment of
competition per se as a criterion of illegality, it is necessary to
countenance an exhaustive analysis of the consequences of particular
actions in the light of some model of perfect or workable competition.
It is not just a matter of outlawing price fixing per se, since the
whole essence of conscious parallelism involves a detailed assessment
of the market in order to even define parallel action and thence to
infer an implicit conspiracy. Therefore, this sort of 'strict'
approach is characterised by a basic concern for the regulation of
competition and the preservation of a series of benefits which, it
is assumed, adhere to free competition; growth, efficiency and
adaptability. As such this response ceases to be a distinctly
legal regulation of economic affairs becoming instead a bureaucratic
response to the free enterprise system.
To some extent this bureaucratic administrative response describes
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the role of the Federal Trade Commission in its dealings with the
problem of restraint of trade. Whilst this sort of perspective
may have left a few high tide marks inscribed in the history of
anti-trust legislation, nevertheless, it has not achieved any
deeper resonance within anti-trust legislation.
For example, the Milgram v. Loew judgement ruled that consciously
parallel practices demonstrated the existence of a conspiracy. Also,
this approach to some extent replaced the 'meeting of the minds',
deemed essential for the finding of conspiracy in earlier
interpretations, with the notion of a constructive conspiracy.
Although on appeal certain reservations were entered along with a
wholesale dissent. In effect the Appeal Court argued that parallel
action was still insufficient by itself but that in the absence of
an attempt by the defence to put forward a plausible alternative
(34)
interpretation it was sufficient in this particular case.
At most, this sort of response has appeared as an adjunct to a
properly constructed legal appraisal of economic affairs and,
therefore, has been subordinated to the dictates of legal concepts
like conspiracy and intent. For example, the Rigid steel conduit
case, often quoted as a landmark in the rigorous pursuit of parallel
action, in fact involved only a secondary charge under Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act abutting a primary finding of
(35)
conspiracy and aimed at preventing its 'renewal'. ^ Furthermore,
even if this response advocating 'constructive conspiracy' constituted
(34) Milgram v. Loew's Inc. 192 F. 2d 579 5 583 (3rd Cir. 1951)
and 343 (U.S.) 929 (1952).
(35) Triangle Conduit & Cable Co. Inc. et, al. v. Federal Trade
Commission, 168 F. 2d 175 (48) and 33(T~U.S. 956 (1949).
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the prevailing interpretation, then the attendant reliance upon
economic consequences would divert attention from the issue of
economic ownership and thus would change the nature of anti-trust
legislation entirely. It would make relevant a potentially infinite
number of essentially contestible economic variables prior to the
assessment and balancing of matters incidental to the existence of
free competitors. Hence all that anti-trust legislation could
achieve, on this reading of it, would be the regulation of abuse
within an overall framework of oligopoly designed to meet certain
criteria of 'performance' rather than prevent monopoly. The issue
of industrial concentration and centralisation would be relevant only
insofar as they impeded or increased 'performance'. Therefore,
the opportunities for the defence of restraint of trade, on the
grounds of technological or strategic importance, efficiency and
so on, would be potentially boundless and the scope of law at best
uncertain and at worst secondary.
The crucial argument is not between the sort of general approach
which would abandon legal concepts, in an attempt to foreclose
monopolistic effects, and the strict criminalisation of corporate
activity. Nor is it between the greater exercise of discretion
and the more rigid imposition of legal sanctions. Both sorts of
response overlap to some extent and each is flawed in very specific
ways. Over and above these particular problems, what is important
is that these two quite general responses supply the paradigm for
legal regulation. That each is based on certain fundamental,
although quite unacceptable, assumptions goes a long way toward
explaining the comparative difficulties encountered by legal and
bureaucratic forms of regulation. If these twin forms of regulation
overlap then the problem of priority becomes apparent. As we have
seen the evidence of the earlier part of the development of anti-trust
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legislation resolves this dilemma by inserting 'economic' criteria
within sharply delineated legal concepts. Thus, intent may be
read off from the existence of certain consequences and a conspiracy
may be 'constructed' by reference to market behaviour. Accordingly,
the denegation of corporate structure, inherent in the conventional
analysis of competition, is compounded by being absorbed within a
form of legal analysis which views corporate structure in terms of
a subjective essence and sees criminal action as the responsibility
of individual authors.
As we have seen, the concept of conspiracy in restraint of trade
characteristic of section one of the Sherman Act indexes the notion
of a subjective agreement between conspirators and also demarcates
discrete corporate spheres capable of entering into a conspiracy as
co-conspirators. Accordingly, the charge of conspiracy requires
the specification of actors who are in fact authors of the conspiracy.
Insofar as the charge derives from the Sherman Act, then these parts
are played either by the corporate subject itself or by identifiable
bearers of the predicates of the corporate subject, corporate
personnel in other words. The Sherman Act quite clearly specifies
that person or persons can include (legal) corporations. Further,
if restraint of trade is to be defined then the criteria by which it
is to be assessed are admitted only as an adjunct of the concept of
conspiracy. Restraint of trade is not an offence per se but
requires a conspiracy to activate the process of legal sanction.
Considerable problems attend the specification of the corporation
as an economic subject or as a constellation of economic actors.
Additionally, the concept of any sort of equilibrium between free
producers and consumers, through free exchange in the market, is
a less than accurate portrayal of the corporate economy. Therefore,
the concepts of restraint of trade and conspiracy are inappropriate
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regulatory mechanisms. This much becomes plain with regard to
their separate capacities, but when each is taken in tandem with
the other then the possibility of effective legal regulation of
economic affairs recedes into the background.
The Concept of Intent and Corporate Agency.
Section one of the Sherman Act depends upon the identification
of a conspiracy in restraint of trade. Similarly, section two of
the Act is sustained by an equal reliance upon the concept of
intent. Monopoly per se is not illegal. What is illegal is the
monopolisation of trade. This special offence of monopolisation
involves two distinct aspects: first, monopoly, which is defined
as the 'power' to fix prices or exclude competition and, secondly,
a deliberate use of, or attempt to preserve or acquire, such
power. Hence, the conventional contraction of these two aspects
as 'power' and 'purpose'. Therefore, the concept of intent is
essential for the finding of a charge under section two. The
concept of intent implies two component parts: first, specific
criteria of guilt, because the Sherman Act is after all a criminal
statute, and, secondly, the identification of specific economic
actors capable of crystallising and exercising intent. In order
to establish authors of criminal intent, it is necessary to
specify the corporation in terms of a subject or subjects. Whilst
it is quite true that these subjects need not be human they must,
nevertheless, express the requisite subjective attributes.
Accordingly, this reliance upon a subjective caricature of the
corporation cannot help but miss the central structure of corporate
relations of ownership. It must be stressed, however, that so
called 'structural' features have not escaped attention entirely.
For example, Kaysen makes it quite clear that the basic issue is
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one of 'structure*. It is the structure of the market which
inspires, and even requires, parallel action or agreements to
agree. But the preoccupation with the definition of parallel
action fails to consider the structure which seems to enforce
parallel action namely, the domination of the market by and for
the few.^^ This sort of interpretation may have much to commend
it, but the solution advocated by Kaysen appears to imply an
unnecessarily restrictive definition of structure. Thus,
divestment, divorcement and divestiture are seen as an effective
relief against the problem of monopoly. Whilst it is quite true,
as far as it goes, that 'behaviour' is a function of market
structure, there is no guarantee that this structure will be
altered by redistributing the boundaries of the corporate
enterprise. Nor is 'oligopoly' or market structure a problem
of legal ownership, to be remedied by redrawing the profile of
stock ownership. To be sure, the call for 'structural' remedies
necessarily implies that oligopoly, or the corporation as such,
is not in fact prohibited. This much is perhaps obvious, and
the point is often made that monopoly is not actually illegal.
Nevertheless, there is a clear presumption, within anti-trust
legislation and, especially within the anti-monopoly movement,
that the law is used to regulate the increasing dominance of the
corporate form through an attack on what it sees as its unacceptable
consequences. Therefore, the spectre of monopoly and the promise
of competition informs every moment of anti-trust legislation,
even though monopoly as such is not quite illegal.
(36) Kaysen, C. (1951) 'Collusion under the Sherman Act',
Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 65, (1951) Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press.
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A section two charge requires more than just a demonstrable
intention, it requires evidence of the necessary power to fix
prices. Obviously, the definition of market power in question
depends upon how the relevant market is construed. The assertion
that, 'size is of course an earmark of monopoly power', was set
(37)
forth xn United States v. Griffith e_t al. Thus, under
certain circumstances, the offence of monopolisation may be
inferred from the mere existence of a near or total monopoly on
the grounds laid out in United States v. Aluminium Company of
America, that 'no monopolist monopolises unconscious of what he
is doing. Perhaps more importantly, the Griffith case
established, further, that 'monopoly power, whether lawfully or
unlawfully acquired, may itself constitute an evil and stand
(39)
condemned under section two even though it remains unexercised'.
There is, therefore, a clear presumption that size is an important
criterion of monopoly power and, at times, even a direct determinant
of the offence of monopolisation. Although size is seldom regarded
as being actionable per se,^0^ it is, nonetheless, an implicit
determinant of action under the anti-trust laws. Furthermore,
size is an important factor in determining whether or not a
monopoly exists. For example, Justice Hand in the Alcoa case
delineated the following rough and ready tariff: 90% of supply
is sufficient to constitute a monopoly; 60 - 64% of supply is
doubtful and 33% of supply is clearly not enough. Of course,
(37) 334 U.S. 100 (194-8) 107 n.10.
(38) 2 Cir., 148 F 2d. 4l6, 432.
(39) 334 U.S. 100 (1948) 107.
(40) See United States v. United States Steel Corporation 251 US.
417 which states that mere size is not outlawed by section 2.
(41) United States v. Aluminium Company of America, 148 F 2d. 4l6.
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by itself the issue of size is seldom conclusive and U.S. v.
Columbia Steel, demonstrated that the ".. relative effect of
percentage command of a market varies with the setting in which
(42)
that factor is placed".
'Economic' criteria are undoubtedly important for any
determination of monopolisation. For example, how the market
is defined; its overall size, the strength of competitors,
prevailing business trends, the freedom of entry, specific capital
requirements for the participation in the market, geographical area,
the levels of advertising and consumer demands, each of these has
an important bearing on the definition of the 'power' to monopolise.
Furthermore, evidence relating to the way that prices are formed
and decisions made, their course, flexibility, relation to prices
in general, price competition and customary procedures, is an
important criterion of 'purpose'. The typically flexible
requirements, necessary for a demonstration of a positive purpose
to monopolise trade, stem from the considerable latitude involved
in defining any particular restraint of trade and from the broadly
based discretion as to whether such a restraint of trade is against
the public interest. As Neale puts it, "Intent is assessed in the
(43)
light of power".
It is true that the requisite 'intent' is not normally the
specific intent to monopolise, although such an intent does exist
under anti-trust legislation, but rather a conclusion based on
how monopoly 'power' was acquired, maintained and used. Accordingly,
(42) 334 U.S. 49r, 527 - 8 (1948).
(43) Neale, A. (1966) ojd cit. p. 129«
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the entire history and business policy of a corporation may be
scrutinised and made relevant for the proof of a general deliberation
and intention to monopolise in violation of section two. The
charge of monopolisation may be sustained if a subjective intent to
acquire and keep a monopoly position characterises business policy
or, if an objective intent can be inferred from the continued
existence of a monopoly. Objective intent is formed by analogy
with the legal notion that human action, and thus corporate action,
is intentional in the absence of evidence to the contrary. For
example, the famous dictum enunciated by Judge Hand that no
monopolist monopolises unconscious of what he is doing demonstrates
(44)
one sort of objective intent. Although 'reading off' intent
from market consequences does not necessarily salvage the concept
of intent as an effective means of regulation. On the contrary,
the tendency is more toward re-inforcing the concept of intent and
further compounding it by reference to an equilibrium between
neo-classical (economic) subjects as an implicit measure of monopoly
(45)
or restraint of trade.
As we have seen, the definition of monopoly power in a specific
market situation and the construction of a deliberate attempt to
secure such market 'power' intermesh to provide typically flexible
interpretations of 'monopolisation'. For example, monopoly need
not violate section two of the Sherman Act, wherever market demand
is so low that reasons of efficiency deem monopoly to be the most
practical means of meeting it. Likewise, where a dramatic change
in demand or cost leaves but a single supplier or, where a sole
(44) United States v. Aluminium Co. of America, 148. F.2d 416 (1945).
(45) Aglietta M. (1979)) 'A Theory of Capitalist Regulation',
London: N.L.B. p. 13-
219
company survives by dint of superior skill, foresight and industry
or by pre-empting demand by developing an entirely new product, then
these situations may justify the existence of a monopoly. Therefore,
if monopoly iS 'thrust' upon a corporation by market forces or by
any one of the above factors, providing that this is the only reason
for the existence of a monopoly, then the corporation is not in
contravention of section two of the Sherman Act. This position
has been upheld in a number of cases which affirm the right of a
corporation to have a monopoly but, nevertheless, introduce sanctions
because of the way in which that monopoly has been exercised. For
example, United States v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis
(1912); Gamco v. Providence Fruit 8c Produce Building (1952) and
United States v. Lorain Journal Company (1951)» all suggest that it
is only the misuse of monopoly power which is likely to infringe
section two. Even then, the issue of misuse may be decided by the
definition of the relevant market, as in the Times Picaycune Company
v. United States (1953)• Here, the Supreme Court returned a
majority verdict in favour of Times Picayune on the grounds that,
whilst the newspaper held a monopoly of the morning market, it did
not have a monopoly of the combined morning and evening market and
that its attempt to contract advertisers to a package deal was not
tantamount to an offence of monopolisation. Nevertheless, this
last case is not typical of the majority of cases of this nature.
There exists, then, a clear presumption that monopoly per se
is not in fact illegal and that the offence of monopolisation
requires some form of proof regarding business malpractice which is
essentially unfair in itself. It is not the 'progressive' aspects
of monopoly, for example, development, expansion, efficiency, which
invoke the wrath of legal sanction, but rather the frustration and
calculated exclusion of potential new entrants which is necessary
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to precipitate action in line with section two. This general
theme persists with reference to the specific section two charges
of attempting to monopolise trade and combining or conspiring to
monopolise trade. Neither of these special offences requires any
evidence of monopoly power at all. In the former, proof of the
requisite intent can be found in documents pertaining to the attempt,
or in an assessment of the industrial backcloth to the attempt.
Whereas for the latter, proof of intent can be regarded largely as
a proof of conspiracy. The specific intention to monopolise is
not consummated in the simple act of merger, but requires conclusive
proof of a larger, altogether more sinister, plan to dominate the
entire industry. Even where the attempt failed, the offence can
still be proved, that is to say, monopoly power is irrelevant. For
example, this has been upheld in the Columbia Steel case of 19^8
and in the Yellow Cab case of 19^9.
One thing is abundantly clear from the foregoing remarks.
The Sherman Act appears to fall rather uneasily between two sorts
of general criteria. First of all, 'economic' criteria are made
relevant at various stages and, in particular, with regard to the
more uncertain interpretation normally associated with the rule of
reason. The exercise is designed to assess the consequences of
specific market conditions. These consequences do not, necessarily,
adhere to identifiable acts nor, for that matter, do they attach
to particular actors. But rather, under certain circumstances,
specific acts such as conspiracy or monopolisation can be linked
with individual authors, largely through the notion of intent, and
both may be inferred from market structure. Thus, economic criteria
are inserted into legal concepts and become an essential part of the
determination of an infraction. Secondly, legal criteria are
involved in ascertaining intentional acts (conspiracy, monopolisation)
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or specific practices (price fixing) which may limit competition.
These acts or practices are outlawed in themselves and, whilst
there may be some scope for discretionary definition of these acts
or practices, once found they are outlawed per se. In practice,
of course, these two sorts of criteria become intertwined. The
essentially legalistic language of anti-trust statutes - which refer
to intent and conspiracy as fundamental to the finding of a violation -
together with the basically 'economic' analysis of market structure -
which finds the concept of monopolisation utterly incomprehensible -
often overlap. As might be expected, they do not prove to be happy
bedmates. For example, there is a persistent tension between the
two with regard to judicial interpretation and it is a tension
which has only partially been resolved in favour of legal criteria.
Thus, the Attorney General's National Committee stated that, "...
The anti-trust laws establish criminal guilt or civil responsibility;
here as in all other phases of the law, legal responsibility is
individual". Hence, actual behaviour cannot be deduced from
general market structure, since legal responsibility has to be
induced from direct evidence pertaining to the individual involvement
and perpetration of a legally prohibited act, price fixing,
monopolisation and so on. Although this interpretation is by no
means clear cut. For example, the former Assistant Attorney
General Wendell Berge said in 1940: "The rights of the accused which
are of the utmost importance when liberty of an individual is in
jeopardy, are irrelevant symbols when the real issue in the
(l±.n)
arrangement under which corporations in industry must compete".
(46) AGNCAT (1955) 0£ cit. p. 340.
(^7) ibid. Quoted, p. 353«
In other words, the corporations were treated unfairly according
to a systematic violation of fundamental principles of justice.
It would appear, then, that the suspension of legal rights, and the
greater reliance upon bureaucratic intervention, did indeed have
some effect, particularly in view of the somewhat strained reaction
of the former Assistant Attorney General. It would be wrong,
however, to conclude that bureaucratic intervention fared any
better than a more legalistic form of economic regulation. They
each have substantial failings. Whereas law is limited by its
reliance <upon concepts like conspiracy, intent and private property,
bureaucratic intervention is perhaps preoccupied by an analysis of
market structure in terms of ideal types (perfect or workable
competition, monopoly and oligopoly) which cannot help but denegate
material structures of ownership in favour of an hypothesised
equilibrium between economic actors. In this sense, any restraint
of trade is measured against a purely imaginary equation. As
Pepinsky argues, the injury caused by price fixing is impossible
to arrive at from the point of view of economic theory or economic
practice. He argues that, "From the point of view of economic
theory, the injury caused by price fixing is shown by models
contrasting oligopolistic or monopolistic markets to competitive
ones. The problem with this comparison is that a competitive
market, as an abstraction, cannot exist in reality".Also,
the definition of economic injury from an empirical point of view
is impossible because the simultaneous existence in the same economy
of two markets for the same product with similar buyers and sellers
(48) Pepinsky, H. (1976) 0£ cit. p. 30.
is impossible. Thus, there is no basis for a comparison.
Accordingly, the ad hoc basis of bureaucratic regulation would
appear to lack any clear cut criteria for arriving at restraint of
trade and, therefore, would seem to be without a sound basis for a
sustained regulation of economic conduct. Of course both legal
and bureaucratic forms of regulation are each hampered, further, by
the measure of their respective separation as agencies of regulation,
but we are more concerned here with the content of regulation rather
than the principle of regulation as such.
The Sherman Act represents the major thrust of anti-rnonopoly
law, especially in view of the resolution of every statutory doubt
in favour of the Sherman Acts basic anti-trust directives.
Nevertheless, anti-monopoly law is far from exhausted by a consideration
of the Sherman Act alone. For example, section seven of the Clayton
Act, as amended in 1950» is the primary provision to which the
department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission resort on
the question of mergers. The clear intention of section seven of
the Clayton Act, which the 1950 amendment strengthened, was to halt
undue concentrations of economic power and monopoly in their infancy;
to nip mergers in the bud before an action under the Sherman Act
became appropriate. As Walter Adams makes abundantly clear, "The
Clayton Act is a prohibitory, not a regulatory statute. By its
enactment, Congress did not intend to authorise the courts or the
commission to determine whether particular mergers are good or bad
or in the public interest. Instead, Congress acted on the
presumption that a substantial foreclosure or elimination of
(ZfQ)
competition was m itself a derogation of the public interest".
(^9) Walter Adams in AGNCAT, (1955) ££ cit. p. 127/128.
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As we have seen already, this is clearly a 1 per se' approach to the
infringement of free competition; an approach which denies not only
the relevance of intent, the ethical basis of an acquiring firms
business practice, but also, price fixing and the exclusion or
destruction of competitors as well. Instead, it is quite sufficient
to demonstrate the reasonable probability that a substantial lessening
of competition or clear tendency toward monopoly would accompany a
merger in order to secure its prohibition under the provisions of the
Act. However, as the Federal Trade Commission made clear in 1953j
competition cannot be directly measured; no single set of
standards can be applied to the whole range of American industries.
No single characteristic of an acquisition (would in all cases)
..of itself be sufficient to determine its effect on competition".
Instead, a case by case examination of all the relevant factors is
necessary to ascertain the probable economic consequences. Whilst
not directly equivalent to a Sherman Act test, since the Clayton
Act requires a less stringent burden of proof, it nonetheless
describes a substantial area of discretion and a tendency to submit
to a rule of reason interpretation. This incipient rule of reason
finds ultimate acceptance in the idea that in certain circumstances
a merger can lead to increased and more effective competition and,
consequently, the proliferation of oligopoly can be beneficial to
vigorous competition between 'equals'. Coupled with the degree of
indeterminacy associated with the questions of how substantial must
any foreclosure of competition be and, at precisely what stage a
merger constitutes an incipient derogation of competition, then the
conclusion amounts to a considerable case for the rule of reason
(50) F.T.C. Dkt. 6000 p.9, (1953) Quoted in AGNCAT (1935) cit. p.121
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approach. Furthermore, as Neale points out, the purely quantitative
test of the substantiality of any decrease in competition is
apparently insensitive to motive. Nevertheless, the preference of
the courts for the concept of 'intent' tends to ensure the convergence
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts on this particular issue, with the
result that intent is still the earmark of an offence for the courts,
(51)
if not for the Federal Trade Commission. For example, the
foreclosure of competition through vertical integration has not
been successfully prosecuted in the absence of intent to monopolise.
Moreover, the impact of the Clayton Act seems to be limited to the
imposition of a sliding scale whereby gratuitous size requires less
stringent proof of intent, coercion and interference and, vice versa,
(52)
small is innocent. Therefore, size appears yet again as an
implicit determinant of action under anti-trust legislation, at
once affirming the prevailing distrust of bigness and, also,
forestalling the appropriate grasp of corporate relations. It is
almost as if a theory of the corporate 'bully' stands instead of
an accurate portrayal of corporate ownership.
It would be entirely incorrect to make the assumption that these
general propositions are in any way definitive statements concerning
the complex nature of anti-trust law. This is particularly true
of the more contemporary use of anti-trust legislation as a rather
different form of regulatory agency, tied much more explicitly to a
type of cost benefit analysis based on levels of price formation.
A consideration of these developments would be out of place here,
particularly in view of the fact that they appear to change the
(51) Neale, A. (1966) o£ cit. p. ^73«
(52) ibid, p. 440.
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complexion of anti-trust legislation quite dramatically, in a
direction at odds with its original structure. What was once a
perhaps uniquely American attempt to get to grips with 'bigness'
and defend free enterprise, has passed over into but another 'tool'
for the ostensible regulation of prices. Although, even with
regard to the earlier course of anti-trust legislation, with which
we are primarily concerned, the process of interpretation is complex
and it would be as true to say that an equal case could be, and
indeed has been, made out for an alternative interpretation of anti¬
trust legislation. The important point, however, is that at bottom
anti-trust legislation, and the ensuing process of interpretation
thereof, is bounded by two quite fundamental persuasions. First
of all, 'economic' consequences are viewed as 'irrelevant' to the
successful prosecution of a conspiracy in restraint of trade,
monopolisation of trade or mergers. Secondly, there is a persistent
tendency to attribute a great deal of importance to 'economic'
context, performance, business practice and history. So much so
that at times economic context may even be a crucial determinant of
(53)
any action under the anti-trust laws.
These two alternative perspectives on anti-trust legislation
provide for a substantial contest sufficient in itself to account
for the wholesale proliferation of anti-trust enterprise.
Irrespective of which persuasion prevails (with a few exceptions
the evidence is largely equivocal on this point), it can be stated
quite plainly that each is entirely inadequate as an agency of
prohibition and potentially flawed as an instrument of regulation
(53) As Miller puts it: there is on the one hand a legislative-
administrative process which provides a degree of flexibility
in detailed application of the law in the face of different
situations and changing attitudes, and on the other hand a
judicial process which provides for substantial consistency and
continuity in broad principles". Miller, J.P. (1962)
'Anti-trust Policy: the U.S. experience' in Miller (ed.)Competitic
Cartels, and Their Eegulation, Amsterdam:
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vis a vis economic affairs in general and corporate structure in
particular. In combination their respective weakness' tend to
be compounded and, in isolation, their marginality in respect of
corporate relations vitiates any potentiality which they may have
to a degree which perhaps overshadows their particular failings.
Punishment.
So far the issue of enforcement of anti-trust legislation and
the punishment of offenders have taken second place to the
examination of the structure of anti-trust legislation. This is
understandable given that the structure of anti-trust legislation
is prior to its enforcement. There are, however, a number of
important details concerning the actual enforcement of anti-trust
legislation which amplifies, further, the argument concerning how
anti-trust legislation is structured and how it portrays the
corporation. The bare outline of enforcement is easily described.
There are three principle enforcement 'mechanisms'. First of all,
the Department of Justice, secondly, the Federal Trade Commission
and, finally, the pursuit of private action by treble-damage
litigants. Obviously, the process of investigation is complex,
involving the sort of decision making criterion which inhere in
any Criminal Justice system. Anti-trust legislation is no exception
on this issue. The process is, however, subject to quite specific
problems. For example, a comprehensive process of investigation is
necessary in order to determine the existence of a probable violation;
an investigation uncovers a violation rather than being stimulated
by a criminal act into the process of finding a responsible author.
Since resources are scarce there is a necessary process of selection
and concentration at work and hence a wide ambit for the exercise of
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discretion. Over and above this fully comprehensive investigatory
procedure employed prior to the instigation of formal criminal or
civil proceedings, there is the additional selection of the appropriate
penalties (criminal action), equitable relief (civil action) or
voluntary agreement (diversion process). In short the proper
channeling of legal/administrative action occupies a crucial place
in the determination of action under the anit-trust laws. Although
formally impressive, the strategies for obtaining information are
in practice attenuated, particularly with regard to civil cases.
This is especially important given the relevance placed on information
to the investigatory and dispersal procedure and the priority accorded
the collation of facts in the judicial process in general. Indeed,
the emphasis on facts is often held to be a direct consequence of
the apparent generality of the statute law which comprises the
anti-trust field. On this particular issue the Attorney General's
National Committee was moved to recommend that, precisely because
the complexities of business life govern the unpredictable nature
of executive action, the criminal process should only be used
where the law is clear and the facts reveal a flagrant offence and
a plain intent to restrain trade unreasonably. One might add,
also, that the existence of an effective relief, other than the
empty reiteration of anti-trust's statutory provisions, is in part
a determinant of action under the anti-trust laws. As Miller says
of the 19^+6 American Tobacco Case "The government after winning the
case was hard pressed to find any effective remedy since, in view
of the structure of the market, instructing the firms not to conspire
(54)
is of little significance.
(5^) See Miller, J. (1962) ojd cit. p. 231.
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The establishment of precedents of this nature plays a large
part in determining whether or not any action will be taken in
future and, if action is to ensue, what sort it will be. In
addition to the issues of investigation, dispersal and enforcement,
the department of Justice also claims some competence in relation
to the provision of advance clearances and releases for proposed
mergers.
Section eleven of the 191^ Clayton Act empowered the Federal
Trade Commission with the authority to enforce compliance with the
Clayton Act provisions. Thus, the F.T.C was endowed as an auxiliary
organ of anti-trust enforcement. As such the F.T.C has no criminal
jurisdiction but is instead a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal
able, in theory, to hold hearings into suspected violations, to
issue cease and desist orders and, contingent upon subsequent
infringement of such orders, to refer a case to an appellate court
for enforcement. The cease and desist order is basically an
injunction comparable to a civil remedy in a Sherman Act case.
The F.T.C also has power to investigate the operation of a department
of Justice decree and, on presidential or congressional authority,
to investigate violations of anti-trust statutes. In addition,
there is an apparatus of informal settlements, trade practice
conferences and voluntary compliance in general. The F.T.C has
statutory powers to obtain information necessary to its function
which are set out at section six of the F.T.C Act.
Finally, the incidence and success rate of private suits for
damage, held to be a result of anti-trust violations, has increased
dramatically since the end of the second world war. One problem
with such suits is caused by the plea of nolo contendere to a
criminal charge. The advantage of such a plea is that, whilst
it doesn't dispute the charge, it, nevertheless, forestalls the
230
establishment of specific violations, which can form valuable
precedents for any number of private treble damage suits. Likewise,
it avoids the publication of what the corporation was up to, in terms
of establishing specific factual transgressions. The advantages
of suppressing publicity of corporate malpractice are fairly obvious
and need not detain us here.
So much for the formal structure of enforcement. The actual
patterns of punishment and discipline, however, which these diverse
practices example, are more important determinants of the efficacy
of legal and administrative regulation. Without doubt the most
far reaching remedy available under the anti-trust laws is the
civil motion in equity to decree the dissolution of a monopoly.
Although potentially powerful, the measure is vitiated, in practice,
by the general reluctance of courts to take what they regard as
extreme action to restructure an industry. As Neale makes
abundantly clear, "Neither in the Alcoa case nor in that of the
United Shoe Machinery Company would the courts accept, as a practical
( 55)
matter, the physical dissolution of the organisation concerned".
This reluctance is compounded by the practical problems involved
in ordering the dissolution of monopolies and, as Neale goes on to
point out, "In some cases the practical difficulties of dissolution
seem to have frustrated the search for effective remedies
(56 ^
altogether". The supreme reluctance of courts to take this
form of drastic action, except where the absolute necessity of such
a decree is overwhelmingly compelling and its execution practicable and
(55) Neale, A. (1966) ££ cit. p. k06.
(56) ibid, p. kOG.
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fair, is sustained by empirical evidence. For example, in over
sixty years of the Sherman Act only twenty four litigated cases
(57)
decreed divestiture or dissolution. Apart from this empirical
manifestation, the supreme reluctance betokens a dilemma close to
the heart of anti-trust law; a dilemma which Justice Hand joined
in enunciating in the Alcoa case of 19^5 that, ".. the Sherman Act
does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which
it is its prime object to foster: finis opus coronat. The
"(58)
successful competitor must not be turned upon when he wins.
Thus, as we have seen already, whilst the efficiency and dynamism
of large enterprises may be viewed with pride and applauded
accordingly, the power of unchecked monopoly is viewed with suspicion
and cynicism. Ambivalence of this magnitude is adequately
summarised thus, "To have the 'power condemned in the courts as
illegal, and its exercise beset by complex injunctions, while the
organisation itself remains intact, is a solution which reflects
(59)
this ambivalence of attitude pretty closely". Such ambivalence
reflects the basic irrelevance of criminal sanctions, especially
with regard to their essentially retrospective character and the
fact that even quite substantial financial penalties wither in
embarrassment beside the corporate budget. This fundamental
irrelevance contrasts markedly with the apparently all too relevant
civil remedy, in that decrees granting divestiture or dissolution
are almost too radical to even contemplate as a 'solution'. The
answer, to this evident discrepancy between criminal and civil
(57) See AGNCAT (1955) 0£ cit. p. 35^.
(58) 148F. 2d Vl6 (12).
(59) Neale, A. (1966) ojd cit. p. ^36.
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sanction, seems to be to embrace soone form of behaviour or conduct
modification whereby the courts decree detailed injunctions relating
to specific practices, a kind of prospectus of rights and duties
designed to regulate business conduct without changing the structure
of ownership which may inspire such conduct in the first place.
In this respect Neale makes the following remark, "In a sense the
real purpose of all that goes before the Court's decree - the
complaint and trial - is to obtain jurisdiction over the parties
for the purpose of regulating their business conduct". As
far as 'real' structural remedy goes, an interesting variant of
the 'prospectus' approach has recently been recycled by Ralf Nader,
to the effect that corporate charters should include specific
restraints on corporate conduct. Although, such solutions
have long been decried by the advocates of so called 'structural'
remedy (Kaysen, Turner) who seem to imply that one cannot 'instruct'
a corporation to throw off the market pressures which produce
monopoly situations. Finally, even in the rare cases where the
formal structure of legal ownership is altered by dissolution, the
actual structure of ownership may alter very little and the
relationships between the component parts of the former corporate
empire remain substantially similar. This much is admitted in
law by the inherent suspicion that even independent firms may in
fact conspire to produce what amounts to a monopoly situation.
It is further sustained in practice by the assessment of the famous
dissolution of Standard Oil in 1911. Despite being fragmented,
(60) Neale, A. (1966) ojd cit. p. 396.
(61) For a criticism of this approach see Stone, C. (1975) ojd cit.
although it is difficult to see how Stone's 'socially aware'
corporation would fare any better than one 'sewn up' by a
restrictive and prescriptive charter. See Nader, JR. et al
(eds.) (1976) 'Taming the Giant Corporation' New York, for the
original position.
233
the various 'independent' 'standard oils' continued to respect each
others marketing zones and acted in concert to suppress the
independents, at least until such time as new international conditions
provided even greater scope for monopoly and thus new arrangements
with 'competitors'.
The options open to law are considerably restricted. Even
supposing that the courts manage to overcome their supreme reluctance
to penalise enterprise, the efficacy of what appears to be an extreme
remedy, dissolution, is vitiated in the extreme. If, on the other
hand, the interrelationships between 'independent' corporations are
taken into account in assessing 'restraint of trade', then the
arsenal which is made available is substantially hampered by the
concepts of conspiracy, intent and private property. Either way,
the room for manoeuvre is blocked with the result that truly
effective legal regulation would appear to have been a dead letter.
Anti-trust legislation sets out two main sorts of sanction
namely, criminal and civil. Whilst both sorts of sanction point
to the centrality of legal process they, nonetheless, each index
quite different types of discipline. Whereas 'criminal' sanction
points up the centrality of punishment and of retrospective penalties
for specific transgression of statute law, 'civil' sanction forces
the issue of the appropriate remedy of restructuration, intervention,
injunction or private damages to the forefront. What they share in
common is some implicit conception of corporate relations. Criminal
sanction relies upon the feasibility of comprehending corporate
structure through the concepts of conspiracy, intent and private
property; concepts which reinforce the picture of the corporation
in terms of human subjects and individual authors. Therefore, the
application of monetary sanctions is designed to affect the behaviour
of the corporation in the same way that individuals are held to be
23^
deterred from re-offending. Accordingly, the corporation is
seen as a rational 'economic' actor, capable of calculating the
simple equation between profit and cost, pleasure and pain. As
Stone points out, "The underlying reasoning is pretty much the same
'bad bargain' analysis that we have brought forward from theorists
like Bentham, and have simply transferred from people to corporations
/ r q \
without reflection". Not only are such classical conceptions
of criminality suspect in themselves but, further, there is very
little warrant for supposing that the corporation would act in the
same way as an individual in any case. The 'behaviour' of corporations
is in no way reducible to individuals, so why should it behave as if
it were? Why should anti-trust legislation assume that the
corporation is a unified essential subject which can both experience
'sanctions' in the same way as individuals and, act upon that
negative experience, to modify its conduct in the way that individuals
are supposed to? The answers to these questions are exceedingly
pertinent, for they penetrate to the heart of the entire notion of
legal regulation and expose glaring faults.
Conversely, civil remedy assumes that to beset the corporation
with a host of complex injunctions, each referring to specific
practices from which the corporation must desist, means that the
relations which sustain and inspire such practices will modify
accordingly, if not immediately then in due course. If they do not,
and given that dissolution is practicable, then the courts have
recourse to the ultimate sanction. The courts are able to decree
some form of dissolution and thereby redraw the corporate boundary.
But, as we have seen, this may leave intact the interrelationships
(62) Stone, C. (1975) ££ cit. p. 36.
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between operating units together with the more or less ubiquitous
forms of calculation which may ensure parallel response.
Civil remedy is caught between dissolution and regulation
which reflects the very raarginality of law, able to intervene only
at the margins of formal ownership and openly exhibited conduct.
Criminal sanction is construed in terms of individual authors and
identifiable practices. This is confirmed in the parallel reluctance
to use the imprisonment clause provided in the Sherman Act. For
example, 'The very few cases in which jail sentences have been
imposed have mostly featured some special element of racketeering or
fraud which aroused moral indignation". Therefore, the law is
more concerned with attaching penalties to individual or corporate
authors than with effective regulation. To be sure, these monetary
sanctions may be more burdensome to the individual than to the
corporate subject, but they are not necessarily any the more effective
for regulating the structure of corporate interrelationships.
Particularly in view of the fact that corporations can find
ways of indemnifying its officers from all but the hard end of
criminal sanction and, even there, can find alternative ways of
're-imbursing' its officers. Even if these 'penalties' were
substantial, there is no guarantee that they would result in any
changed 'practices'. Finally, it is often argued that the real
value of anti-trust legislation lies not in what it does but in what
it does not. That is to say, in its capacity as a general
deterrent. It is argued that the abhorrence associated with the
stigma of criminal prosecution is such that it deters all but the
hard core of corporate criminals. As Wendell Berge argued,
(63) Neale, A. (1966) ££ cit. p. 39^«
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"The stigma of indictment tends to be the real punishment".
This is a little disingenuous given the relative attenuation of
criminal sanction and the marginality of the human subjects apparently
capable of espousing such feelings. Moreover, even if the
responsibility for corporate crime can be traced to readily
identifiable personnel within the corporation, this does not imply
that they or, more importantly for the 'stigma' argument, their
contemporaries, will actually perceive the 'offence' as 'real'
r-
crime to be viewed with genuine abhorrence. There is much evidence
to suggest that such an expectation is, at best, equivocal and,
at worst, wholly misleading.
Conclusion.
The purposes of this Chapter have been twofold. First of all,
to demonstrate that legal regulation and administrative agency are
both interventions of one 'form' with respect to another, economic,
'form'. This much is upheld in the constitutional separation of
powers enshrined in Anglo-American political domains. Law and
Economy are fundamentally distinct but, nonetheless, firmly
interrelated - contract, exchange and proprietal right, facilitate
and enable economic production. Therefore, the separation set
out as a cornerstone of bourgeois democracy is undermined from the
inside. But, more importantly, this initial separation accounts
for the attenuation of the legal/administrative review of corporate
relations. Thus, law is excluded from a realistic intervention
(64) Former Assistant Attorney General, Wendell Berge quoted in
AGNCAT (1955) 0£ cit. p. 353.
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in corporate forms of ownership because of the marginality imposed
upon it by the doctrine of separation. Accordingly, law is restricted
to the limited role of intervening in corporate affairs and,
consequently, reduced to policing what can only be described as the
margins of corporate crime. Secondly, the structure of 'legal'
ownership, and its reiteration in the respective concepts of company
law and anti-trust legislation, ensures that 'corporate' forms of
ownership escape the grasp of legal sanction. To be sure, the
escape is not unequivocal, but it is an escape which leaves imprisoned
the general relationships of ownership which characterise the
corporate 'economy', whilst redrawing the form of corporate
boundaries, sacrificing certain corporate personnel and perhaps
denting the corporate person a a little. This corporate
genuflection before the alter of legal regulation is far from just
a mere gesture. On the contrary, it is a real concession to
criminal sanction and civil remedy: the 'law' does have real
effects. Although, in the final analysis, insofar as anti-trust
legislation is concerned with the form of ownership, and given that
this remains substantially untouched by anti-trust action, then
anti-trust can only be adjudged a relative 'failure'. Precisely






Anti-trust legislation is commonly regarded with a certain
amount of dissatisfaction. Dissatisfaction with its utter failure
to do anything significant about the trusts; disgust because
agencies of regulation have become regulated agencies (chief
among the regulators being the very corporations that anti-trust was
designed to shift) and, distaste because agencies of regulation
have somehow spawned yet more agencies in a veritable orgy of
state control. This last sense bears witness to the contemporary
obsession with 'de-regulation', both in the U.S.A and, more recently,
in Great Britain. This dissatisfaction with anti-trust legislation
clearly references discrete sources of grievance, but they share in
common the tendency to discount the historical role played by the
anti-monopoly movement. It is almost as if the movement is
ignored in what has become the celebration of an American failure;
the counterpoint to the success story of business and enterprise.
Or, worse still, the movement is regarded as but a pawn in a ploy
by cynical plutocrats designed to fettle the opposition.
This Chapter aims to restore a certain authenticity to the
anti-monopoly movement and to describe the arterial network which
formed the basis for its construction. Thus, it is argued, the
anti-monopoly movement can best be analysed as a genuinely
independent movement irrespective of the particular 'fate' of
anti-trust legislation. On the contrary, this fate has its own
origins which do not concern the motives or the structure of the
anti-monopoly movement as such but, as it has been argued, refer
to the nature of law per se.
In Chapter One there was an implicit indication that the
anti-monopoly movement was both authentic and, in some respects,
even potent. This belief can be sustained by the demonstration of
distinct reasons for the failure of anti-trust legislation,
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reasons which relate to the structure of law per se rather than,
for example, to the omnipotence of big business. The construction
of specific reasons for the relative 'failure' of anti-trust
legislation to control monopoly relieves the anti-monopoly movement
and, to some extent, anti-trust legislation of any necessary status
as purely instrumental tools of big business or the capitalist class
in general. Therefore, the argument evinces a clear rejection of
any attempt to reduce anti-trust legislation to the abstract
requirements of capitalism or, again, of those tendencies which
seek to remove the arena of political tension and class conflict from
the agenda. Although Eschewing these tendencies does mean that the
issue of political struggle and strategy is forced to the surface.
It is necessary, therefore, to demonstrate the appropriate framework
which allows for the specificity of political strategy.
Political organisation.
There are a number of ways in which the specificity of political
practice may be realised. Two principal means of realising this
aim will be examined. In the first, largely associated with the
work of Louis Althusser, the role of the political is normally
granted a measure of autonomy, albeit within a context in which
the ultimate impotence of the 'political' is induced by the coming
of the last instance. For this perspective, the state somehow
ensures the 'final' coherence of ruling class interests and, in
this particular case, it manages to negate any residual hostility
toward 'monopoly' capital. The second, involves a discussion of
(1 )the recent work of Cutler et al. Here, the radical independence
(1) Cutler et al & Hirst, P. (1977) o£ cit. (1977 & 1978) o£ cit.
See also Hindess, B. (1978).
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of politics is ensured in a way which dissolves altogether the
privileged relation of political representation to 'economic'
interests. For example, there is no reason why political issues
need represent more basic 'economic' interests. Indeed, it is
argued further that the conditions which allow economic interests
(2)
to be theorised 'separately' entail unnacceptable consequences.
The concept of Relative Autonomy enshrined in the work of
Althusser depends upon the particular mechanism responsible for
ensuring 'relativity'. As we have seen, this mechanism appears
to collapse all too readily into the requirements of the last
instance and the coherence of the 'totality'. On the other hand,
'absolute' autonomy would seem to liberate politics altogether,
projecting interests into the realm of Social Democratic politics.
Because politics is genuinely autonomous, everything is possible.
It is almost as if the political manifesto carries the seeds of
its own fruition. Both of these positions entail unnacceptable
consequences, not least because of the way they pose the problem
in the first place. This particular conception is not restricted
to these two perspectives. For example, the problem of political
specificity is invariably seen in three basic ways. First of all,
in terms of a series of instances which are integrated, subsequently,
within a totality. Secondly, as a tripartite division of powers,
which are somehow fixed in splendid isolation and independence.
Finally, and in the interests of avoiding rampant idealism, as the
(2) Of course, there are other ways of rendering specificity to the
political. For example, the work of Max Weber represents
just such a tendency. The two accounts discussed here,
however, are of particular interest because they address the
problem of the interrelation of the 'political' and 'economic'
and, moreover, they do so in ways which are quite distinct.
The issue of the interrelation of 'political' and 'economic'
relations is a pertinent one for the reason that it is basic to
the existence of an anti-monopoly movement.
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political expression of formally separate economic interests.
Each of these perspectives involves the necessity of some mechanism
which explains the eventual co-incidence of initially or relatively
separate 'instances' of sociality. To the extent that this
mechanism is specified, it sets unnecessary obstacles to the conduct
of social inquiry and, to the degree that it is absent, sets new
standards in myopia. In opposition, it is argued here that the
concept of totality, the concept of the political representation
of economically derived interests and the intriguing possibility
of 'necessary' non-correspondence, each forestalls the 'proper'
solution to the complex problem of political specificity.
The task of this introductory section is to establish the
parameters which allow the anti-trust movement a substantial
measure of authenticity, on the basis of the existence of specific
(3)
reasons for the failure of the movement to achieve its objectives.
These reasons clearly involve the use of law as such. Thus, it is
argued, to state the eventual convergence of federal institutions
around the requirements of monopoly capital, or the 'needs' of
capitalism in general, even if it were true, would explain nothing
without recourse to some conception of an 'expressive' causality.
This conception upholds the sort of coherence provided by the concept
(3) It is quite true that anti-trust legislation does have its
defenders. For example, Rashid, B.J. (1960) 'What is Right
with Anti-trust', Anti-trust Bulletin, 5- There is,
however, a substantial body of opinion which points to its
complete failure, particularly during the period under
discussion, See Reagan, M.D. (19^3)- 'The Managed Economy',
New York; Arnold, T. (1937) ojd cit. and Pearce, F. (1976)
op cit. Furthermore, it will be argued, in due course,
that the anti-monopoly movement was directed at the corporate
form of business organisation which, by its very longevity,
signals a major setback to the realisation of the anti-monopoly
movements objectives. It is in this sense that the word
'failure' is used and the full sense of the word is not
mitigated by the mere inscription of anti-trust legislation upon
the Statute book.
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of a 'totality' and, also, re-inforces the co-incidence involved
in the reduction of political action to economic, and in this
case essentially capitalist, interests. Of course, there have
been many attempts to shake loose from the consequences of conceiving
the anti-trust movement thus. But these attempts are, sooner or
later, presented with a paradox. For example, to the extent that
one or other of these 'explanations' is seemingly rejected, then
the underlying account of the failure of anti-trust legislation
becomes meaningless. On the other hand, if they are retained,
then the consequences of such a retention involve an entirely
unnacceptable portrait of the social formation as a series of
levels linked by some form of expressive causality. The problems
involved in this sort of conception have been recorded elsewhere.
Furthermore, to talk specifically in terms of 'capital' as having
a goal or, 'capital' as being in some sense in control of the state,
is to misunderstand the nature of capital. For example, monopoly
capital is often held to control the state and, therefore, to limit
the effectivity of anti-trust legislation. But it is constantly
re-iterated, within political economy, that capital is not a thing
but rather a relation. More importantly, perhaps, it is a specific
type of social relation constituted through discrete forms of
calculation, strategic controls and enabling conditions. At the
very least, this realisation would appear to forestall the a priori
distribution of social space into economic and political instances,
production relations and social relations. In addition, it would
seem to generate the possibility of avoiding the reduction of
political positions to economically derived interests. Finally,
it would appear to render highly ambiguous the concept of the
control of the state apparatus by capital or, a fraction of capital,
for example, 'monopoly' capital.
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The argument is quite easily summarised. The concepts of
relative autonomy, non-correspondence and economism, are each
predicated upon a nominal or actual separation of instances and,
therefore, lead on, quite naturally, to an obsession with the sort
of relationship and priority which governs any subsequent communion.
As we have seen, in Chapter two, such issues are inherently
intractable.
Let us examine the problem in more detail. Once the problem
of anti-trust legislation is conceived in terms which suggest
'structural' relations, on one side, and 'phenomenal' effects,
on the other, then the twin problems of determinism and causality
appear on the agenda. The essentially spinozian concept of
structure implicit, albeit vehemently denied, in the work of Louis
Althusser, (the structure is present in its effects) avoids the
problem of specifying modes of causality, since everything is
subsumed under a special type of structural causality. But this
in no way absolves Althusser from a more fundamental criticism,
namely, the tension induced by arguing the centrality of what
amounts to a determinative principle, and the forms of historicism
and essentialism implied therein, at the same time as he maintains
a rigorous polemic against all forms of economism, historicism and
idealism. Alternatively, Cutler _ej: al would argue for the radical
separation of determinate relations of production and their
conditions of existence, which re-introduces the problem of
determinism but for which they fail to specify any sort of solution.
Where their position does entail some indication of the mechanism
involved in connecting conditions of existence to determinate
relations of production, it seems to hinge upon the fact that
determinate relations of production 'possess' conditions of
existence. These conditions of existence are uniquely 'theirs'.
As we have seen, in Chapter two, this involves an exceedingly
formal type of functionalist explanation. Exactly how this
solution, which remains implicit in their work, accords with the
simultaneous denial of all forms of causality is not entirely
clear. This is especially confusing since the denial of causality
seems to depend upon the twin problems of causal agency and the
cleavage of social space into instances.
On the other hand, if political actors are granted a measure
of independence - they are not simply reduced to the immanence of
the structure in its effects and are analysed in terms of their
representation of the 'interests' of big business, farmers or
entrepreneurs - then the problems inherent in the concept of
'interests' and, the issue of what it is that they 'represent',
became crucial. For example, to state that a political position,
platform party or argument is in the interests of big business is
to specify those interests independently of the means of their
representation, to locate an abstract arena where the interests
of big business can be crystallised quite unambiguously. The
actual course of politics can then be measured against this
abstract spectrum. But, as Hirst makes clear, in the absence of
any attempt to account for the 'distortion' or 'non-representation'
of fundamental class interests the analysis is short circuited and,
once again, politics becomes the more or less direct expression of
(if)
basic class interests. Both the concept of totality, and that
of 'interests', appear to grant a measure of autonomy to the
political but, as we have seen, inserting that 'autonomy' into a
coherent social formation or, constantly referring it back to more
(*f) See Hirst, P. (1977) ££ cit
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basic and, therefore, more real class interests or potentialities,
produces one of two results: either the concept is made redundant
and once again politics reflects economic forces directly or, the
distortion is entirely accidental and, therefore, beyond analysis.
At the very least this is surely an inadequate basis on which to
conduct an examination of what will be argued is the specificity
of political action and the specificity of the anti-monopoly
movement.
The problem is by no means exhausted by these two particular
attempts to render a solution to the problem of political authenticity.
Even if the concept of an expressive totality, and the notion of
interests and their representation in politics, are rejected, the
manner in which the problem is posed reduces, still further, the
likelihood of a proper solution. For example, to state that
monopoly capital has certain requirements and that these requirements
are represented in particular forms of political action, even if
such representation or reproduction is imperfect, qualified or
independently determined, is to indicate an underlying motor of
history, which allows monopoly capital to be the fundamental
dynamic of historical change, and a functional correspondence
between phenomenon and essence, politics and interests, which
enables those requirements to be met. Both Hindess and Hirst,
quite clearly reject the concept of 'interests' as representations
of svengali like forces and they, therefore, refuse the necessity
of any correspondence. But, for all that, the concept of
determinate relations of production, their conditions of existence
and the means and practices which achieve them cannot, at least
on the face of it, avoid specifying a functional relation, between
'production' and its conditions of existence and, a contingent
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connection, between political practice and 'conditions' of
existence. Nevertheless, they both assert the radical autonomy
of political practice and, hence, the possibility of addressing
political movements and strategies in their specificity, rather
than in their capacity as manifestations of a more basic essence.
In asserting such autonomy, however, they allow for the possibility,
even the necessity, of some form of their general interconnection.
In this sense it seems quite inevitable that there is some prior
allocation of social space involved. But the warrant for such a
division appears to be arbitrarily decided and, as we have seen,
presents problems which are perhaps unnecessary.
Each of these various renditions of the 'relative autonomy'
of political practice depends upon an implicit concept of class.
To be sure, the concept exhibits considerable internal variation,
but the concept as such occupies a privileged position. For
example, the concept of class may be used to secure a positive
relation between political representation and economic interests.
Or else the concept may be more of a vision, an ultimate reference
point for and a proximate site of, a whole host of intersecting,
relatively autonomous determinations. Witness the way in which
the class struggle is often invoked to account for particular
discrepancies. But, as Poulantzas & Althusser have made abundantly
clear there are no social classes prior to their opposition in
struggle, classes do not exist first and foremost and only then
join in struggle. Classes can only be identified in the process
of struggle and, more importantly, only come into existence in
forms of struggle and conflict. Therefore, struggle would appear
to assume a certain priority over classes and the associated problem
of prior or structural determination. Hence the elegant, albeit
excessively formal, typologies of class determination produced by
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(5)
Erik Olin Wright, are essentially secondary problems.
Accordingly, the actual forms of struggle, conflict, tensions,
strategies, political articulations, issues and arguments, are
of paramount importance and are not just secondary to some real
arena of class struggle situated within structural parameters or
on the terrain of history. In short, attention cannot centre on
an essential theatre of class struggle demarcated by orthodox
Marxism, of which particular issues are but phenomenal manifestations,
without in turn heralding the relative denegation of particular
political strategies. To assert the specificity of political
struggles in such a context as this is an essentially stillborn
enterprise which, at the very least, forestalls a proper analysis
of the anti-monopoly movement.
In terms of the analysis of anti-trust law the foregoing
argument has a number of highly specific consequences. For
example, the anti-trust 'movement' can be viewed, on this basis,
as a particular articulation of discrete forms of 'political'
practice comprising distinct organisational forms and definite
structurations of 'political' issues quite irreducible to the
crystallisation of interests condensed in the wholly abstract
domain of 'class struggle' or, to the requirements of specific
fractions of capital or, to the functional necessities of
determinate relations of production. Of course, a number of
issues remain unresolved by this form of argument namely; what
is the relation between the apparently 'real' adjustment of the
form of ownership and the forms of political opposition/defence
entailed in the anti-trust movement? If there is a genuine
(5) Wright, E.O. (1978) 'Class, Crisis and the State', London:
N.L.B.
independence of 'polities' from 'pure' class positions and
interests, a genuine liberation of the political from the
artificial insemination by the economic instance, then, a radical
separation is entailed along the lines advocated by Cutler _et al,
with all the attendant difficulties thereof. But, if the
specification of instances is dissolved on the basis that there is no
distinction between political and economic instances, merely
organisational complexes which defy classification as economic/
political items, then the question of representation is made
redundant. Everything is 'determined' by their essential
organisation as social relations per se; the anti-monopoly
movement is inseparable from laisser-faire Capitalism and
Entrepreneurial forms of ownership, with the result that laisser-
faire capital re-appears in person on the 'political' stage.
Given the form of the critique employed here, this solution is
clearly unnacceptable, although it is by no means certain that
it is the inevitable conclusion to the radical dissolution of
instances. Let us consider the position espoused by Cutler
et al: there are determinate relations of production, these have
specific conditions of existence which are secured by distinct
forms of political and social practice. The first point is why
must determinate relations of production assume priority over their
conditions of existence and their ensuing relation assume a functional
form? No doubt the answer is that materialism necessarily implies
some form of priority for relations of production, although as we
have seen, such a conception of the relations of production is
unnecessarily restrictive, which leads on to the second point.
Why distribute social relations into determinate and conditional
relations, especially in view of the radical denial of the validity
of distributing social space which underlies the rejection of
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instances and the criticism of general doctrines of causality?
Surely the logical outcome would be a seamless web in which causal
priority is denied, rather than a surrogate form of conditional
and determinative ' instances1 .
The present argument is conducted in terms of taking further
the concept of radical discontinuity whilst, at the same time,
recognising the more fundamental and particular continuities which
characterise all forms of sociality. Since it is impossible, for
a genuinely social analysis, to separate instances, items and forms
without a_t some stage re-introducing a general means for their
subsequent interrelation, then, a truly radical separation of forms,
or the assertion of political specificity, is only possible on the
basis of a completely different form of continuity. Discontinuity
presupposes continuity and it is, therefore, a question of what
sort of continuity characterises social relations. Thus, to state
the specific convergence between the social form of ownership, a
particular strategy of political organisation, a series of
constitutional premises and so on and, the construction of a political
platform of anti-monopoly politics, is very different from countenancing
a general relationship between class determination, real or potential
interests, and their political expression; a long way from reading
off political positions from class or economic locations. In short,
there are a whole series of contingencies which comprise the anti¬
trust movement. There is a complex network of social relations,
law, forms of calculation and technical criteria which govern the
'existence' of laisser-faire 'capitalism' and, therefore, the basis
(6) Wright, E.O. (1979) 'The Value Controversy and Social Research',
N.L.R. 116, p. 72.
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of anti-monopolism; a whole series of socio-cultural residues
which cannot be adequately comprehended by the distribution of
sociality into determinate and conditional relations.
A number of objections may be made to this sort of argument
not least because it appears to be a form of pluralism. Whilst
there may be a plurality of 'contingencies', the one element
crucial to a definition of pluralism namely, the demarcation of a
given social item, the state, from the range of forces which
influence it, is quite definitely absent. Accordingly, the
tendency to drift into a general theory of multiple-causality or
a concept of political plasticity is muted. At the very least
the conception of the state as but a special type of organisation
of social relations would prevent the state from being regarded as
an instance with the capacity to condense separate and politically
diverse interests. Likewise, the companion charge of historicism
or essentialism would also be misplaced. In the absence of any
fundamental, unifying or determinative principle earmarked by a
spirit, epoch or totality which forces its imprint on all social
relations it seems difficult to envisage how such a charge could be
sustained.
It is perhaps inevitable that the argument has, so far, remained
rather defensive. It is possible, however, to assert the analysis
more forcefully. It was argued in Chapter IV that each of the
relations of ownership contains a fundamental tension or conflict,
it is this tension which characterises the dynamic of the relations
of ownership and their capacity to change. Thus, 'title' is
governed by a persistent tension between sale/income and between
'corporate' and 'stockholder' claims; 'possession' is gripped by
a struggle over the conditions of the labour process, strategies
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and counter-strategies are evolved as problems of organisation,
research is undertaken, innovation countenanced and various human
relations and organisation theories invoked, stimulated and
commissioned as practical and theoretical responses to problems
generated by the tension inherent in the relation of possession/
exclusion; 'control' is engrossed by larger issues of national/
international climate. All three relations are articulated
together in a complex, wholly interactive manner and, as such,
define the (corporate) form of ownership. The determination of
particular classes is not the primary aim; that tension and conflict
exist can be stated independently of specifying the class location
of the 'supports' of such struggle. Thus, the general relation,
ownership of/separation from, replicated in discrete ways in each
relation of ownership, describes the source of a fundamental conflict
without requiring the actual presence of wholly unambiguous classes
at each and every point. The primary reference is to elements of
struggle, rather than to completely formed historical agents each
embodying some pure class position diametrically opposed to, and
inextricably set upon a collision course with, another pure class
location. The fundamental problem is not really resolved by a
resort to contradictory class locations, which serves only to
demonstrate the facility with which basic categories admix themselves
(7)
in ever more infinite permutations. The position argued here
suggests that it is necessary to dissolve the trajectory of an
essentialist form of class struggle in order to realise the particular
character of 'regional' struggles, tensions and conflicts.
Accordingly, 'interests' are defined, not as quasi-automatic
(7) For example see Olin Wright, E. (1978) ojo cit.
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reflections of neo-class positions but, in terms of organisational
forms and strategies constituted in the very interstices of ownership.
For example, this procedure bears directly upon the notion of whether
there exists a distinct managerial elite unified by a series of
interests which separate managers, as a distinct class, from the
narrower range of 'capitalist' interests. As Hindess & Hirst
respectively point out, it is not so much an issue of groups,
positions and classes but rather, strategies, political sediments
and legal residues. In short, it is unnecessary to identify
'interests' and, therefore, authors of such interests, since it is
quite sufficient to locate political forces and arguments in as much
as they are constructed through definite forms of political practice
and organisational strategy.
It is not so much that 'ownership' is real, and that legal
and ideological forms are predicated upon, or indeed lag behind,
that prior reality but rather, that the relations of ownership are
inextricably tied up with so called 'ideological' frames and
decision making parameters, which in part constitute those relations.
But this is no structural determination of class position or an
economistic derivation of ideology, state and law since (i) the form
of ownership is not a structure, nor is it yet a totality, still
less is it a constellation of positions, and (ii) ideology, law
and state are not conditions of ownership, nor are they reflections
of ownership, they are quite simply mutually implicated in forms of
ownership. The form of ownership is defined by the organisational
strategies and relations which do not necessarily form a unity, and,
therefore, cannot be reduced to an essential principle of ownership/
separation, nor can they be fixed as a static, functional complex.
But neither are they radically distinct in the sense of being
assigned a priori to particular social destinations - the economic,
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the political, the legal - such that their autonomy becomes
problematic and ultimately reduces to some concept of overall or
final convergence. This may be a hard option but, since relative
autonomy is ultimately meaningless and radical autonomy virtually
impossible, there is no alternative but to consider ways in which
specific discontinuities are rendered in a general context of
continuity. To be sure, the danger of conflation applies an
important brake to this conception and, whilst it is quite true
that such an argument provides no prior grounds for distinguishing
levels, or types of social relations, the organisational relations
are, nevertheless, discrete 'orders'. But they are not discrete
in a way which draws rationalist cleavages between 'real' adjuncts
of academic disciplines; law and economics, or which assign certain
types of sociality to discrete levels of the social formation.
In a word this argument is perhaps the logical outcome of a
systematic denial of epistemology and hence of the relation between
existence and discourse, (Hindess 8c Hirst) and the result of an
attempt to take seriously the notion of structuration (Giddens) as
/ O \
an alternative to structure.
Anti-monopolism.
It is now possible to confront the components of what may be
termed anti-monopolism. Whilst falling considerably short of
prescribing free competition and enjoining business to compete
under the threat of injunction or criminal sanction, the federal
anti-trust laws are, nonetheless, inextricably bound up with a
particular set of social arrangements based on the theme of free
(8) Giddens, A. (1979) 'Central Problems in Social Theory',
London: Macmillan.
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competition and laisser-faire capitalism. The 'connection'is
forged in at least two particular ways: not only does the Sherman
Act fail to make any sense outside of a context which records an
implicit faith in some sort of free enterprise system, but the
central protagonists on the 'political' stage and, the 'final'
assessment of anti-trust law, can only be regarded in the interstices
of two general 'types' of social arrangements. For example, to
talk of monopoly points inevitably to a distinct type of ownership
in which a substantial proportion of any local, national, or
international market is brought under the auspices of a common
organisational complex. Whether the components of a corporation
are formally separate or organisationally uniform, the very fact
that a company has a monopoly means that the form of control is
distinct from that entailed under free competition and that the
relations of ownership are different in consequence. These two
general sets of social arrangements define the parameters for the
anti-trust movement and anti-trust law respectively.
Although the fundamental provisions of anti-trust law have
considerable common law precedents/antecedents dating back to 17th
Century English law, these provisions only become all the more
opaque when viewed as the systematic outcome of a process of
rationalisation and legal change, or as the advance which signals
the essential mutability of law in the wake of complex industrial
(9)and social change. For this sort of perspective, law is
counterposed to other forms of sociality as an item governed by an
internal dynamic of advance, rupture or response to external
exigencies, rather than being looked at as a complex element fully
(9) For a detailed account of the genesis of anti-trust legislation
see ThorelH, H. (195*0 ££ cit.
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'integral' to the organisation of social relationships. For the
present, anti-trust law is not seen primarily as a rational
administrative response to the erosion of enterprise by a wholly
alien and apparently spontaneous outburst of monopolisation or
merger mania, but is instead viewed as a strategy undertaken as
a challenge to a particular sort of social organisation which
involves, as a matter of course, a defence of certain sets of social
relations. That the strategy was authentic and sincere is very far
from implying that it was necessarily successful or that it echoed
some basic revolutionary chord in the class struggle. Of course,
this procedure necessarily points to some form of 'class struggle',
but it is far from being the sort of original class struggle which
maps out all social relations or which provides the motor of
history; far from the struggle between classes which at once
characterises the totality which in turn structures class position
and thence, in true circularity, class struggle. On the contrary,
it is viewed in terms of a highly specific strategy which involves
the tensions and contradictions engendered by the form of 'ownership'
and the form of organisation of social relations.
A cautionary note should be sounded in relation to the
substance of this Chapter. An argument such as the one presented
here depends upon the precise determination of what happened in the
run up to the Sherman Act of 1890. Otherwise there is an equally
powerful argument to the effect that anti-trust legislation was the
result of an entirely cynical manipulation of concessions formulated
and granted at the conscious level by political leaders or
hypothesised as entirely responsive to the interests of the ruling
class or big business. There is, however, a sense in which 'what
happened' is beyond us. The empiricist denegation of the past as
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non-existent, and history as thereby impossible, carries considerable
weight, particularly in view of the historians reliance on empirical
materials - accounts, reconstructed events and so on - materials
which are publicly contestible but, nonetheless, 'empirical'
artefacts. The analysis must hinge upon something other than
the actuality of historical evidence. In the absence of absolute
guarantees concerning the past, whether sustained by Rationalist
or empiricist forms of discourse, attention must turn to other
\ ,
sorts of requirement. For example, Poppers assert"o.n that elegance
may, under certain circumstances, stand as a criterion of 'scientific'
acceptability or, E.P. Thompson's insistence, on the unique quality
of 'historical logic' would at least appear to allow for alternative
'guarantees* of scientificity.^^^ What is clear is that history
can in no sense provide an independent crucible wherein the competing
claims of historical interpretation can be resolved. On the
contrary, historical explanation of this kind touches the very
core constituents of any social theory - what kind of social
portrait does a particular 'historical' explanation imply, what
are the implications for social analysis entailed therein? These
are the sorts of issues which separate out competing interpretations
of the anti-trust movement. Not a claim to absolute truth, nor
even to relative acceptability or to purity of purpose, but to
the consequences and coherence of social theory entailed in any
analysis of anti-trust law, legal regulation and control.
The orthodox liberal historians view of anti-trust, gently
satirised by Hofstadter and pedalled more or less intact by
Pearce, unfolds as follows. "In 1890, as a largely meaningless
(10) See Thompson, E.P. (1978) 'The Poverty of Theory' p. 230 - 232.
London: Merlin, and Popper, K. (l968)'The Logic of Scientific
Discovery' 2nd ed. London.
257
and cynical gesture to appease public sentiment, an ultra-
(11)
conservative Congress passed the Sherman Anti-trust Act".
The gesture was so vague as to be almost unintelligible and
neglected to such a degree that it became dormant, if not actually
impotent. Far from controlling combinations in pursuance of
monopoly power, the law was used to far greater effect in hounding
labour unions; a reversal of 'intent' later consolidated during the
1920's when the Federal Trade Commission was 'turned', from an
agency designed to control business, to an agency dominated by
business interests. Whilst Hofstadter, refrains from suggesting
that such a portrait is entirely false, he, nonetheless, concludes
that it is substantially misleading, largely because it tends to
discount the .. "honest if ineffectual concern with the problems
of size and monopoly, and genuine doubts about the proper means
(12)
of solving them". The liberal view of anti-trust portrayed
here stems, in part, from telescoping the undoubted 'failure' of
anti-trust law to such an extent that it overlaps and, ultimately,
discounts the validity of the anti-monopoly movement altogether.
Accordingly, the anti-monopoly movement is considered only insofar
as it presents the necessity of being assuaged, sold out to, or
manipulated by, cynical plutocrats. It will be readily apparent
that the logical result of this reduction is the anti-monopoly
movement is denied any organisational integrity what so ever.
Over and against the liberal-historians view portrayed above,
the thesis advanced here is really very simple. There are specific
(11) Hofstadter, R. (1967) 'What Happened to the Anti-trust Movement'?
in 'The Paranoid Style in American Politics and Other Essays',
New York: Vintage, p. 190«
(12) ibid, pp. 191/2.
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reasons which account for the failure of anti-monopoly law,
reasons which belong to the structure of law and the manner in
which law conventionally addresses the corporate form of enterprise.
These reasons more than account for the 'failure' of anti-trust
law without having recourse to a conspiracy view of history or to
a conception of an omniscient plutocracy; the specific failings
of each of these accounts have been recorded in Chapter one.
Moreover, in the final analysis, a theory of plutocratic omniscience
can only gain credence through a cynical disregard or distortion
of the organisational basis of 'anti-monopolism'.
The present Chapter attempts to give expression to the
organisational basis of anti-monopolism. The intention is not
so much to guage the extent of anti-monopoly feeling, nor the
somewhat intangible relation between popular sentiment and
legislative activity, but rather to record the rudimentary nexus
which sustained anti-monopolism in the first place. The
organisational nexus is important for the reason that political
sentiment should not be viewed as an automatic reflex of productive
status but instead, as something which requires specific means for
its articulation. Therefore, it is quite insufficient to point
to the relative disadvantage of certain economic groups in relation
to, and largely as a result of, the growth of the corporate economy,
and thence to infer the inevitable tide of anti-monopolism. On
the contrary, sentiment of this character requires substantial
organisation, since it doesn't simply issue forth from the underlying
dislocation of economic forces. This much should not be taken as
a denial of any link between 'economic' organisation and 'political'
action, merely that the link, if link is an appropriate word, is
forged in a very special manner. Thus, the heart of the matter
is the organisation of 'so called' 'economic activity' and the
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struggle to preserve one set of social arrangements over another.
The form of organisation of ownership and the organisation of anti-
monopolism are, in this sense, inseparable - since they each depend
upon the other - with the result that the concept of'representation'
is hardly a relevant method with which to grasp the phenomenon of
anti-monopolism. Accordingly, the organisation of ownership and
the organisation of anti-monopolism are continuous, not in the sense
that 'pressure groups' are held to be continuous with 'economic'
groups and thus to represent their interests, but in the sense that
the arrangements entailed under one form of ownership and the
positions articulated or generated within a particular type of
'political' organisation are inseparable as types of social
relations. In a word, the organised defence of 'entrepreneurial
ownership' is a necessary part of the continued existence of that
form of ownership, which is not to say that such a defence is
secured automatically by the form of ownership merely that, for
analytical purposes, the two cannot be separated out because they
are 'continuous'.
What then is the organisational basis of anti-monopoly
politics? The roots of organised anti-monopolism are to be
found in the agrarian campaigns of the late nineteenth century
and, in particular, those directed against the railroads. For
example, the Granger movement of the 1870's resulted, albeit
indirectly, in the Granger laws designed to regulate the railroads.
The importance of agrarian discontent is usually registered in a
curiously abstract way as a generalised discontent with the economic
and political changes of the late nineteenth century. Thus, it
is often argued that, whilst these campaigns focused upon the
specific inadequacies of the rate rebate system or the currency
issue, these deficiencies were less important than the basic
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(13)
•immorality of the system as a whole'. Without in any way
wishing to deny the force of this disgruntled reaction it must
be stressed, however, that anti-monopolism was not .just a generalised
response to a shift in the principles of democratic government or,
to a perceived interruption of the American Dream, still less was
it purely a spontaneous outburst of popular sentiment. On the
contrary, anti-monopolism contained exceedingly specific points
of reference and particular grievances and, moreover, a distinct
organisational structure. As Thorelli indicates "Opposition to
the malpractices of transportation agencies and other 'natural
monopolies' was always a significant part of the anti-monopoly
movement in post-bellum years; in fact, until at least 1880 the
outcry against the railroads constituted the core of that movement.
Short-term exorbitance and flagrant discriminations of many
varieties formed the focus of opposition to the railroads. Only
secondarily were the farmers of the West and South, the Grangers,
the independent, Reform and Anti-monopoly parties antagonised by
(12+)
the forms of railroad organisation". It is true to say,
however, that these particular grievances did engage more
fundamental issues, in the sense that the deficiencies of the
rate rebate system, for example, were inseparable from the issue
of monopoly per se and, therefore, the form of organisation
involved in their perpetration. But it is not the case that
these specific grievances were but manifestations of some more
basic morality play or, that the form of organisation was simply
a secondary consideration. The relationship between actual
grievances and more abstract issues is far more profound than is
(13) Miller, G.H. (1971) 'Railroads and the Granger Laws', London:
University of Wisconsin Press, p. 162.
(1^) Thorelli, H. (195^) ££ cit. pp. 568/9.
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credited by either Miller or Thorelli involving, as it does, the
implication of so called 'abstract' issues in the actual formulation
and even identification of grievances.
The importance of organisation in this respect is vital but it
is a consideration which is all too easily forgotten. For example,
Hofstadter remarks that, ".. it is too little realised that the
farmers, who were quite impotent as a special interest when they
were numerous, competing, and unorganised, grew stronger as they
grew relatively fewer, became more concerted, more tenaciously
(15)
organised and self centred". This is indeed a compelling
indication of the limitations involved in reducing political
influence to numerical stxengtA. and, a persuasive indictment of
the contraction of politics to the mere expression of economic
position.
The organisation of anti-monopoly politics was by no means clear
cut. Indeed the organisation of 'the anti-monopoly movement, in
defence of what amounts to the right to remain unorganised, contains
an apparent paradox. Whilst it is quite true that the process of
organisation in defence of individual enterprise against the
encroachment of opportunity by organised conglomerates of wealth
engendered tensions within anti-monopolism this did not, however,
detract from the importance of organisation to the anti-monopoly
movement. What these tensions did affect is the particular
organisational objectives and, more importantly, the choice of
legalistic remedies designed more to enable competition than to
interfere with free choice.
It is perhaps a commonplace to assert that the organisation of
(15) Hofstadter, R. (1955) 'The Age of Reform', New York: Vintage,
P. 7/8.
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political movements can only take place according to a set of more
or less explicit premises and on the basis of a series of ideological/
cultural conditions. It is these conditions and premises which
provide a clue as to the unique thread which joins entrepreneurial
endeavour and political democracy in a seemingly unbreakable weave.
The link, once forged, proves an exceedingly versatile and inclusive
tool in the construction of anti-monopolism as an organised movement.
What, then, are these premises and conditions? In terms of the
agrarian movement, undoubtedly the most important premise concerns
the physical possession and use of land as a necessary and sufficient
condition of valid ownership, legal title and property right. This
commonwealth of land owning producers can then be protected by a
form of minimalist state given over to sanctifying and guaranteeing
the rights of separate producers. These components go to make up
what Hofstadter entitles the Agrarian Myth, according to which
Americans pay homage to the 'fancied innocence of their origins'.
Its importance for us stems from the common vocabulary which the
myth spells out, enabling a variety of disparate groups to coalesce
in organised anti-monopolism. Furthermore, the consensual quality
of the vocabulary of the agrarian myth denotes an important convergence
between the exigencies of organising anti-monopolism and the essential
features of entrepreneurial ownership - since they both depend upon
the same cultural artefacts. Therefore, it is this co-incidence
of structural features which heralds the form of ownership as an
organising principle of anti-monopolism, rather than any clear cut
relationship based on the 'interests' of the victims of economic
disruption.
It has been indicated already that anti-trust legislation presents
a certain paradox with regard to the regulation of free enterprise.
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Likewise, the central place accorded to the collective organisation
of anti-monopolism would appear to be at variance with its avowed
intention; the preservation of individual entrepreneurs.
It might be expected, also, that the position of the farmer,
within the anti-monopoly movement, is not exactly unambiguous,
poised as he is between the dignity of labour, on the one hand, and
the claims of independent ownership, on the other. Indeed, Hofstadter
goes as far as to argue that the character of the American farmer
evinced a dual structure, espousing at one and the same time solid
entrepreneurial values embracing opportunity, progress, profit and
commercial values and a form of agrarian radicalism, which vented
his yeoman inheritance, betokening a solidarity with labour rather
than capital. Far from manifesting a fundamental contradiction,
this dual aspect of agrarian 'character' demonstrates what Hofstadter,
in another context, called the co-existence of reform and reaction in
American politics; the fact that anti-monopolism was organised
around entrepreneurial or conservative principles against the
encroachment of opportunity by big business. It is deeply
significant, therefore, that the opposition to big business was based
upon the idea of a privileged relationship between entrepreneurial
endeavour and political democracy. As a political faith this
relationship was useful in combining diverse political organisations
and, as an organisational principle, it demonstrated the cleavage
between entrepreneurial and corporate forms of ownership. In
addition, anti-monopolism demonstrated the profound co-incidence
between political organisation and the form of ownership. Thus
the growth of land speculation in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, unrelieved by the Homestead Act and facilitated by
unrestricted entry until 1888, indicated a fundamental change in
the form of ownership.
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The Absentee-owner of land displaced the yeoman farmer as the
prototype of agrarian America and the pattern of tenancy, entailed
in absentee ownership, was consolidated accordingly. The Farmers
Alliance and, more especially, the Populist movement can, then, be
seen as organised expressions of the principles of entrepreneurial
ownership and, therefore, a direct defence of its actual structure.
For Hofstadter at least, the Populist movement was but another
episode in the well established tradition of American entrepreneurial
radicalism", an expression which well sums up the organisational
principles of anti-monopolism.
The importance of Populism for the anti-monopoly movement lay
principally in the way that Populism sustained the idea of a single
all important struggle, between the allied hosts of monopolies, the
money power, great trusts and railroad corporations, in one corner,
and the farmers, labourers and merchants, who produced wealth and
paid their taxes, in the other. The struggle was viewed as fierce,
the stakes as high and, above all, the contest as one which admitted
of no middle way. Thus anti-monopolism was clearly defined as the
opposition in American society and the price of failure as absolute
despotism and/or the end of civilisation. The link between routing
the plutocrats and the preservation of democratic freedom could
scarcely have been made any stronger; a factor which perhaps accounts
for the inclusive character of Populism. As we have seen already,
this particular link has always been regarded as an essential feature
of anti-trust legislation. For example, the Attorney General's
Committee stated that "Anti-trust is a distinctive American means
for assuring the competitive economy on which our political and social
(16) Hofstadter, R. (1955) ££ cit. p. 58.
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(17)
freedom under representative government in part depend". The
inclusive appeal of this sentiment, for Populism, was further
reinforced by the unique crystallising power of the merest suspicion
of conspiracy. Whether the locus of the conspiracy is alcohol,
Communism or big business, it has always received its fair share of
heated invective. Indeed, the corporate conspiracy was deemed to
be so omnipotent that the farmers alliances, initially distrustful
of all forms of government regulation, eventually countenanced
almost any federal measure that would shift the 'balance' away from
the 'corporate' economy. Even where such measures appeared to
contradict fundamental principles of laisser-faire society, they
seemed admissible given the deep cleavage riven by the polarisation
of corporate and anti-corporate organisation. Whereas the Granger
movement or rather the Granger laws of the 1870's, limited intervention
to state level, the Alliance movement of the 1880's effectively
paved the way for federal regulation and control of the corporate
economy. As a result, the mere fact of federal action against the
trusts was by no means as contradictory as it may seem to some
contemporary observers. Although it must be reiterated that in this
respect the Granger movement vested little faith in the idea of
regulation per se. As Miller makes clear the farmer, "... showed
little confidence in legislative control and continued to look to
£ompeti_tion from waterways and more railways for a solution to some
of his problems. The state and law, the farmer believed, were too
easily perverted into instruments of advantage for the commercial
classes".A disquiet which was echoed in the very failure of
(17) AGNCAT o£ cit. p. 2.
(18) Miller, G. (1971) ££ cit. p. 162.
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the Granger laws to achieve their, admittedly limited, objectives.
What this line of thinking demonstrates very clearly is the need
to account for the resort to the legal regulation of monopolies or
railroads since the actuality of legal regulation cannot be induced
from the prevalence of a public clamour for a distinctly legal form
of regulation. If for no other reason than because the clamour was
not so much for legal regulation as for political and social
annihilation. At the same time though, Miller does argue that the
railroads preferred to make their stand in the federal courts for a
number of reasons. In the first place, the companies seriously
doubted the impartiality of the state courts, and it is true that
(ig)these courts were highly responsive to popular pressures".
An idea which has been recycled by Pearce in the sense that local
political organisation threatened the railroads in a way in which
federal regulation could not and which would appear to indicate
preference for the least inneffectual of two equally inneffective
remedies.
The various agrarian organisations were by no means the sole
basis of the anti-monopoly movement. Indeed, it was characteristic
of the Populist movement in general that an organisational nexus was
formulated which embraced a diverse range of 'causes'. Not least
important of these alliances was that between 'yeoman' and 'labourer',
agrarian and proletarian organisation. Thus, 'rural' and 'civic'
labour were equivalent forms for the Populist movement engaging,
as it did, both the Knights of Labor and the Farmers alliance.
That these groups later diverged, labour toward more collectivist
programmes under the aegis of the American Federation of Labour
from 1886 onwards, and the farmers to commercial and even corporate
(19) Miller, G. (1971) ojd cit. p. 175-
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forms of organisation, does not in any way belie the potency of the
alliance at the time. In this respect Millis & Montgomery make it
clear that the demands of organised labour before the first world
war were .. "of an individualistic, anti-monopoly, personal rights,
uplift character rather than protection of the job and security of
tenure". Again, Thorelli appears to suggest that this anti-
monopolism was perhaps a result of the effective separation of labour
(21)
from the possession and control of its conditions of production.
Notwithstanding the apparent ease with which anti-monopoly sentiment
emerged, the task involved in uniting these various groups under one
umbrella should not be underestimated. In this respect the professional
experience of the Populist leadership, albeit much of it an experience
of failure, is a significant example of the organised structure of
(22)
'Populism'. Likewise, the pre-eminence of merchants and
business men, rather than farmers per se, in the reform movement of
the 1870's perhaps highlights the importance of the organisation of
'interests' rather than their simple transmission from economic
(23)
position to legislative outcome. The fact that the farmers were
organised on a different and more self consciously commercial basis
by 1919} when the Farm Bureau Federation was founded or, that the
farmers themselves began to fall afoul of the anti-trust laws,
(20) Quoted in Thorelli, H. (195^) ££ cit. p. 1^7.
(21) Thorelli, H. (195^) o£ cit. p. 150.
(22) Hofstadter, R. (1967) ££ cit. details the previous involvement
of the Populist leadership in a succession of 'lost causes'.
(23) Miller, G.H. (1971) op cit.
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that is until their partial exemption along with labour organisations
under the Clayton Act in 191^, in no way detracts from their vital
and radical role in the latter half of the nineteenth century.
Furthermore, and this is possibly the basic point, welding together
seemingly diverse causes into a coherent movement, characterised
above all by a deeply held consensus against the trusts, could
scarcely have been achieved spontaneously.
In addition to organised labour and agrarian groups, the place
of small and medium sized business should not be ignored. After
all, these firms expressed the prototype of laisser-faire enterprise
and, as such, could be expected to be in the forefront of anti-
monopolist organisation. Even an apparent reluctance on behalf of
businessmen to engage in an organised defence of free market forces
does not detract from the role of enterprise in anti-monopolism.
Of course, this reluctance would be irrelevant in any case given
the priority of organisation over sentiment. In this respect the
role of the Sovereigns of Industry cannot be overestimated. This
organisation ".. during the 1870's successfully, if temporarily,
brought such diverse elements as farmers, labourers and urban
middle class together for purposes of political and economic
(2k)
reform". This organisation was stridently anti-monopolist
and provided an effective framework for the crystallisation of
entrepreneurial values, together with a programme for their defence.
Likewise, the anti-trust league provided an important forum for
independent businessmen.
At various times, then, the Granger and Reform movements of
the 1870's organised the campaign against the railroads and the
(2k) Thorelli, H. (195*0, ££ cit. p. 1*f9.
269
farmers alliance orchestrated anti-monopolism which, by 1890, and
buttressed by various Labour and business groups, was at the forefront
of a national campaign against the trusts. W.S. Morgan notes the
organised opinion of the farmers as follows: "Monopolies exist by
law are chartered by law, and should be controlled by law. A trust
is a conspiracy against legitimate trade .... It is demoralising
in its influence, inconsistent with free institutions and dangerous
to our liberties. To participate in a trust should be a crime
(25)
subject to severe punishment". Likewise, a farmers congress
of the United States in 1889 reiterated its opposition to all
combinations of capital which control the market, whether those
combinations were in the form of trusts or not. Whilst the form
of agrarian organisation was at least maintained by the Greenback
movement, that is until 1888, the organisation of local farm labour
groups successfully articulated more explicit demands for state
action on the trust question. Such action, on the issue of trusts
in general, betokened a much wider alliance with, for example, the
Knights of Labour; an organisation which, during the l880's,
addressed itself to, amongst other objectives, the problem of
'strangling' monopoly. The demands for constitutional action on
the issue of the trusts, initiated rather falteringly and perhaps
unwillingly within agrarian farmers at first, were later furthered
under the auspices of the national Anti-monopoly party formed in
188^ out of an 'amalgamation' of various state equivalents or
predecessors. Together with the Sovereigns of Industry, the Anti¬
trust League and the National Labour unions, these were the diverse
components of anti-monopolism in its first, largely populist, phase.
(25) Scott Morgan, W. (1889) Quoted in Thorelli, H. (195^)
op cit. p. l4*f.
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The campaigns instituted under the banner of anti-monopolism were
not, in the final analysis, unconnected with the Interstate Commerce
Act of 1887 and the Sherman Act of 1890. Although it must be said
that the connection, between popular sentiment and legislative
remedy, is by no means clear cut. Whilst reaching a crescendo in
the 1880's Anti-monopolism did not recede after this apparent victory,
indeed Hofstadter argues that it was at its most intense until
( 26 )191^. Nevertheless, anti-monopolism underwent a subtle change
of form as a result perhaps of its articulation within the provisions
of 'progressivism'.
Quite simply it is not feasible to examine Progressivism in any
great detail, nor is it essential to chart the precise demise of
Populism and the exact germination of the Progressive movement.
Indeed, a precise distinction between Populism and Progressivism is
difficult to achieve. Perhaps the most that can be said, at this
juncture, is that whilst Populism was characterised by a marked
consensus, Progressivism heralded ambivalence on many crucial
issues. Thus, Hofstadter is able to remark that .."the Populists
had tended to be of one mind on most broad social issues, and that
(27)mind was rather narrow and predictable". Whereas the Progressive
movement attempted to realign the benefits and limitations of
corporate size, by means of a distinction between 'responsible'
and 'irresponsible' wealth, the Populist movement was unremitting
in its hostility to big business per se. To be sure, the Progressive
movement attempted to draw the equation between private property and
political freedom ever more tightly, as George Mowry observed,
(26) Hofstadter, R. (1967) ££ cit. p. 193»
(27) Hofstadter, R. (1955) ££ cit. p. 13^-«
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progressivism was opposed to .. "the impersonal, concentrated, and
supposedly privileged property represented by the behemoth
corporation. Looking backward to an older America (they) sought
to recapture and reaffirm the older individualistic values in all
( PPi )
the strata of political, economic and social life". In this
they were at one with the Populists and, as one observer put it,
the Progressives succeeded in enacting one after another of the
Populist demands or, rather less charitably, they stole much of
the Populists underwear and clothed it in more respectable garments.
Although founded on a clear commitment to laisser-faire philosophy,
the Progressive movement underwent a substantial modification
ultimately perhaps aspiring to a form of leadership which Appleman
Williams would describe as 'class conscious'; a form of enlightened
self interest or 'reformism' prepared to hold the ring between
(29)
corporate excesses and Collective Trade unionism. As has
been seen already the Progressive movement was to have a very
important effect upon the unfolding of anti-trust enterprise, with
the most obvious connections being the distinction between good and
bad trusts and, the introduction of the rule of reason and the
concept of abuse. There is, after all, a clear distinction between
Populism, which was vigorously anti-monopoly and of undoubted
importance in generating the 'possibility' of the 1887 Interstate
Commerce Act and the 1890 Sherman Act, and Progressivism, which
sought an operating equation between laissez-faire and industrial
(28) Mowry, G. (1951) 'The California Progressives', Berkeley,
pp. 88/9.
(29) Appleman Williams, W. (1961) 'The Contours of American History',
New York: World Publishing.
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concentration and, needless to say, failed abysmally in terms of its
anti-monopolism, (whatever its more limited successes as a harbinger
of regulation).
We have, so far, seen the substantial organisational basis of
anti-monopolism, but the force of anti-monopoly sentiment presents
us with a perplexing paradox. If Populism was as fervently anti-
monopolist as is claimed, and given the sincerity of congressional
intent in passing the 1887 and 1890 anti-monopoly laws, how then can
we account for the failure of so laudable an attempt? Some have
attempted to explain the underachievement of anti-trust legislation.
Thus, Thorelli observes that, "It has been held that business regarded
the anti-trust bill as completely innocuous or even favoured it as a
means of 'pacifying the general disquietude without doing any serious
damage to business interests".An opinion which resonates at
varying amplitudes within the work of revisionist historians, for
example, Kolko, Weinstein and latterly Pearce. This position has
been criticised in Chapter one and, at this juncture, it need only
be argued, along with Thorelli, that 'business' was not as homogenous
as it appeared and that small business and agrarian representatives
were scarcely invisible in their opposition to monopoly and in their
support of the bill. For example, "The records of legislative
debates furnish abundant proof that the direct and specific aim of
(31)
Congress was to eliminate and prevent restrictions on competition".
Likewise, it is quite clear that in passing the Sherman Act "Congress
meant to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in
(32)
restraining trust and monopoly agreements". Although it must
(30) Thorelli, H. (195^) ££ cit. p. 215.
(31) ibid, p. 571.
(32) See U.S. v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. 322 U.S. 533* 558,
(19H).
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be conceded that the question of intent is not crucial to this
sort of argument. For example, it is perfectly possible to argue
the complete sincerity of congressional intent and to account for
the failure of anti-trust legislation by reference to its subsequent
manipulation by corporate interests. This has been argued by many
commentators. For example, Neale argues a similar point to the
effect that a tradition of dissolving monopolies during the 1911
period of structural remedy was abrogated in favour of the mere
(33)
regulation of business conduct. As some would put it 'disillusion
instead of dissolution' summed up the change in direction. Again
this sort of argument ignores the defects inherent in law, which
were written, or incorporated, into the provisions of anti-trust
legislation. But the question still remains, why did anti-monopolism
adopt a regulatory form so ill suited to its task namely, that of
the legal regulation of monopoly? This is indeed the crux of the
issue, for if anti-monopolism had a strong organisational base,
and ijf congress was at least not uninterested in passing a measure
to control monopoly, then why was the Sherman Act so constrained
in principle, let alone in practice?
The reasons for anti-monopolism using the law as a regulatory
agency are exceedingly complex and could be accounted for by
ascribing an attitude of legalism to the social structure of late
nineteenth century America. Thus the 'law' is seen as an essentially
bourgeois construction, the anti-trust movement is viewed as a
bourgeois organisation and anti-trust legislation is seen as an
eminently suitable remedy. This sort of account may have its
attractions, perhaps chief among them being its apparently all inclusive
(33) Neale, A. (1966) ojo cit.
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character. There are, though, more direct components which can be
assembled into a more persuasive explanation of the legalistic draft
of anti-monopolism. It must be remembered that the opposition to
the corporations was based upon a strongly individualist conception
of ownership and democracy. Accordingly, whilst the corporations
were seen as impersonal assaults on individual liberty and
opportunity they were, nevertheless, reduced to individual terms,
whether as corporate entities or as constellations of personal
characteristics. For example, the so called muckraking magazines
of the progressive era were able ".. not merely to name the
malpractices in American business and politics, but to name the
(34)
malpractitioners and their specific misdeeds". Thus, the
individualistic conception of the corporation in terms of individual
agencies of malpractice made a resort to law appear eminently
practicable. As we have seen, the extension of personal responsibility
to include corporate behaviour was afforded by the general conception
of the corporation as a legal person. Furthermore, if it were
possible for the muckraking magazines to name the actual perpetrators
of particular misdeeds, it was perhaps not unreasonable to accept
that the law would be capable of doing likewise. In this sense,
then, it would seem that the legal conception of the corporation
and the journalistic arsenal interlocked to provide typical
explanations of the roots of the trust problem. It was individual
agents or individual corporations which were responsible for steering
these vast conglomerates of corporate wealth to the brink of total
domination and control of American Society. Accordingly, not only
was the law required to do something, it was seen as being capable
(3^0 Hofstadter, R. (1955) ££ cit. p. 188.
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of doing something.
An example of the individualistic thrust of much expose
journalism can be seen in the history of Standard Oil written by
(35)Ida Tarbell. This history was serialised by McClures magazine,
between 1903 and 190^-, and undoubtedly focussed upon the particular
exploits of John D. Rockefeller and his associates, principally,
Henry Flagler, Samuel Andrews, Stephen Harkness and William
Rockefeller. Thus Rockefeller was singled out as the symbol of
the trust problem. With such powerful individualistic imagery
it is perhaps a small step from exp osure to enforcement. Therefore,
this sort of journalistic foray undoubtedly contributed, in some
sense, to the belief in the efficacy of legal sanction. To the
extent that the sort of muckraking characteristic of the progressive
era marks the culmination of a long process of expose journalism
dating back to the 1870's, it is perhaps not unreasonable to suppose
that it shaped the way that corporations were viewed and, in turn,
paved the way for the acceptance of a legal remedy. This much
perhaps indicates the way in which the form of law accorded with the
way in which the problem was popularly conceived, but it doesn't
tell us why there was a resort to legal remedy.
The idea that the trust problem should be approached by way of
a strict application of the doctrine of personal responsibility has
recently been renovated. For example, it is possible to detect
very similar currents at work in the vigorous campaigns of Ralph
Nader which appear to centre upon the accountability of corporate
personnel. ^^The idea depends upon the enforcement of law
(35) Tarbell, I. (1904) 'The History of the Standard Oil Company',
New York: Macmillan, 2 Vols.
(36) Nader, R. e_t al (eds.) (1976) ojd cit, See also Nader, R. (1973)
ed. 'The Consumer 8c Corporate Accountability' , New York:
Harcourt Bruce Jovanovich Ltd.
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relating to personal responsibility. Whether or not this would
'work' is open to grave doubts, especially in view of the criticisms
detailed in Chapter five. But what is important is that it reveals
the feasibility of such an approach and, therefore, the basic
individualistic structure of anti-trust legislation. Accordingly,
as long as the trust problem is viewed in terms of the perpetration
of individual acts by specific authors, then, it carries the strong
possibility that a legalistic remedy is seen as appropriate.
Undoubtedly such an approach to the problem would have, and indeed
has had, some effect, but whether it succeeds in restructuring
corporate relationships, and thereby alleviating the problem of
monopoly, would have to be examined in the light of the constraints
on law recorded already. In that regard it is possible to state
that any effect would be at best limited.
A similar conception of individual responsibility was broached
by Ross at the turn of the century. In the context of an argument
which suggested that sin had become corporate and impersonal with
the onset of the 'corporate' economy, Ross put forward the idea that
corporate directors should be held personally responsible for every
(37)
preventable corporate abuse. Thus, the solution to the problem
of corporate malpractice was, yet again, viewed in terms of individual
accountability.
A persistent fear within the anti-monopoly movement was that at
some stage a combination of the combinations would emerge to dominate
every facet of American society, including government. This fear
clearly hinged upon corporations getting together in a conspiracy
to defraud the American public of its birthright. The importance
(37) Ross, E. (1907) 'Sin & Society', Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
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of conspiracy for the anti-monopoly movement and anti-trust
legislation has been recorded in some detail. There is, though,
an important connection between the two. If the basic threat was
seen to be conspiracy, then it is not unlikely that the law would
be used as a means of dealing with the problem and, that the concept
of conspiracy would be accorded a central place within any ensuing
legislation. Therefore, there is a congruence between the conception
of the trust problem and the basic structure of law. From there
it is but a short step to arguing that this congruence may explain
the use of law as a regulatory remedy and also the basis of its
relative failure.
If law is seen in some sense or other as a guarantee or
condition of private property then again it is not unreasonable to
suppose that the law would be used to ensure the persistence of
private centres of decision making, based on private property.
To the extent that big business is regarded as eclipsing the
freedoms associated with private property, then, the corollary would
appear to be that the law should defend those freedoms. Hence it
is possible to infer the genesis of anti-trust legislation from
the concept of private ownership. Thus, the prevalence of, what
Hofstadter refers to as, Anglo-Saxon or Yankee 'thinking' is often
held to account for the resort to legislation and legal enforcement
as the appropriate redress for corporate 'wrongs'. For example,
in order for the concepts of personal freedom and guilt to have
any meaning it is necessary to defend the context in which they
operate from the incursion of corporate disregard. Accordingly,
it is possible to argue, not only that law should control monopoly,
but that it can control monopoly both in principle and, if given
enough attention and men of good will, in practice as well.
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These partial accounts of the resort to the law may have much
to commend them. For example, they each demonstrate the clear
co-incidence of legal and popular conceptions of the trust problem.
But what they fail to do is to explain why the law was used. This
is a particular problem given the initial lack of faith in legal
remedies described above. There is, however, one overriding sense
in which the resort to the law can be explained persuasively.
That is to say, short of a radical restructuring of American society
what other option was available but the use of anti-trust legislation?
We have seen already how the link between anti-trust legislation
and democracy was seen to depend upon the preservation of private
centres of decision making within American society. This
'constitutional' link, however, is important for another reason.
For example, the separation of powers, the balancing act whereby
relatively distinct bodies are charged with the responsibility for
reviewing other organs of state, is quite basic to any account of
anti-trust legislation. In this scheme the law is charged with the
responsibility both for controlling and proscribing behaviour and
for reviewing and regulating the conduct of other social orders.
Thus, the law is regarded in terms of a separate agency of review
and regulation. It has been argued that this conception affects
the ability of anti-trust legislation to achieve any significant
alteration of corporate relations. This very same portrait of law,
as a separate agency of revue, also explains why the anti-monopoly
movement was faced with no other option than that of legal regulation.
Within the constitutional separation of powers where else could the
movement look for the regulation of monopoly but the law? Law was
the body responsible for the review and regulation of other social
orders. Moreover, given that the trust problem was popularly
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conceived in terms of the need for greater personal accountability
and predicated upon the dangers of conspiracy, then, the law was
more than likely to be the prime candidate for the regulation of
monopoly. This candidacy was further re-inforced by the anti-
monopoly movements basically conservative commitment to private
property.
Conclusion.
It has been suggested that the anti-monopoly movement had a
strong organisational basis which, for a time, provided a radical
critique of the emerging corporate economy. That this radicalism
was enveloped by an essentially conservative commitment to laisser-
faire economics, entrepreneurial freedom and private property, in no
way detracts from its critical vigour. This commitment did,
however, severely limit the range of solutions which were adoptable
and thence, in the long run, served to vitiate the radical potential
of anti-monopolism. Nevertheless, the existence of a strong
organisational basis for anti-monopolism does not necessarily imply
that such strength was automatically reflected in legislative
activity. In this sense the implied disagreement between those
who insist upon discounting the strength and depth of anti-monopolism
in the run up to the Sherman Act, for example, John Clark, and those
who, like Oswald Knauth, detect a profound uproar and frenzy concerning
( "^8 ^
the trust issue prior to the Sherman Act, is misplaced. Both
perspectives seem to assume that popular sentiment is important;
(38) Clark, J. (1931) 'The Federal Trust Policy*, Baltimore:
John Hopkins Press, and Knauth, 0. (191^0, 'The Policy
of the United States Towards Industrial Monopoly',
New York: Columbia U.P.
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for the former, by its apparent absence or neutralisation by
cynical plutocrats and, for the latter, by an overriding presence
which enables a more or less automatic translation of sentiment
» into legislative effect. They each appear to assume either, that
legislative activity is insulated from popular sentiment, (sentiment
which is in any case grossly exaggerated), through some form of
cynical manipulation by 'conservative' or 'business' interests or
else, that legislative activity reflects public opinion in a wholly
representative fashion. It is argued here that anti-monopolism
cannot be reduced to the status of pressure politics and, therefore,
to an adjunct of legislative outcome, without in some way colouring
anti-monopolism with the all too evident failure of anti-trust
legislation; a failure which has precise rather than plutocratic
determinants. Furthermore, preoccupation with the presence,
absence or extent of popular sentiment inevitably discounts the
organisational basis and principles of anti-monopolism, reducing
them to the preamble of what amounts to the sale of the century.
On the contrary, the anti-monopoly movement had an authentic
organisational basis which, for specific reasons, adopted a
legislative approach, which was genuinely designed to do something
about the trusts but which failed for reasons of its very design




In conclusion I can only re-iterate what has been said already.
The relative failure of anti-trust legislation in the United States
depends upon two major factors. First of all, in attributing the
process of regulation to 'law', that is to say, by framing it as
anti-trust legislation, referencing certain acts as criminal and,
by attaching definite penalties to the violation of the relevant
statutes, law is clearly seen as an independent agency of review
and regulation. Whatever its more general merits, this sort of
(1)
perspective contains two main weaknesses. Not only is there
very little justification for distributing particular sorts of
social relations to distinct and separate orders, but, also, the
very process of separation, which is supposed to guarantee
'independence1, means that law is placed in a position which makes
it very difficult to comprehend the complexity of that which it is
supposed to regulate. Thus, the very existence of anti-trust
legislation means that 'law' is separated out from other sorts of
social processes and cast as an independent review body. This
separation is seen as vital to its proper function. But there
are immense problems involved in analysing 'society' in this way;
problems which are insurmountable when law is then supposed to
regulate the oomplex equation between free enterprise and monopoly.
Secondly, irrespective of the fact that law is placed in the
untenable position of having to regulate the 'corporate' form of
ownership, the way in which 'law' conventionally portrays the
corporation, together with the strategies designed to achieve its
(1) For an interesting defence of the concept of review in
post-revolutionary society see Hirst, P. (1980), 'Law,
Socialism & Rights', in Carlen, P. & Collinson, M. (eds.)
•Radical Issues in Criminology', Oxford: Martin .Robertson.
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regulation, are further indices of the failure of anti-trust
legislation to fulfill its avowed objective. The corporation
cannot be viewed as an extended and distorted analogue of the
concept of private property. Moreover, in treating the corporation
as if it would respond, either collectively or in 'person', in the
way in which individuals are supposed to behave is to court
(2)
disaster. Fines, imprisonment and decrees are, at best,
in appropriate and, at worst, irrelevant mechanisms of regulation.
Although even if the arsenal of available sanctions were improved,
then the way in which the corporation is seen to operate would
place severe constraints on the viability of law as an agency of
regulation.
Of course this does not mean that law has no effects, nor even
that it has unintended effects. Rather any effects which can be
attributed to the existence of anti-trust legislation do not involve
what must be its fundamental tenet namely, the form of ownership.
Since the form of corporate ownership remains intact, albeit in
ways which would be unrecognisable in the declining years of the
last century, then this alone is a compelling indictment of the
fate of anti-trust legislation. But is it fair to judge the
record thus? After all is not anti-trust legislation at least
a minor success? Does it not affect prices, corporate designs
and overbearing conglomerates at least a little? Maybe, but the
essence of anti-trust legislation concerned the way in which the
corporate form of ownership threatened the very basis of American
democracy and entrepreneurial endeavour. As Schwartz has made
(2) As we have seen Stone (1975) ojd cit. makes this point
quite convincingly.
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clear, competition is desirable on principle .. like political
liberty and because political liberty is jeopardised if economic
power drifts into relatively few hands".Similarly, the anti-
monopoly movement depended upon a very clear, and quite general,
indictment of the form of corporate ownership. Accordingly, to
argue that anti-trust legislation is but another lever for the
adjustment of prices or the optimisation of output, is to misrepresent
the nature of anti-trust legislation and to diminish the extent of
its 'failure *.
To be sure, it may be possible to construct a type of legal
regulation which does not depend upon the logic of subjective
rights and the concept of private property, but this sort of
regulation would still be limited by its formal role as an independent
agency of review,, To the extent that the form of regulation is not
separated out thus, it would be necessary to ask in what sense can
we talk of a distinctly legal regulation. For example, the
possibility of viable regulation would seem to depend upon the
very dissolution of the idea of 'law' as an agency of review.
Instead, it has been argued that the only way to alter the relations
of ownership is through a process of re-defining the parameters of
control, title and possession. Needless to say, this is more
difficult than it sounds, but it is only by altering the strategies
of decision making, the forms of calculus and the status of the
relations of title, possession and control that the relations of
ownership can be 'regulated' in any meaningful sense of the word.
This is the painful lesson of nearly a century of anti-trust
legislation.
(3) Louis B. Schwartz in AGNCAT ojd cit. p. 2.
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CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL AND BEYOND: AN ESSAY REVIEW
KELVIN JONES
In an attempt to widen the focus of criminology and to render its
categories more inclusive, attention has increasingly centered on white collar
crime, organized crime, crimes of the powerful and, more recently criminal
organizations, institutions and fractions of capital. This particular strand of
criminology which takes the powerful as its object, ie., the criminology of
the powerful, has increasingly used and come to rely on political economy as
a resource. It is necessary to ask whether the comparative structures of
criminology and political economy are such that they can be combined;
whether the concepts of each are compatible with the other; and whether
the concept of combination is a valid one? These questions are fundamental
to both the criminology of the powerful and to the political economy of
crime and law.
The most recent, and arguably the most developed, exponent of the
"criminology of the powerful" is Frank Pearce who, in Crimes of the
Powerful and "Crime Corporations and the American Social Order" [ 1 ],
presents a fully developed combination of criminology and political
economy. For the most part Pearce is concerned with three major themes.
Firstly, that the American economy has not been based on free enterprise
since the late nineteenth century. As such he is presenting an internal critique
of legitimation ideologies based on the persistence of free enterprise, ie.
based on an "imaginary social order". Secondly he deals with the "crimin¬
ality" of big business in the sense of its direct involvement in "criminal"
acts, eg. Standard Oil in its formative years. Thirdly he examines the ability
of big business to enact legislation in its favour; to skew enforcement
procedures to its advantage; to refocus anti-trust law from monopoly
practices onto unionization, and, finally to encourage the growth of
racketeering within, or in opposition to, the labour unions. In this sense his
work provides an opportunity to examine both the possibility and the
consequences of the combination of criminology and political economy.
Two main questions must be borne in mind with regard to such an
University ofEdinburgh, Scotland.
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enterprise. One, how must criminology be constituted in order that it can
address the "powerful" and with what consequences for criminology in
general and two, has Crimes of the Powerful reformulated criminology so
that it can achieve its objective? These two general questions locate Pearce's
work in relation to the "criminology of the powerful". More specifically
Pearce's work will be situated in relation to two criteria:
1. Its internal consistency or accuracy both theoretically and empirically, ie.
historically.
2. Its overarching theoretical adequacy or validity [2].
These twin criteria, it will be argued, provide the grounds for a continuous
critique of the Crimes of the Powerful through an examination of its
handling of the specific areas of capital, the state history and empirical
evidence. They also serve to demonstrate the exact range of inconsistencies
and problems generated by the conjunction of two areas — political
economy and crime. The critique is extended by the attempt both to offer a
concrete alternative account of anti-trust legislation together with a basis
for the proper conceptualization of crime and law within political economy.
Crimes of the Powerful is committed to an instrumentalist conception of
the state with all the consequences for theoretical and political practice
entailed in that position. It will be argued that Crimes of the Powerful is
internally inconsistent in its application of this problematic — both in the
sense that it embraces an element of state autonomy and, in relation to the
highly selected realm of empirical material. Moreover the two series of
problems — internal inconsistency (both conceptual and empirical) and the
theoretical failings of the instrumentalist/idealist couple itself — stem
directly from the contradictory relationship established between political
economy and criminology.
Throughout Crimes of the Powerful there exists the presence of "big
business", a presence that somehow functions as the ultimate, if not the
proximate, explanation of events. For instance, big business was in "control"
of the major political parties, the federal legislature, the federal agencies,
etc.. Implicit in this is the idea that the state apparatus was in some way
controlled by big business. In this formulation, Pearce reifies the state as
something to be captured, as a powerful instrument to be used by big
business. It follows that the state is quite clearly established as "thing"
rather than as "autonomous subject". This commitment to one side of the
couple — state as thing/state as subject - is at the heart of the problem.
Pearce's resolution of it in favour of an instrumentalist conception of the
state cannot even do justice to the complexity of the "empirical"
evidence that he uses, nor is it a consistent resolution. Further, as Poulantzas
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demonstrates, it is the instrumentalist/idealist couple itself, ie. independent of
any commitment to one side or the other, that entails a conception of the
state as an entity possessing its own power. The hegemonic fraction of
capital is then free to either absorb the state's power through fusion with it,
or be resisted by the state's power involving the independence of, or
arbitration by, the state [3]. That Pearce advocates the fusion thesis is only
central to the question of consistency and application, it is not central to the
question of adequacy. What is central to the determination of theoretical
adequacy is the overall location of Crimes of the Powerful within the idea¬
list/instrumentalist couple itself, a couple which generates the conception of
the state as guardian of its own power. Instead, for Poulantzas, "The state
does not have its own 'power', but it forms the contradictory locus of
condensation for the balance of forces that divides even the dominant class
itself, and particularly its hegemonic fraction — monopoly capital [4].
The thesis of state power is far from settled for political economy and the
fact that Pearce treats it as if it were is of crucial importance to the
conditions under which criminology and political economy can or cannot be
conjoined. Moreover, Crimes of the Powerful is inconsistent in its formula¬
tion of a theoretical position, inconsistent in the application of that position
to a series of data, and is unaware of the problems generated by the
formulation of the position in that way. These systematic silences and
anomalies, it is argued, betray the contradictory relationship between
political economy and criminology.
Attendant on the failure to adequately derive a concept of the state is the
lack of any explicit division within capital itself. Capital is simply left as an
unfractured whole and its conditions of existence conceived as a unity. For,
Crimes of the Powerful there is only big business; the rest is reduced to
nothing. As will be seen there is, in Crimes of the Powerful an implicit
demonstration of the empirical consequences of different fractions of
capital, of a clash of political interests relating to diverse conditions of
existence. Nevertheless, these remain outside the theoretical display since
they are not part of Pearce's central concern namely — the demonstration of
the total dominance of big business. There is a contradiction between the
concept of capital used and the range of empirical evidence which implies a
different concept of capital. The theoretical analysis is at variance with the
empirical display, ie. two series of inconsistencies intersect.
Continuous with the problem of the state and the unitary concept of
capital is the ahistorical approach of Crimes of the Powerful. There is little
attempt made to confront the differential relationship between the condi¬
tions of existence of various capital fractions and the forms in which they
are secured through time, ie., the differential "mobilization" of state and
federal levels in relation to the historical displacement of the conditions of
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existence of non-monopoly capital by those of monopoly capital. This
particular silence leads Pearce to adopt an ahistorical subsumption of all
interests to big business at all periods under consideration thereby ignoring
the dynamic development of the monopoly capital form. Furthermore, as
Pearce is committed to an instrumentalist view of the state and its relation¬
ship with big business this presupposes a prior separation of the two. This
separation, whilst necessary for Pearce, is nowhere demonstrated in the
analysis. The omission is two tiered for there is also no indication of any
prior instrumental relationship between the state and, for example, entrepre¬
neurial capital; big business is simply projected backwards in time as if it had
always controlled the state. The analysis of the historical derivation of the
state is inadequate and inconsistent in relation to the theoretical concept of
state power.
The range and treatment of sources by Crimes of the Powerful suggests
two things: One, the inadequacy of the concept of merger and two, that the
empirical evidence is at variance with the argument. For instance, when he
states that mergers were largely completed by the beginning of the twentieth
century Pearce ignores two factors:
1.The "empirical" fact that there were three merger booms;1898—1902;
1925-1929; 1955-1969, corresponding to three definite moments
within the formation of monopoly capital. Namely: a) The phase of
relative transition from relations of production characterized predomin¬
antly by non-monopoly capital to relations of production characterized
by the pre-eminence of monopoly capital; b) The phase of consolidation;
of the conditions of existence of monopoly capital; c) The phase repre¬
senting the partial re-integration of economic ownership and possession
signalling a new conjuncture of increased political conflict [5]. In short
mergers were not "completed" by the beginning of the twentieth century
and, more importantly, mergers occurred after they had supposedly
finished. Mergers which had a very precise theoretical significance, ie.
they were far from small scale and negligible as Pearce seems to suggest.
2. The crucial distinction between economic ownership — the ability to
assign the means of production and to allocate resources and profits to
this or that use — and economic possession — the direction and relative
control of a certain Labour process - is lost to Pearce. In effect the
distinction indicates that possession is not a necessary pre-condition for
control, for example subcontracting, oligopoly, minority shareholder
control and price leadership all represent effective forms of economic
control of the market. So that to argue the completion of mergers is to
say very little. Not only is this very dissociation of economic ownership
from economic possession a consequence of the relative transition from
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competitive to monopoly capitalism, ie. it denotes a particular phase of
monopoly capitals formation, but it also means that the process of
concentration and centralization of capital are effected under forms that
are often hidden by legal ownership [6]. To place such store by the concept
of merger in the light of the above considerations is to reveal a theoretical
deficiency associated with a poorly specified empirical content — in that
"mergers" were not completed anyway. Where he does raise the problem
of other means of control he does so in terms of the subordination of all
else to big business. The process fulfills a different function within
Pearce's theoretical framework since it serves to establish the absolute
domination of big business rather than its conditions of existence and
mode of operation in the market. Although monopoly capital did, in
effect, "control" large sections of industrial production and distribution
though merger and economic possession there were still significant sectors
that were not "controlled" by monopoly capital.
Anti-Trust Legislation
So far the problems which the state, capital, history and empirical
material raise for a criminology of the powerful have been discussed
separately. It is now necessary to consider to what extent they intersect in
relation to anti-trust legislation. In the process one can trace the existence
of continuities with other revisionists, continuities that are not accidental
but rather reveal the same fundamental problem — namely the conflation of
causes and effect.
In any analysis of anti-trust legislation it is necessary to draw a distinction
between the anti-trust movement and the effectiveness of anti-trust
enterprise. Pearce concentrates on the function and effect of anti-trust
legislation and thereby ignores or reduces the anti-trust movement. Two
statements serve as an occasion for analysis: 1) that "The attitude of the
large corporations to the anti-trust laws developed from hostility in the late
nineteenth century to an active involvement in their administration by
1914" [7] and 2) that "The corporations became aware of their precarious
position in relation to the federal government and at the same time were
recognizing their vulnerability to prosecution by socialist state legislatures"
[8] and consequently they agitated for a "transfer of these powers to the
federal level where they would be able to effectively control the implemen¬
tation of Federal regulation of their activity" [9]. Several points of interest
arise "internally" from these statements.
Firstly, the large corporations "hostility" to anti-trust legislrtion implies a
certain degree of effectiveness in such legislation, an element of "threat" to
the corporations. There existed, therefore, a period in time when anti-trust
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legislation or enterprise was not enacted by, nor under the control of, big
business and, as a result, was in a position to challenge its conditions of
existence. Anti-trust legislation and, more especially the anti-trust move¬
ment cannot, therefore, be reduced to its control by big business since its
prior independence is at least implied if not argued by Pearce. Yet Pearce
explicitly argues the opposite namely, anti-trust is reducible to its function¬
ality for big business.
Secondly, vulnerability to prosecution by state legislatures indicates the
existence of significant interests opposed to the mergers and, in addition,
suggests that since enforcement of anti-trust legislation could be con¬
trolled more effectively at federal than at state level, the federal/state split
is an index of the division within the "power" bloc and an admission of the
effectivity of political conflict.
Thirdly, the overall emphasis which Pearce places on the appropriation or
control of anti-trust by big business explains away any possibility of anti¬
trust legislation being the product of political class struggle. The importance
of class struggle is simply ignored in favour of the overwhelming, all perva¬
sive, dominance of big business. Origins are collapsed into ends.
From these critical comments and elements of inconsistency alone it is
possible to construct the existence, at the political level, of an "anti-
monopoly alliance" comprising socialist, populist and entrepreneurial frac¬
tions that formed the anti-trust movement. As Hofstadter notes "often a
common hostility to big business was the one link that bound together a
variety of interest groups that diverged on other issues" [ 10] . This political
alliance, once established, could be said to function, at least for a time, in
opposition to the conditions of existence of monopoly capital, an opposition
that was located in many significant respects in the federal/state split [11].
There are several points at which Pearce's formulation implies or allows
alternative interpretations. Alternatives which derive as much from internal
theoretical inconsistencies as from the particular choice of evidence. For
example, in opposition to the earlier "fusion" thesis — regarding the relation¬
ship of the state to big business — Pearce erects the conception of the
"states" short term autonomy vis-^-vis a section of the ruling class in the
interests of the whole ruling class. As was demonstrated at the outset this is
merely a change in terms since the couple which allows the state to be
conceived in terms of having its own power is retained, ie. it is common to
both the fusion and arbitration variants. "Big business" was, therefore,
simply "restrained" in order that the system of hegemony vis-a-vis the
dominated classes was not challenged. But by whom or by which class or
combination of classes or fractions and indeed by what process? Pearce
cannot answer this because his conception does not contain any extended
analysis of the power bloc he has in mind.
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There are, then five components to Pearce's analysis of anti-trust:
1. Mergers were effectively complete and, therefore, anti-trust was ineffec¬
tive.
2. Mergers made a dramatic impact and there was a consequent need to
assuage radical socialist and populist demands — demands that are not
theorized at the political level but are merely referenced by Pearce.
3. The appropriation, co-optation or emasculation of anti-trust legislation by
big business.
4. Mergers involved only one section, presumably big business, of the ruling
class and the whole ruling class made its presence felt in opposition to big
business in the general interest of long term survival.
5. The active involvement of big business in the advocacy of anti-trust
legislation with the result that anti-trust becomes a front behind which the
market is ordered and structured in the interests of big business.
These five components are positions made explicit at various points in
Crimes of the Powerful. They represent the more or less ad hoc importation
of an eclectic series of explanations or accounts borrowed in the main from
revisionist history [12]. In themselves these accounts are not necessarily
contradictory and thus Pearce is able to maintain their mutual articulation
without too much trouble. What is important is that these various compo¬
nents, taken together with the positions which are either implicit or logically
entailed in Pearce's work, reveal the fundamental absence of any critical
comment on the concepts and theoretical systems introduced willy nilly into
the area. The absence of a theoretical instance derived in the first place from
political economy introduces the range of inconsistencies and contradictions
that cloud a "criminology of the powerful". That such inconsistencies are
registered at an overtly concrete level is evidenced by the apparent need to
buttress Crimes of the Powerful with an electic reading of Revisionist
history. The inadequacy of the concepts results in a retreat into history
which, far from producing a solution, simply re-inforces the inconsistencies
already there.
The historical sources for Crimes of the Powerful are supplied by
revisionism in general and the work of Kolko in particular. Accordingly
anti-trust legislation is seen as part of a conscious strategy advocated by big
business and engineered by a powerful elite with a view to the rational
stabilization of an increasingly competitive market. As a result big business
controlled itself through the agency of a unified elite rather than being
controlled by anti-trust enterprise. This formulation offers a voluntaristic,
conspirational conception of big business in terms of a series of interlocking
elites with the result that a reified political strategy on one side is arbitrarily
324
"coupled" with an abstract economic "need" or "necessity" on the other.
Furthermore, the perception of an "increasingly competitive market", which
supposedly contains within itself the "need" to be rationally organized, is
based upon a series of misconceptions; of the conditions of existence of
monopoly capital; of its "eventual" compatibility with "elements" of
competition and; of the increasing "anarchy" of monopoly capital produc¬
tion (Lenin).
Thus we now arrive at the more general theoretical implication of Crimes
of the Powerful in that anti-trust legislation is now seen as a product of the
whole ruling class in the interest of the long term survival of the capitalist
system as a whole. This position assumes an internal discipline within the
power bloc itself together with the historical subservience of big business to
the general capitalist interest. It is characteristic of this position that it can
take one of two general forms involving either the relative autonomy of state
power in relation to its function of organizing factor of, or for, the "ruling
class" or, the pre-given internal consensus of the ruling class and its simple
translation into state power through fusion with it. As a result anti-trust can
be viewed as an anticipation of harsher measures, as a reaction to the reform
movement or, finally, as the self-organizing principle of the capitalist
system.
It is inherent in the method of Crimes of the Powerful that the incon¬
sistencies generated within the concept of "state power"; ie. the failure to
produce a consistent resolution of the concept in terms of either instrumen-
talism, idealism or even relative autonomy; leads Pearce to attempt to bury
those inconsistencies in the apparent anarchy of empirical history. The
decision to engage revisionist history in the form of Kolko leads inexorably
to the demonstration of the relative autonomy of the capitalist class as a
whole vis-a-vis big business in particular. This relative autonomy occurs
within and on the basis of the more general fusion of the capitalist class and
state power. This formulation is upheld notwithstanding the persistent
reduction of state power to big business alone. Whilst being consistent in the
adherence to "state power" as a concept the internal variations within that
concept develop severe contradictions which are only compounded by the
retreat into historical empiricism.
The preceding analysis has shown that Crimes of the Powerful is incap¬
able of handling the concepts of big business, power and the state. That
Pearce is aware of the problems is clear:
Thus the ultimate implication of this mode of analysis is the dissolution of criminology as a
separate discipline [13].
Thus in analysing 'crimes of corporations' we are ultimately led to ask fundamental questions
about the nature of America and the worlds 'free enterprise system' [ 14].
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That neither the conditions nor the consequences of the dissolution of
criminology are specified and that Crimes of the Powerful fails to ask
fundamental questions of the "free enterprise system", let alone provide a
framework for an answer, is a function of the incompatibility of criminology
and political economy. Moreover, by implying the end of criminology the
question of the proper formulation of the "powerful" is redundant, whilst
the conditions under which crime and law can become central to Marxism
are assumed to be covered by an eclectic combination of concepts. Crimes of
the Powerful is, therefore, left in a theoretical vacuum since it belongs
neither to criminology nor to political economy. If a "criminology of the
powerful" were at all adequate to its object then quite simply it would cease
to be "criminology".
The problems of Crimes of the Powerful are conceptual and logical. They
can, in the end, be reduced to two, one the imperfect and ad hoc translation
of political economy's concepts into criminology and two, the failure to
address the fundamental debates within political economy concerning the
nature of the state, capital and the interrelation, or even separate existence
of the political and economic levels. This last carries the assumption that
such debates either do not exist or, can effectively be ignored for the
purposes of a "Marxist" position on criminology. The position argued here is
that not only can those debates not be ignored but further such ignorance
obscures the conditions under which crime and law can become central to
political economy — namely by theorizing law and crime in terms of their
centrality or otherwise to the reproduction of the conditions of existence of
determinate relations of production.
Towards a Political Economy of Crime and Law
It is now necessary to demonstrate the theoretical underpining which
makes the preceding critique possible. In short it is necessary to establish
the theoretical position from which a critique can be mounted in the precise
manner in which it has, together with the basis on which an analysis of
corporate crime and law can be formulated within political economy rather
than criminology.
The fundamental theoretical position taken here is that anti-trust legisla¬
tion can be theorized on the basis of the historical dislocation between the
conditions of existence of monopoly capital, on the one hand, and the
conditions of existence of non-monopoly capital on the other. It follows
that there is no necessary connection between the special "requirements" of
monopoly capital and the form of their political securement. The two are
conceptually distinct. It is thus not a question of reading off the interests of
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monopoly capital at the political level, nor of seeing an automatic transla¬
tion of economic interests into legislative enactments. Put simply on one side
there are two definite sets of relations of production referring to the mode
of appropriation and distribution of surplus labour involved in the monopoly
and non-monopoly capital forms respectively and, on the other, there are
the conditions of existence of the respective capital forms [15]. The secure-
ment of those conditions of existence is a matter of political and, more
especially, class struggle and cannot be reduced to the automatic translation
of the interests of big business into the existence of an anti-trust enterprise
functioning as a rationalization program determined by and for big
business — however that connection be mediated in Revisionist history. In
concrete terms this results in the following analysis of anti-trust.
The inherent capacity of absolute free competition to generate monopoly
through, in particular, the role of credit expansion and the joint stock
enterprise leads to a number of consequences for the legal structure of
property. They are: 1) the separation of beneficial ownership from control
and 2) the separation of control from management. These separations are
expressed through the double disjunction between, on the one hand,
economic ownership and economic possession and, on the other, the capital
function and the mere title to a portion of surplus value. Such changes have
been theorized in a number of ways:
1. As the change in function of the legal form of property leaving that
"form" intact and merely registering the separation of the capital function
from the title to property as a change in the substratum — but still cast
within the same legal form of property, eg. Karl Renner [ 16].
2. As the . . abolition of capital as private property within the framework
of capitalist production itself ..." [17] and the ". . . emergence as a sub¬
ject of the object of property itself, ie., the complete emancipation of
property from man himself. . ."[18]. In short the dissolution of private
property within the capitalist mode of production itself with the result
that the appropriation of surplus labour is part "social" or, at least not
exclusively private.
3. "A juridically distinct form of private property no longer reflects the true
state of things for the reason that — with the aid of methods of participa¬
tion and control — the factual domination extends far beyond the purely
juridic framework" [19], In other words the dislocation between real
economic domination and the juridic framework with the result that legal
subjectivity becomes merely a "technical definition", a mere convenience,
or a "speculative hypothesis" with no real basis.
What is of interest here is the real dissolution of private property as
such — however that dissolution be registered in law. The consequences of
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this dissolution for an adequate understanding of anti-trust legislation
cannot be overstated since it is the dissolution of private appropriation
within one capitalist centre - based on the co-incidence of the capital
function and the title to surplus value — which directly undermines the
conditions of existence of non-monopoly capital. This dissolution takes the
form of the three fold division of property into:
Title — stockholders for example, simply receive a title to a certain proportion of non-labour income
as compensation for their loss of effective control, for their loss of the capital function in
production and for their loss of independent ownership. Owners of capital are transformed into
mere owners, mere money - capitalists. The ". . . total profit is henceforth received only in the
form of interest, ie., as mere compensation for owning capital that now is entirely divorced
from the function in the actual process of reproduction" [20]. The "beneficial ownership" of
assets and profits is consequently separated entirely from control. This does not represent a
socialization of the capital function but merely a partial socialization of beneficial ownership
through its wider distribution.
Possession - the direction and relative control of a certain labour process (Poulantzas) or the technical
capital function, ie. economic possession. In other words the "Transformation of the actually
functioning capitalist into a mere manager, administrator of other peoples capital" [21 ] .
Economic ownership or control - the ability to assign the means of production and to allocate
resources and profits to this or that use. This is the function of general economic direction
[22],
Just as these developments relate to the ownership/possession of the means
of production so too with the form in which direct producers are separated
from the means of production, ie., their double separation from the "posses¬
sion" of the means of production and their separation from the (economic)
ownership of the means of production. In short this twin separation of
producers from the means of production and of the various functions of
property from each other indicates the emergence of social property and
social capital — the capital of directly associated producers (Marx) — and the
. .appropriation of social property by a few [23], In other words the
development, in a new form, of the antithesis between private and social
wealth and the restriction of social capital within the monopoly capital
form, ie. through its appropriation. It is "private production without the
control of private property" [24].
Without this development of its conditions of existence, especially the
role of credit, monopoly capital would not exist in the fact of its reproduc¬
tion, it would not exist in the monopoly capital form. The dissolution of the
property form and the development of social capital are essential conditions
for the extended reproduction of monopoly capital.
There are, then, two questions that effectively locate anti-trust legislation
in relation to the dissolution of private property within the capitalist mode
of production they are:
1. What degree of compatibility, or difference, is there between the condi-
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tions of existence of monopoly and non-monopoly capital respectively
and what consequences do each entail for the other?
2. In what form are those conditions secured and with what result?
As for monopoly capital there is, at first, no restraint on its existence
within a free enterprise economy since monopoly is inherent in any
extended free competition. The problem, for the conditions of existence of
monopoly capital, is precisely located in the relation between monopoly
and non-monopoly capital. The conditions of existence of non-monopoly
capital are threatened in two ways. One "physically" — in that small capitals
are peacefully, or not so peacefully, expropriated by big capitals
(Luxemburg) — and two, in that the dissolution of "private" property entails
considerable threat to the extended reproduction of the non-monopoly
capital form. It is almost as if the conditions of existence, in their traditional
form, vanish. The way then becomes clear for a political analysis of anti-trust
in terms of its role in the re-affirmation of the conditions of existence of
non-monopoly capital. The anti-trust movement is, therefore, based on a
political alliance founded on the centrality of private property for the
preservation of the democratic forms associated with the hitherto free-
enterprise economy. The process is genuinely political and cannot be
reduced to the presence on the political stage of non-monopoly capital in
person. The process is subject to the particular historical conjuncture in
which those politics are played out and is in no way guaranteed but is
instead subject to considerable contradictions, eg. the need to organize to
remain unorganized, the need for federal regulation as against the traditional
diffuse and ill-defined government; the split between the rule of reason and
strict enforcement and the "real" object of ani-trust legislation — collusion
or capital centralization.
To some extent anti-trust legislation was framed with the reality of
monopoly capital's conditions of existence in mind It was not merely a front
or a cardboard gesture and, as such, affected the rhythm and profile of
monopoly capital's extended reproduction but not its central dynamic. The
final assessment of anti-trust effectiveness must rest with the conditions in
which monopoly and non-monopoly captial's respective conditions of
existence were rendered compatible, ie. by the preservation of non-
monopoly capital in terms of its functionality for monopoly capital. Non-
monopoly capital does not vanish but instead continually reproduces itself in
relation to monopoly capital [25]. The form in which those conditions of
existence are secured is then subject to further political process.
This conception avoids a whole series of problems bound up with
economic determinism, relative autonomy and idealism. It does this by
abolishing the notion of the necessary translation of economic or structural
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requirements into their se//-securement. It introduces the concept of class
struggle, avoids the post-hoc reduction of causes to functions and refrains
from writing history in the future anterior.
Conclusion
I have argued that the problems with Crimes of the Powerful are instances
of the inherent limitation of a "criminology of the powerful" and thus are
not specific to a particular text, but refer centrally to a particular enterprise.
These problems result from the contradictions entailed in the conjunction of
criminology and political economy and the formal use of concepts derived
from the latter as an explanation of, or gloss on, problems generated by the
former. The formal introduction of the concepts of political economy does
not, of itself, entail a break with the criminological agenda and, as a result,
the analysis produced is inadequate to its object — the powerful. It is the
position of this article that if one is to theorize upon either corporate crime
or anti-trust law then political economy must assume priority — or else one
simply establishes, as does Pearce, the "criminality" of big business. It is not
the case that crime and law are irrelevant areas for political economy and,
more especially Marxism, but rather that a proper understanding of the
theoretical requirements necessary for an adequate analysis of corporate
crime and anti-trust law must, of necessity, be founded in political economy,
not criminology. Hitherto these requirements have not been met by crimino¬
logy. This can be witnessed by the way in which criminology has addressed
political economy, ie. in a purely arbitrary fashion in which concepts are
simply adopted as if they were given — concepts which are effectively
riddled with contradictions. Until these theoretical requirements are met, or
built upon, then criminology is doomed to receive into itself a simple
multiplication of texts like Crimes of the Powerful together with all the
consequent inadequacies associated with such texts. In such a context the
"powerful" remains an ever elusive object
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